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ECONOMIC AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTS 
By Angela Moore 
This  research  compares  in-house  and  third  party  recovery  processes, 
including Loss Given Default (LGD) models for in-house and third party and 
looks  at  advanced  LGD  models  required  for  the  Basel  II  Capital  Accord, 
including  LGD  models  using  payment  patterns,  economic  variables  and 
individual characteristics.  
  The  in-house  LGD  models  include  using  economic  variables  as  well  as 
individual  characteristics.  The  Basel  regulations  require  lenders  to  use 
economic  conditions  as  part  of  the  model.  The  data  set  for  the  in-house 
PRGHOOLQJFRYHUVWKHUHFHVVLRQGXULQJWKH¶VDQGUHFRYHU\WKLVPDNHVLW
ideal for including economic variables.  
  Once a debtor defaults on a loan the majority will try to pay back what they 
can in instalments. These debtors often stop paying again and again, causing 
the collector to renegotiate the instalments. These sequences of instalment 
patterns are referred to as payment patterns in this thesis, where the patterns 
being the stop-start payments, which can potentially go on for years.   
  Using  individual  and  economic  characteristics  in  a  regression  analysis  to 
estimate the size of each payment using and the length and number of the 
payment patterns. These payment patterns can be used to predict LGD. This 
approach is completely new and novel but has great potential. This approach 
is far more flexible than other models because it can be used to not only 
calculate the final LGD but also the LGD at any given time. This approach can   iv 
be used to help lenders not only estimate the final LGD but also assess the 
HIIHFWVRIFROOHFWLRQV¶SROLF\GLIIHUHQWZULWHRIISROLFLHVDQGVHOOLQJSULFHV 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Consumer credit in the UK is on the rise. This thesis looks at consumer debt 
recovery models, for defaulted debt. This chapter discusses the problem of 
Loss  Given  Default  (LGD)  and  how  this  research  models  recovery  rate  to 
predict LGD. 
In 2002, the outstanding consumer credit for the UK was over £150 trillion 
(American trillion), a threefold increase since 1992 [25]. By 2009 it was over 
£200 trillion [29]. The Bank of England in 2010 reported that loss given default 
rates have been increasing over the past three years [58] and the reported 
change was increasing for almost all quarters. Default rates were also on the 
rise during the same time period. 
Given that the UK debt industry is so large and that defaults are increasing it 
is astounding how little research has been done into the Loss Given Default 
(LGD).  LGD  is  the  loss  incurred  by  a  financial  institution  when  a  debtor 
defaults on a loan, given as the fraction of Exposure At Default (EAD). LGD 
usually  has  a  value between  0 and 1  where  0 means  the balance  is fully 
recovered  and  1  means  total  loss.  LGD  needs  to  be  estimated  accurately 
because it is used to calculate the expected financial loss of a loan, which is 
required under the advent of the Basel regulations  [7]. LGD can also help 
determine the appropriate collection policy to maximise their potential revenue 
from defaulted debtors. This revenue could come from either the collections 
department after default or from the sale of debt to a third party. For example, 
if the LGD is estimated to be close to 1 it may be more profitable to sell off the 
debt  quickly  to  a  third  party  thereby  eliminating  the  collection  costs  and 
allowing  the  collections  department  to  concentrate  on  the  more  profitable 
defaults with expected LGDs closer to 0.  
What  LGD  modelling  had  been  done  was  mainly  in  the  corporate  lending 
market where LGD was needed as part of the more sophisticated bond pricing 
formulae. In the consumer debt market, modelling LGD is not something that 
had  really  been  addressed  until  the  advent  of  the  Basel  regulations.  The 
Basel II Capital Accord [7] allows banks the opportunity to estimate LGD using 
their own models with the advanced Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach.   2 
Since 2006 there have been some papers modelling consumer LGD, however 
this research is still in its infancy and the problems with estimating LGD are 
vast.  To  put  the  problem  into  perspective,  there  is  not  even  a  common 
definition of default, some use six months, others only three months, of money 
overdue. There is also no set time period over which LGD is calculated. The 
UK law states that a loan cannot be collected if there have been no payments 
or written acknowledgement for over six years [40]. However as some of the 
data in this thesis shows debtors can pay on and off for years, meaning that 
the  lifetime  of  the  loan  can  stretch  for  decades.  This  adds  a  difficult 
complication  onto  the  models,  as  the  loan  could  have  an  immensely  long 
lifetime  after  default.  Another  complication  is  the  recovery  process  itself, 
which is entirely determined by the lender. The lender can choose when, and 
if, to sell off the debt, farm out the debt to a collections agency to collect the 
debt for them or collect in-house. So far none of the consumer LGD research 
has focused on the drivers of recovery in the collections process, particularly 
for  collections  by  debt  recovery  agents,  where  there  have  usually  been 
VHYHUDOSUHYLRXVDWWHPSWVWRUHFRYHUWKHFRQVXPHU¶VGHEW 
This research  is original because  (1) it  compares  in-house  and  third  party 
recovery processes, (2) compares the actual LGD for in-house and third party 
and  models  for  predicting  the  LGD,  (3)  looks  at  advanced  LGD  models 
required for the Basel II Capital Accord  [7], (4) creates LGD models using 
payment patterns not just individual characteristics.  
Chapter 3 discusses the differences between debt that is collected in-house 
and debt that is collected by a third party. The two collections mediums have 
a  variety  of  differences,  including;  debt  age,  information  available  and 
FROOHFWLRQSURFHVVHV7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHµHDVLHU¶GHEWLVFROOHFWHGILUVWE\WKH
in-house collectors. So only the debt which has proven difficult to collect, is 
passed on to the third party. Also included is a comparison of debt collection 
models for predicting LGD for in-house and agency collections over a similar 
time period. 
Chapter 4 is focused on improving the third party collection predictions. The 
models used in chapter 3 were designed to compare third party LGD models 
with in-house models. Therefore these predictions were improved by a more   3 
detailed analysis by splitting the debtors into groups based on debt amounts 
and  then  modelled  using  regression.  Again  these  results  although  not 
impressive are competitive with industry results. 
Chapter  5  discusses  the  in-house  LGD  models  and  improves  them  by 
including economic variables. The Basel regulations require lenders to use 
economic conditions as part of the model. For most LGD models this causes 
problems since until the credit crunch the UK had been enjoying a relatively 
uneventful economic situation for the last fifteen years. This means that most 
of the data being modelled was collected during that period. The data set for 
the in-house modelling KRZHYHUFRPHVIURPWKHUHFHVVLRQGXULQJWKH¶V
and  the  relatively  uneventful  period  after.  This  makes  it  ideal for  including 
economic variables. The improvements to LGD models by including economic 
variables are demonstrated here. 
All of the models discussed are based on calculating the final LGD or the LGD 
after a predetermined time period. This is similar to other new models being 
developed. However chapter 6 discusses the advantages of a revolutionary 
LGD  modelling  approach.  Once  a  debtor  defaults  on  a  loan  they  do  not 
behave the same way as a non-defaulted debtor. Some pay back all of their 
debt in one go, others never pay back anything but the majority pay back what 
they can with instalments. These instalments are discussed with the collector, 
and oIWHQWKHOHQGHUGHVFULEHVWKHVHGHEWRUVDVEHLQJ³FXUHG´+RZHYHUWKHVH
³FXUHG´ GHEWRUV GR QRW VWD\ ³FXUHG´ WKH\ VWRS SD\LQJ DJDLQ DQG DJDLQ
causing the collector to renegotiate the instalments time and again. These 
sequences of instalment patterns are referred to as payment patterns in this 
thesis,  where  the  patterns  being  the  stop-start  payments,  which  can 
potentially go on for years.   
Chapter 6 uses these payment patterns to predict LGD by using regression to 
estimate  the  size  of  each  payment  using  individual  and  economic 
characteristics  and  the  length  and  number  of  the  payment  patterns.  This 
approach is completely new and novel but has great potential. This approach 
is far more flexible than other models because it can be used to not only 
calculate the final LGD but also the LGD at any given time. This approach can   4 
be used to help lenders not only estimate the final LGD but also assess the 
DIIHFWVRIFROOHFWLRQV¶SROLF\GLIIHUHQWZULWHRIISROLFLHVVHOOLQJSULFHVHWF 
The  model  discussed  in  chapter  6  only  uses  the  individual  and  economic 
characteristics to calculate the size of each payment. This could be enhanced 
in  future  work  by  using  the  individual  and  economic  characteristics  to 
calculate  the  length  and  number  of  the  payment  patterns.  The  economic 
variables could also be improved to include not only the variables at default 
but also future predicted variables during the lifetime of the loan after default.   5 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter first discusses the limited literature on LGD for both corporate 
and consumer lending. Then there is a discussion on the practical ways in 
which  debt  is  recovered.  Although  the  debt  recovery  techniques  are  not 
strictly part of a literature review, it is still useful to record the different actions 
available  to  the  lender  during  the  recovery  process.  Finally  this  chapter 
reviews the literature on the different techniques available for building LGD 
models. 
The Diners Club issued the first credit cards in 1950, which were used to pay 
for food in restaurants anywhere that the Diners Club Card was accepted. 
Technically  this  was  a  charge  card  not  a  credit  card  because  the  entire 
balance had to be paid when the user was billed. American Express issued 
the first real credit card in 1958 followed by BankAmericard (now Visa) later 
that year. [20] The first credit card to be issued in the UK was the Barclaycard 
owned by Barclays Bank in 1966. [57] Over the last ten years, there has been 
a  rapid  rise  in  the  popularity  of  plastic  cards.  The  credit  card  industry  is 
booming. In July 2004, the UK broke through the symbolic £1 trillion barrier of 
outstanding debt for the first time. [11] By 2006 nearly a third of all consumer 
spending was on plastic cards. [10] In June 2007 there were 66 million cards 
in the UK making 157.3 million transactions that month with a value of £12.3 
billion. [20] During the first quarter of 2010, UK banks and building societies 
wrote off £2.13bn of which £1.25bn was credit card debt. [50] 
Unfortunately with increased credit card use, many consumers fail to pay back 
the  debt.    There  are  many  factors  contributing  to  customer  delinquency. 
These include poor financial management skills, the economy and ease of 
access to loans and credit cards. When a debtor becomes delinquent for 180 
days (FSA definition) then the loan is considered to be in default.  
There is no standard definition of default. For the New Basel Accord, a default 
is considered to have occurred when either or both of the following criteria 
have been met: [8]   6 
x  The  lender  considers  the  debtor  to  be  unable  to  repay  their  credit 
obligations in full 
x  The debtor is more than 90 days in arrears on any credit obligation to 
the lender 
When this happens most lenders will try to collect the debt in-house. However 
VRPHFRPSDQLHVXVHRXWVLGHDJHQWVRUZLOOMXVWVHOORIIWKHGHEW,IWKHOHQGHU¶V
collection department is unable to collect the debt, then they may also decide 
to use a collection agency or just sell off the debt. The debt can be passed on 
several times, and can be collected up to six years after the last payment was 
made. [40] The amount of debt passed to debt collection agencies, exceeds 
£5 billion per annum. [26] 
Under the Limitations Act 1980, for unsecured loans the limitation period is 6 
years. If the debtor acknowledges the debt in writing or pays an instalment 
within the original limitation period, then the time limit begins again from the 
date of  acknowledgement  or the  date of payment.  If  the  creditor does not 
contact the debtor for 6 or more years, then the debtor may be able to claim 
that the outstanding debt is Statute Barred under this Limitations Act, where 
Statute Barred means that the creditor cannot use the legal system to enforce 
payment. 
Relevant literature in the area of debt collection is very limited. Bennett et al 
[16] looks at the validation of LGD models, and Chin and Kotak [23] discusses 
using  rule-based  engines.  In  corporate  default,  there  has  been  a  growing 
literature  on  building  regression  based  models  to  determine  the  drivers  of 
recovery rate, see for example the book edited by Altman, Resti and Sironi 
[4]. Though there is no collection process. Data on the way banks collected 
debts from small and medium sized firms was used in Dermine and Neto de 
Carvalho [28] to build a regression model of how much was recovered. On the 
consumer debt side, there is very little modelling literature.  Bower et al [18] 
were  looking  at  charged  off  credit  card  accounts  being  collected  via  an 
automated  call  centre.  They  found  that  by  using  a  prioritisation  model  to 
arrange accounts based on probability of contact and value of account they 
were able to improve recovery rates. Makuch et al [42] looked at managing   7 
the delinquency in the US economy using linear programming to optimise the 
allocation of resources within collections. However there has been no work on 
the drivers of recovery in the collection process of consumer debt, particularly 
for  collections  by  debt  recovery  agents,  where  there  have  usually  been 
VHYHUDOSUHYLRXVDWWHPSWVWRUHFRYHUWKHFRQVXPHU¶VGHEW 
This chapter will look at all the relevant literature for predicted Loss Given 
Default  (LGD),  Recovery  Rates  (RR)  where  RR=1-LGD for consumer debt 
and  discuss  the  techniques  available  to  the  collector  once  the  debtor  has 
defaulted and the mathematical techniques to predict LGD and RR. LGD is 
defined as the ratio of losses to exposure at default and therefore usually has 
a value between 1 and 0 where, 1 indicates that no money was recovered and 
0 indicates all of the debt was recovered. 
2.2 LGD Corporate Borrowing 
The  New  Basel  Accord  allows  a  bank  to  calculate  credit  risk  capital 
requirements according to either of two approaches: a standardized approach 
which  uses  agency  ratings  for  risk-weighting  assets  and  Internal  Ratings 
Based  (IRB)  approach  which  allows  a  bank  to  use  internal  estimates  of 
components of credit risk to calculate credit risk capital. To use the IRB, the 
institution needs to develop methods to estimate the following components of 
their loan portfolio: 
x  PD (probability of default in the next 12 months); 
x  LGD (loss given default); 
x  EAD (expected exposure at default). 
Modelling  PD,  the  probability  of  default  has  been  the  objective  of  credit 
scoring systems for fifty years but modelling LGD is not something that had 
really  been  addressed  in  consumer  credit  until  the  advent  of  the  Basel 
regulations.  EAD  is  the  expected  amount  outstanding  at  default  and  the 
expected loss (EL) at default: EL = EAD*PD*LGD. 
What  LGD  modelling  has  been  done  was  mainly  in  the  corporate  lending 
market, where LGD (or Recovery Rate (RR), where LGD = 1-RR) was needed 
as part of the more sophisticated bond pricing formulae. Even there, until the   8 
mid nineties LGD was assumed to be a deterministic value obtained from a 
historical analysis of bond losses or banks worked it out through experience 
[5]. Only when it was recognised that LGD was needed for the pricing formula 
for non-defaulted risky bonds were models of LGD developed. 
 Bruche  and  González-Aguado  [21]  look  at  the  time-series  behaviour  of 
default  probabilities  and  recovery  rates  distributions  using  an  econometric 
model. They state that the time-variation in recovery rate distributions does 
amplify risk, but that this effect is much smaller than the contribution of the 
time  variation  in  default  probabilities  to  systematic  risk.  Also  their  results 
indicate that default rates and recovery rates are more tightly related to each 
other than to macroeconomic variables. They found that credit downturns do 
not perfectly aligned with recessions; they start earlier and last longer. 
To determine the average LGD for a portfolio, there are three approaches 
available:  dollar-weighting,  default-weighting  and  time-weighting.  However 
since  the  LGD  disWULEXWLRQ LV ³ELPRGDO´ WZR-humped),  the  average  can  be 
very misleading. [4] 
These market values, or implied market values, of Loss Given Default were 
then  used  to  build  regression  models  that  related  LGD  to  some  relevant 
factors; 
x  Seniority of the debt,  
x  Country of issue,  
x  Size of issue, 
x  Size of firm,  
x  Industrial sector of firm, 
x  Economic conditions. 
The  need  for  such  models  was  identified  by  Altman  and  Kishore  [3]  and 
reviews of some of the models are given in several recent books ([4], [27], 
[30]).  
 
   9 
2.3 LGD Personal Borrowing 
Corporate LGD modelling is not appropriate for consumer credit LGD models 
since there is no continuous pricing of the debt as is the case on the bond 
market.  The  Basel Accord  [8]  suggests  using  implied  historic  LGD as  one 
approach in determining LGD for retail portfolios. The realised losses (RL) per 
unit  amount  loaned  in  a  segment  of  the  portfolio  is  identified  and  then  if 
default probability (PD) for that segment can be estimated, one can calculate 
LGD  since  RL=LGD*PD.  One  difficulty  with  this  approach  is  that  it  is 
accounting losses that are often recorded and not the actual economic losses, 
which should include the collection costs and any repayments after a write-off. 
Also since LGD must be estimated at the segment level of the portfolio, if not 
at the individual loan level there is often insufficient data in some segments to 
make a robust estimation.  
The  alternative  method  suggested  in  the  Basel  Accord  is  to  model  the 
collections. Dermine and Neto de Carvalho [28] used such data of bank loans 
to  small  and  medium  sized  firms  in  Portugal.  Small  and  medium  sized 
companies falls under the retail (or consumer) segment of the Basel Accord.  
Dermine  et  al  [28]  used  a  regression  approach,  in  the  form  of  log-log 
regression to estimate the data.  
In  2006  Lucas  [41]  suggested  the  idea  of  using  the  collection  process  to 
model  LGD  mortgages.  The  collection  process  was  split  into  whether  the 
property  was  repossessed  and  the  loss  if  there  was  repossession.  So  a 
scorecard was built to estimate the probability of repossession and then a 
model used to estimate the sale value of the house that is actually realised at 
the  time  of  sale.  Qi  &  Yang  [44]  used  linear  regression  to  model  LGD  in 
mortgages.  They  observed  that  LGD  could  be  explained  by  the  loan 
characteristics; the nature of the underlying property, and variables measuring 
the  default,  foreclosure  and  settlement  process.  The  most  important  factor 
they found is the current loan-to-value ratio. 
Leow et al [39] model mortgage LGD by using the probability of repossession 
multiplied by a haircut model to predict LGD. They found that the two stage 
model was more affective at accurately reflecting the LGD distribution. They   10 
also tried using macroeconomic variables to predict LGD but found that while 
they  were  significant  they  had  very  little  effect  on  improving  the  predictive 
performance of the model. 
Bower et al [18] found that by using a prioritisation model arranges accounts 
based  on  probability  of  contact  and  value  of  account  they  were  able  to 
improve recovery rate via an automated call centre.  
Allred  et  al  [2]  looked  at  dynamic  data-driven  decision  making  tools  and 
procedures  to  evaluate  all  aspects  of  credit  card  operations,  specifically, 
bankruptcy,  fraud,  and  collections.  For  collections  the  most  important 
predictor variables were based on past payments, specifically time since last 
payment  and  frequency  of  payments.  They  found  a  positive  relationship 
between the number of past payments and the probability of future payments. 
Other significant variables were initial balance, balance remaining, frequency 
of calls made, and frequency of contacting the right party.  
Qi and Zhaoa [45] report regression results from four  parametric methods; 
ordinary least squares regression, fractional response regression, the inverse 
Gaussian,  and    inverse  Gaussian  with  beta  transformation,  and  two  non-
parametric methods; regression tree and neural network They found that the 
non-parametric  methods  outperform  the  parametric  methods  in  terms  of 
model fit and predictive accuracy. 
Bastos  [9]  looked  at  forecasting  LGD  on  bank  loans  using  parametric 
fractional  regression  and  a  nonparametric  regression  tree  models.  The 
nonparametric model gave better results over shorter time periods, of 12 and 
24  months.  The  parametric  regression  model  was  better  at  predicting  for 
longer time periods.  
Thomas and Zhang [54] modelled recovery rates and recovery amounts, for 
unsecured  consumer  loans  using  linear  regression  and  survival  analysis 
models. They found that in all cases, the models were better at modelling 
recovery rate and that using this estimate the recovery amount, was more 
effective  than  modelling  the  recovery  amount  directly.  Linear  regression 
achieved a higher R
2 value and Spearman rank coefficient than the survival 
analysis models for modelling recovery rate.   11 
Querci [46] sought to explain LGD geographic location, loan type, workout 
process  length  and  borrower  characteristics.    Querci  found  that  borrower 
characteristics gave the best results but concluded that none of them could 
fully explain LGD. 
Thomas et al [53] pointed out that one of the problems with LGD modelling for 
unsecured credit is that the outcome depends not only on the ability and the 
willingness of the debtor to repay but also on the decisions by the lender. 
They used a decision tree approach to model the strategic level decisions of a 
lender of whether to collect in-house, through an agent or to sell off the debt 
to  a  third  party.  They  also  suggested  that  LGD  estimates  for  one  type  of 
collection might be built using mixture distributions. Caselli et al [22] used data 
IURP DQ ,WDOLDQ EDQN¶V LQ-house  collection  process  to  show  that  economic 
effects are important in LGD values. Bellotti and Crook [13] also looked at 
using economic variables as well as loan and borrower characteristics in a 
regression  approach  to  LGD  for  in-house  collection  while  Somers  and 
Whittaker [47] suggested using quantile regression to estimate LGD, but in all 
cases the resultant models had R
2 values between 0.05 and 0.2. It seems 
estimating LGD is a difficult problem. 
2.4 Debt Recovery Techniques 
The debt recovery techniques discussed here were based upon observations 
made whilst the author attended a Debt Collection Techniques course run by 
a debt collections agency. 
The debt collection agency works out of London. Their primary method of debt 
collection is telephone with written communication in support. The telephone 
is used because it can lead to fast recovery of debt, as it is a direct line of 
communication  with  the  debtor  and  can  result  in  a  payment  from  the  first 
conversation. The telephone is also very cost effective compared to face-to-
face  communication  but  is  just  as  personal.  There  is  also  the  element  of 
surprise  and  the  debtor  and  collector  can  negotiate  to  achieve  a  mutual 
satisfactory result. 
There  are  two  objectives  for  every  call.  The  primary  objective  is  to  obtain 
payment in full or at least a partial payment and an arrangement to pay the   12 
rest. The secondary objective is to obtain further information on the debtor to 
improve negotiations.  
7KH FROOHFWRUKDV D UDQJH RI ³WUDGDEOHV´ LQ WKHLU DUVHQDOWR QHJRWLDWH ZLWK
They can threaten the debtor with legal action; this can result in an increase in 
debt due to charges. They can give the debtor a discount or offer to remove 
WKHLULQWHUHVWFKDUJHV7KH\FDQUHSDLURUGDPDJHWKHGHEWRU¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJ
thus making it easier or harder to obtain future credit.  
The debtor has four options for dealing with the debt: 
1.  Pay in full (ask for a deal or just pay) 
2.  Pay part of the debt to avoid legal action or additional charges 
3.  Set up a payment plan (e.g. £10 per week) 
4.  'HQ\WKHGHEWRUGRQ¶WPDNHDQ\SD\PHQW 
The collector has seven options for dealing with the debt: 
1.  Ask (persuade) the debtor to pay in full 
2.  Ask (persuade) the debtor to pay part of the debt 
3.  Ask (persuade) the debtor for an arrangement to pay the debt 
4.  Write off the debt or send it back to the bank (Recourse) 
5.  Start County Court proceedings 
6.  Start Bankruptcy proceedings 
7.  Add additional charges and interest 
2.4.1 Payment In Full 
Getting the debtor to pay the debt in full is the ideal solution for the collector 
EHFDXVHLWLVWKHPRVWFRVWHIIHFWLYHXVHRIWKHFROOHFWRU¶VWLPHDQGDOVRKHOSV
cash flow. It is also a good result for the debtor because it is the least hassle 
and gives them peace of mind, the debtor may also be able to cut a deal and 
get a discount. 
Trying to persuade the debtor of the virtues of this is never easy. The collector 
can use the threat of additional charges, starting county court proceedings or 
even  bankruptcy,  which  are  all  discussed  in  more  detail  further  on.  The   13 
collector could also try to encourage them with discounts (e.g. 10% discount if 
you pay by the end of the day), reduce or remove previous charges, or offer to 
UHSDLURUGDPDJHWKHGHEWRU¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJWKXVPDNLQJLWHDVLHURUKDUGHUWR
obtain future credit. 
2.4.2 Part Payment 
If the debtor pays part of the debt, even if it is only a pound, then the debtor 
has admitted to the debt. This means that legally the collector has a full six 
years to collect the remainder of the debt. So the collector should always try 
to  get  some  sort  of  payment  out  of  the  debtor.  The  collector  can  try  to 
SHUVXDGHWKHGHEWRUZLWKGLVFRXQWVVLQFH\RXFDQ¶t afford to pay the whole 
debt today, how about paying £1000 today and we will arrange a payment 
SODQ IRU WKH UHVW DQG ,¶OO NQRFN  RII \RXU GHEW UHGXFHG RU UHPRYHG
previous charges, add charges, threaten legal action etc. 
The collector should try to find out as much about the debtor as possible, 
especially if the debtor claims that they cannot afford to pay the debt. If the 
debtor claims to be working, then finding out their income, expenditure and 
job can help the collector assess how much they can afford and if they are 
lying.  If  the debtor claims  not  to  be  working,  then finding  out what  sort  of 
benefits they are on provides the collector with their income and again finding 
out their expenditure can also lead to finding other sources of income. Finding 
out about other people they can ask to lend them the money to stop further 
charges can help, e.g. spouse, parent, child, or friend. 
7KHGHEWRUFDQWU\WRXVHSDUWSD\PHQWWRFXWDGHDOHJ,¶OOSD\WRGD\LI
you remove the interest charges for the last six months. 
Part payments can be used in conjunction with payment plans, i.e. paying part 
of the debt today and then setting up a payment scheme for the remainder. 
2.4.3 Payment Plan 
If the debtor is unable to pay the full amount but can afford to contribute on a 
weekly or monthly payment plan, then this is a good solution for both parties. 
The debtor has the peace of mind that they are paying off the debt at a rate 
they  can  afford  and  will  avoid  further  inconvenience,  charges  and  legal   14 
proceedings. The collector can rely on a steady income from the debtor and if 
they fail to pay all of their payments, then they can sue the debtor for the 
arrears. This has the advantage that it is cheaper to sue for part of the debt. 
The debtor can be sued again for the debt. Since it costs the debtor each time 
they are sued and causes inconvenience when the county court judgements 
DUHHQIRUFHGWKHQLWLVLQWKHGHEWRU¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWWRHQVXUHWKH\VWLFNWRWKH
payment plan. 
Again the collector should try to find out as much as possible about the debtor 
to be able to assess what is the correct rate at which the debtor should pay 
them back. If the collector asks for too little, then they are not helping their 
cash flow and it will take longer to remove the debt from the books. On the 
other hand if they ask for too much and the debtor cannot afford to pay, then 
the debtor will fall behind again on their payments, leading to additional time 
and resources being spent on suing the debtor or trying to find an alternative 
payment plan. 
2.4.4 Recourse: Returning Debt to the Bank 
There are several situations when the third party can return the debt to the 
bank from which it was bought: this is called Recourse. Typical conditions 
where this can apply are: 
x  If the debtor is dead (depending on when he died) 
x  If the debt is disputed 
x  If the debt does not meet the conditions under which it was bought e.g. 
already been through the legal process 
x  There is the question of fraud 
x  If  the  account  holder  is  in  prison  (depending  on  when  they  were 
sentenced) 
If the debt cannot be recoursed, and it is unlikely that the collector will be able 
to collect the debt, then the third party can decide to write off the debt. It is 
very unlikely that the debts will be written off because then third party will 
have lost the money unlike in-house collectors who then may sell off the debt 
to third parties.   15 
2.4.5 County Court Judgements 
If the debtor refuses to pay any of the debt, then the collector can start county 
court proceedings. Before you can start county court proceedings there are 
some  pre-action  protocols,  which  were  introduced  by  the Woolf  reforms  of 
1999 [35] to reduce the amount of unnecessary court action. Before starting 
proceedings  you  must  first  try  to  seek  a  resolution,  (i.e.  try  to  set  up  a 
paymeQWVFKHPHDQGVHQGDVROLFLWRU¶VOHWWHUstating that if the debtor does 
not pay then they will be taken to court. 
If the debtor still does not pay then the collector can fill out a county court 
claim form for either the full amount or part of the debt. If the collector sues for 
part of the debt then they may persuade the debtor to pay the rest of the debt 
DQGDYRLGIXUWKHULQFRQYHQLHQFH,IWKH\GRQ¶WWKHQWKH\FDQEHVXHGDJDLQIRU
the remainder of the debt. From the date the county court judgement is issued 
(day the form is completed), there is a pause of five days while it is being 
processed and then the debtor/defendant has 14 days to respond.  
The debtor/defendant can: 
x  Ignore it (judgement by default) 
x  Admit it and make an offer which is accepted (judgement by admission) 
x  Admit  it  and  make  an  offer  which  is  not  accepted  (judgement  by 
admission) 
x  Admit part of it  
x  Defend it and/or counter claim 
x  Pay it 
x  Ask for a further 14 days to respond 
There are four types of judgement: 
x  Judgement by default ± the defendant ignores the county court claim 
x  Judgement by admission ± the defendant admits to the debt 
x  Judgement by determination ± the judge decides the outcome 
x  Summary judgement ± the judge decides that the defence is invalid.   16 
In  most  of  the  cases  that  the  debt  collectors  are  involved  with,  the 
debtor/defendant will ignore it and hence judgement will be made by default. 
The debtor will then have a further 28 days to pay the debt before judgment is 
entered (49 days since the date of issue). Once the judgement is entered it 
will be on record for 6 years even if the debtor pays back the debt. Once the 
judgement is entered onto record it will have a very negative effect on their 
credit rating. 
Once  a  judgement  has  been  made  and  before  it  has  been  entered  onto 
record, the judgement can be enforced. Typical types of enforcement are: 
x  Order to Obtain Information 
x  Warrant of Execution 
x  Attachment of Earnings Order 
x  Third Party Debt Order 
x  Charging Order 
Any or all of these can be used on the debtor/defendant.  
2.4.6 Order to Obtain Information  
This is an oral examination in court. The defendant must attend the court and 
is then asked a series of questions by the collectors. If the defendant does not 
attend the court twice, then they will be in contempt of court, which can mean 
being arrested. The collector can ask the defendant any question they want, 
e.g. the start of their bank accounts, home life, income, expenses, property 
and if the defendant tells a lie they are committing perjury, which is also an 
arrestable offence. 
2.4.7 Warrant of Execution 
This is basically sending the bailiffs round. They can take property that has a 
value of up to 6 times the debt. The bailiffs can come round up to three times 
in the course of six months; all of the goods are then sold at public auction. If 
the goods are sold for more than the debt, the remaining money goes back to 
the  defendant,  and  they  are  left  with  the  very  expensive  cost  of  replacing 
everything that has been sold. If the goods do not cover the cost of the debt   17 
then the bailiffs can be sent around again or another enforcement can be 
used. 
2.4.8 Attachment of Earnings Order 
If the defendant is employed, then the court can contact their employer and 
have money taken out of their wages regularly until the debt is paid off. This 
causes an irritation to the employer because each month they have to inform 
the  court  that  the  debtor  is  still  employed  by  them  and  arrange  for  the 
payments to be removed form WKHLUZDJHV7KLVLVQRWOLNHO\WRGRWKHGHEWRU¶V
career much good, for instance if some redundancies are coming up which 
person is more likely to be sacked, a person with or without an attachment to 
earning.  If  the  debtor  is  made  redundant  then  they  must  inform  other 
companies they are applying to that they have an attachment to earnings. 
Technically  you  can  put  an  attachment  of  earnings  onto  statutory  sick, 
maternity and paternity pay. The court determines the percentage of earnings, 
which is paid. 
2.4.9 Third Party Debt Order 
7KLVIUHH]HVWKHGHEWRU¶VEDQNDFFRXQWIRUVL[ZHHNVDQGDQ\PRQH\ZKLFKLV
in the bank account on the day it is frozen, can be used to pay the debt. When 
the bank account is frozen, money can still be paid into the bank account but 
no  money  can  be  taken  out.  Therefore  direct  debits,  standing  orders  and 
checks will not be paid. This will result in the bank charging for the payments 
not being made. This means that the debtor will be facing additional charges, 
none payment of direct debits which could result in the termination of goods 
and services e.g. if the insurance is not paid then it may become invalid, and 
will have all the money in the bank account removed. This can only be used 
on one bank account at a time. If this enforcement is used in conjunction with 
an Order to Obtain Information, then the collector could find out which bank 
account has the most money in it and when the next payment is being made 
and therefore freeze that bank account on the day the next payment is to be 
made.  This  enforcement  can  be  used  several  times  to  ensure  the  debt  is 
collected.   18 
2.4.10 Charging Order 
$ &KDUJLQJ 2UGHULV ZKHUH D FKDUJH LVSXW RQ WKH GHEWRU¶V SURSHUW\ 7KLV
property can be a house, land, or stocks and shares. Once a charge is put on 
the property, then the debtor has to pay when they sell the property. The court 
can also force the sale of the property but this is not done very often in the 
FDVHRIWKHGHEWRU¶VKRPe. 
2.4.11 Charges 
Each  time  a  County  Court  Judgement  is  made  there  are  additional  costs 
which must be met by the debtor if they lose the judgement.  
2.4.12 Statutory Interest 
Statutory Interest is charge on the debt as stated in section 69 of the County 
Courts Act 1984 [36]. Interest is charged at a rate of 8% per annum between 
the default date and the date of issue. To calculate the statuary interest: 
Interest =No. of days (Issue Date-Default Date) * Daily Rate of Interest 
(Balance*8%/365) 
The interest is added to the principal of the debt. 
2.4.13 Bankruptcy  
Bankruptcy  Law  has  been  around  for  many  centuries.  The  first  act  was 
passed in England in 1542; the most recent acts are the Insolvency Act of 
1986 [51] and the Enterprise Act of 2002. The aims of bankruptcy are twofold: 
to free the individual from pressure of creditors and to ensure that all of the 
assets are distributed fairly among the creditors. The individual (debtor) or the 
creditors may start bankruptcy proceedings. However it is the Courts who are 
officially  responsible  for  making  an  order  against  the  individual.  All  of  the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VDVVHWVWKHQIDOOXQGHUWKHFRQWURORIWKH7UXVWHHDSSRLQWHGZKRVH
responsibility is to get all of the assets to the creditors. Hence ensuring the 
creditors can no longer bother the individual. In the Insolvency Act of 1986 
[51] the amount of time you remained bankrupt depended on what you owed: 
it was 2 years for less than £20,000 and 3 years for more. The Enterprise Act 
of 2002 changed the negating factor from the amount owed to whether or not 
WKHLQGLYLGXDOLVFRQVLGHUHGWREH³5HFNOHVV´DQG³1HJOLJHQW´,IEDQNUXSWF\  19 
was not their fault then they are given a fresh start in 12 months. However if 
they are found to bH³5HFNOHVV´DQG³1HJOLJHQW´WKHQLWLVEHWZHHQDQG
years, with a limit of three years to release the equity in their home. 
When a bankruptcy order has been made, you must: 
x  &RPSO\ ZLWK WKH 2IILFLDO 5HFHLYHU¶V UHTXHVW WR SURYLGH LQIRUPDWLRQ
about your financial affairs; 
x  Give the Official Receiver a full list of your assets and details of what 
you owe and to whom; 
x  Look  after  and  then  hand  over  your  assets  to  the  Official  Receiver 
together  with  all  your  books,  records,  bank  statements,  insurance 
policies and other papers relating to your property and financial affairs; 
x  Tell  your  trustee  about  assets  and  increases  in  income  you  obtain 
during your bankruptcy; 
x  Stop using your bank, building society, credit card and similar accounts 
straightaway;  
x  Not  obtain  credit  of  £500  or  more  from  any  person  without  first 
disclosing the fact that you are bankrupt; 
x  You may also have to go to court and explain why you are in debt. If 
you do not co-operate, you could be arrested. 
Bankruptcy will affect you in many ways, including; 
x  You will no longer control your assets as these will be sold to pay your 
debts 
x  Your home may have to be sold to go towards paying your debts. Any 
increase in value after being made bankrupt does not belong to you 
x  Contributions from your salary can be deducted to pay your debts for 
up to 3 years 
x  If you are self-employed, your business is normally closed down and 
any employees are dismissed 
It is a Criminal offence during bankruptcy to;   20 
x  Obtain credit of over £500; 
x  Start a new business; 
x  Become a Company Director, either formally or informally; 
x  Not disclose that you are an undischarged bankrupt 
After being discharged, there will still be certain restrictions, such as; 
x  Any increase in the value of your home will not belong to you 
x  You cannot obtain overdraft facilities 
x  Any excess funds over and above reasonable living expenses can be 
claimed to pay off your debts 
x  Inheritance and assets can be affected many years after discharge 
2.4.14 Summary of Debt Recovery Techniques 
Debt collectors conduct their business over the telephone. This would appear 
to be mainly from the point of view of cost efficiency and the safety of their 
staff. From discussions with collectors, a lot of their debtors are the sort, who 
would use a face to face meeting as a chance to show off to their friends. 
They  use  bullying  tactics  to  belittle  the  collector  and  have  no  intention  of 
paying. Over the phone they do not have this audience and so can be more 
responsive. 
The ideal outcome for the collector is to receive payment in full on the first 
call. In order to achieve this they will often offer discounts or threaten legal 
action. If they discover that the debtor is unable to pay the full amount then 
the fall back positions are to set up a payment plan and to receive part of the 
payment in advance. In order to set up the correct payment plan, the collector 
should find out as much information as possible from the debtor.  
,IWKHGHEWRUUHIXVHVWRSD\RUGRHVQ¶WPDNHWKHDJUHHGSD\PHQWVWKHQWKH
agency will start County Court Proceedings. This will most likely result in a 
warrant of execution to retrieve the debt. 
The author did not observe any of the collection telephone calls but did hear 
several  of  the  role  playing  exercises,  where  experienced  debt  collectors   21 
pretended to be the debtors, and the collectors had to try to get the money out 
of them. The debtors  were trying to be deliberately difficult sometimes not 
even admitting to their own name. It was very impressive the way they tried to 
coax payments out of them.   22 
2.5 Statistical Techniques 
2.5.1 Logistic Regression 
Logistic  regression  is  a  generalised  linear  model  used  when  the  target 
variable  can  take  only  two  possible  values.  The distributions  of LGD  have 
large spikes at LGD=1 and LGD=0. The logistic regressions in this thesis will 
be used to predict if the LGD will be zero or one as applicable. 
The logistic function is given by: 
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The  logistic  function  can  take  in  any  input  value  from  negative  infinity  to 
positive infinity, yet the output values are confined to between 0 and 1. The 
variable  x  is  a  measure  of  the  total  contribution  of  all  of  the  independent 
variables used in the model, defined as: 
k kz z z x E E E E        ... 2 2 1 1 0  
where ȕ0 is the intercept, ȕ1ȕ2ȕ3«ȕk are the regression coefficients of z1, 
z2, z3«]k respectively. Each regression coefficient describes the size of the 
contribution of that variable. A positive regression coefficient indicates that the 
associated variable increases the probability of the outcome, while a negative 
indicates  a  decrease  in  the  probability  of  the  outcome.  The  size  of  the 
regression  coefficient  indicates  how  strongly  the  variable  influences  the 
probability of the outcome.  
Logistic  regression  is  used  to  express  the  relationship  in  the  form  of  a 
probability between one or more independent variables and a binary response 
variable. The main approaches are: 
x  Forward  selection,  which  involves  starting  with  no  variables  in  the 
model, trying out the variables one by one and including them if they 
are 'statistically significant'.  
x  Backward  elimination,  which  involves  starting  with  all  candidate 
variables  and  testing  them  one  by  one  for  statistical  significance, 
deleting any that are not significant.    23 
x  Stepwise  methods  are  a  combination  of  the  above,  testing  at  each 
stage for variables to be included or excluded. 
2.5.2 Linear Regression 
Linear regression is modelling the relationship between a scalar variable  y 
and one or more  variables  denoted  x. The  model depends  linearly  on  the 
unknown  parameters  to  be  estimated  from  the  data.  Like  all  forms  of 
regression analysis, linear regression focuses on the conditional probability 
distribution of y given x. 
Thus the model takes the form of: 
i ik k i i i x x x y H E E E E        ... 2 2 1 1 0  
where L «Qİi is an unobserved random variable which adds noise to the 
linear relationship.  
Linear  regression  is  often  used  for  modelling  LGD.  To  name  but  a  few, 
Hillebrand [35], Huang and Oosterlee [36],Thomas et al [53] all used linear 
regression models for predicting LGD. 
The linear regression in the thesis was all done within SAS where the model 
is  fitted  by  least-squares.  The  output  includes  the  two-tailed  significance 
probability for all variables, which was used to determine significance of the 
variable (<0.05). The model output also quotes the root Mean Squared Error 
(MSE) and the R-squared values for the model that were used to determine 
the goodness of fit of the model. However once a model was created, the R-
squared values quoted were based on the explained variance method on the 
holdout sample, which is explained later in this chapter. 
One of the problems with using linear regression to predict LGD is that LGD 
was  not  normally  distributed,  and  linear  regression  assumes  a  normally 
distributed variable. This meant that when the linear regression models were 
applied,  the  predicted  results  clustered  around  the  mean.  This  model 
predicted a normally distributed LGD with a very small variance. Therefore the 
target values (LGD) had to be transformed into a normal distribution before 
linear regression could be performed. Two of the distributions used were beta 
and lognormal. This meant that the target values were transformed using beta   24 
or  lognormal,  then  the  regression  analysis  run,  and  the  predicted  results 
transformed back using the inverse transformation. One example of a non-
linear regression is the commercial product LossCalc [34] that is based on the 
fact that the LGD distribution should be approximated by a beta distribution.  
2.5.3 Box-Cox method 
Box-Cox  changes  non  normal  distributions  to  a  closer  approximation  of  a 
normal  distribution.  The  Box±Cox,  or  power-normal  distribution,  is  the 
distribution of a random variable X for which the Box±Cox transformation on X 
follows  a  truncated  normal  distribution.  It  is  a  continuous  probability 
distribution having probability density function (pdf) given by 
 
  
for  y  >  0,  where  m  is  the  location  parameter  of  the  distribution,  s  is  the 
GLVSHUVLRQ ¦ LV WKH IDPLO\ SDUDPHWHU I  is  the  indicator  function,  ĭ  is  the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and sgn is 
the signum function. [19] 
2.5.4 Trend lines 
A trend line represents a trend; the long-term movement in time series data 
after other components have been accounted for. It tells whether a particular 
data set has increased or decreased over the period of WLPH7KHWUHQGOLQH¶V
position  and  slope  is  calculated  using  statistical  techniques  such  as  linear 
regression. Typically they are just straight lines, although some variations use 
higher degree polynomials depending on the degree of curvature desired in 
the line. 
The  trend  line  function  in  Excel  was  used  in  this  thesis  to  determine  the 
rudimentary shape of graphs in order to select the best models for describing 
the data.   25 
2.5.5 Weight Of Evidence (WOE) 
In the WOE approach the target variable is changed to a binary variable by 
asking:  is  the  LGD  value  above  or  below  the  mean  LGD  value?  Each 
characteristic is then split into deciles and the ratio of above mean to below 
mean in each group is assessed. This means that the percentage above the 
mean  in  each  group  is  divided  by  the  percentage  below  the  mean  and 
adjacent groups with similar odds are combined. Thus each characteristic is 
GLYLGHGLQWRWKHDSSURSULDWHQXPEHURI³ELQV´HDFKFRQVLVWLQJRIRQHRUPRUH
neighbouring deciles.  
Generally, if Na and Nb are the total number of data points with LGD values 
above or below the mean and na(i) nb(i) are the number in bin i with LGD 
values above or below the mean. The bin is given the value: 
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Once the weights are calculated they can then be used to either calculate the 
Information Value described below to calculate if the variable is useful or not. 
Or in a regression model to predict if the debtor will be good or bad by using 
the modified variables and the binary variable of: is the LGD value above or 
below the mean LGD value. 
The information value is determined by  
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where n is the number of bins 
The higher the information value the more useful the variable is to determine 
the outcome. 
2.5.6 R-squared 
R
2 is the coefficient of determination; the proportion of variability in the data 
set, which is accounted for by the statistical model.[1] R
2 can vary from 0 to 1 
where the value of 1 indicates that the statistical model perfectly fits the data 
and 0 indicates that there is no relationship between the model and the data.   26 
There are several different definitions of R
2 depending upon the context. With 
linear regression R
2 is simply the square of the sample correlation coefficient 
between the outcomes and their predicted values. In this thesis there are two 
types of R-squared quoted. One is the reading from the PROC REG when a 
linear  regression  was  performed  in  SAS.  The  other  is  calculated  on  the 
holdout sample in terms of explained variance. 
When a  regression  is  performed  in  SAS,  an  R
2  is  reported  as  part  of  the 
output. This R
2 is calculated by using the likelihood-ratio statistic (G
2) where 
the probability distribution of the test statistic is approximated by a chi-square 
distribution for testing the null hypothesis that all covariants have a coefficient 
of 0. R
2 is calculated by: 
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Where m is the sample size. [36] 
The  PROC REG  R
2  is  used  as  an  initial test  to  determine  the best  linear 
regression model. However once selected model then had its R
2 calculated 
using explained variance on the holdout sample. 
The  explained  variance  method  of  R
2  was  calculated  as  followed.  The 
observed data set values ( i y DQGWKHPRGHO¶VSUHGLFWHGYDOXHV i y Ö ) are used 
as follows: 
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1 and n is the sample size. 
The R
2 statistic will give some idea about the goodness of fit of a model.  
2.5.7 Errors  
The mean square error (MSE) quantifies the difference between an estimate 
and  the  observed  value.  MSE  corresponds  to  the  expected  value  of  the 
squared error loss or quadratic loss. The error is the amount the estimate   27 
differs  from  the  observed  value.  The  difference  can  occur  because  of 
randomness  or  because  the  model  doesn't  account  for  all  information  to 
produce a more accurate estimate. [38] Taking the square root of the MSE 
yields the root mean squared error (RMSE), which has the same units as the 
observed values. For an unbiased estimator, the RMSE is the square root of 
the  variance,  also  known  as  the  standard  error.  MSE  is  calculated  by: 
  > @
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A MSE of 0 means that the model predicts the observed values with perfect 
accuracy. The main disadvantage to the MSE is that, like the variance, it is 
heavily weighted towards outliers. [17] Since each of the terms is squared, 
larger errors are more heavily weighted than smaller ones. The root MSE is 
quoted from the SAS results for linear regression as another indicator of the 
goodness of fit of the models. 
2.5.8 6SHDUPDQ¶V5DQN 
6SHDUPDQ¶V5DQNPHDVXUHVWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQUDQNLQJUDWKHUWKDQLQWKHYDOXHV
of the predicted and observed data sets. It is used to compare the predicted 
ranks of the debtoUV¶/*'ZLWKWKHLUREVHUYHGUDQNV7KLVLVXVHIXOVLQFHVRPH
of  the  models  can  be  used  not  to  determine  the  value  of  the  debt  but  to 
assess  which  will  be  the  worst  debtors and  best  debtors at  repaying  their 
debts.  This  allows  the  collections  department  to  allocate  resources 
accordingly and improve their recovery rate like in the Bower et al [18] study. 
R
2 can be used to determine the goodness of fit for the models. However 
since two-stage models are used in this thesis as well as linear regression 
models  R
2  is  not  as  useful  for  the  individual  stages.  An  alternative  is  the 
Spearman  Rank  Correlation,  which  is  a  non-parametric  measure  of 
correlation. The real LGD observed results and the predicted LGD results are 
converted  to  ranks,  and  the  differences  di,  between  the  ranks  of  each 
observation and prediction are calculated. 
7KH GHEWRU¶V SUHGLFWHG UDQN ZDV EDVHG RQ WKHLU SUHGLFWHG /*' UHVXOW
GHVFHQGLQJ7KHGHEWRU¶VUHDOREVHUYHGUDQNZDVEDVHGRQWKHLUREVHUYHG
LGD result; descending. The differences di between their predicted rank and   28 
real  observed  rank  are  used  to  calculate  the  Spearman  Rank  Correlation 
coefficient. However there are many tied ranks (share the same rank) since 
there are several debtors with an observed or predicted LGD of 0. When a 
rank is tied; all associated ranks are assigned the mean of the tied ranks. Tied 
ranks also means that the classic Pearson's Correlation coefficient has to be 
used instead of the abbreviated Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient. 
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Where  
ȡ =   Pearson's Correlation coefficient 
xi =  real observation rank 
yi =  predicted rank 
n =  sample size 
If there are no tied ranks, then ȡis given by:  
 
 
2.6 Summary 
There is a body of literature on LGD modelling for corporate loans, mainly 
because LGD is vital factor in the pricing of risky bonds. The literature for 
unsecured  consumer  credit  is  much  sparser  and  it  was  only  following  the 
advent  of  the  new  Basel  Accord  [8]  in  2007  that  there  has  been  any 
concentrated  attempt  by  practitioners  and  academics  to  model  LGD  for 
consumer debt. Most of the research uses are linear regression to predict 
LGD.  
This  chapter  also  describes  the  debt  collection  techniques  employed  by  a 
third party. So far most of the LGD models do not include collection variables.  
   29 
Chapter  3:  Comparison  Of  In-house  Collections &  Third 
Party Collections 
Once a loan has defaulted the lender can choose to collect the debt in-house, 
pass it along to a debt collections agency to collect or sell off the debt to a 
third  party.  This  chapter  discusses  the  differences  between  debt  that  is 
collected  in-house  and  debt  that  is  collected  by  a  third  party.  The  two 
collection  mediums  have  a  variety  of  differences,  including;  debt  age, 
information available and collection processes. Also included is a comparison 
of debt collection models for predicting LGD (Loss Given Default) for in-house 
and agency collections. 
Normally  an  in-house  team  belonging  to  the  lender  undertakes  the  first 
attempt  at  collections.  Such  a  team  will  have  the  information  the  debtor 
supplieG RQ DSSOLFDWLRQ DOO WKH GHWDLOV RI WKH ORDQ DQG WKH ERUURZHU¶V
repayment performance until default. Although the formal Basel definition in 
the UK for default is that the debtor is 180 days overdue (unlike most other 
countries which is 90 days overdue) most lenders will freeze the loan or credit 
card  facilities  and  undertake  recovery  measures  once  the  loan  is  90  days 
overdue. A UK financial institution provided the representative data set used 
IRU PRGHOOLQJ VXFK ³LQ-KRXVH´ FROOHFWLRQV ,W FRQVLVWHG of  10,000  defaulted 
consumer loans, which defaulted over a two-year period in the 1990s together 
with  their  repayment  performance  in  the  collection  process.  The  collection 
models  concentrated  only  on  their  performance  in  the  first  two  years  of 
collections  to  match  the  information  that  was  available  on  the  third  party 
collections process. For modelling purposes the data was split into 70% for 
the training set and 30% for a holdout test set. 
The lender can also decide to use a third party to try and collect the defaulted 
amounts usually on a percentage fee basis so the third party will keep x% of 
what is collected. Alternatively or sometimes after using agents, the lender 
can sell the debt to a third party who then has the right to seek recovery of the 
outstanding debt. Our second data set consisted of such loans, which had 
been purchased by a third party from several of the UK banks. This data set 
consisted  of  the  information  on  70,000  loans  where  the  outstanding  debts   30 
varied from £10 to £40,000. These debts were purchased in 2000 and 2001 
and so most of the defaults had occurred in the late 1990s. The repayments 
RIWKHGHEWRUVIRUWKHILUVWPRQWKVLQWKLV³WKLUGSDUW\´FROOHFWLRQVSURFHVV
were available at an individual loan level. Again for modelling purposes the 
data was split into training and hold out test set in the ratio 70:30. 
,WLVFOHDUZKHQH[DPLQLQJWKH³WKLUGSDUW\´GDWDWKDWWKHUHLVOHVVLQIRUPDWLRQ
available  on  the  debtor  than  was  available  to  the  in-house  collectors.  The 
details of the debt, including the amount outstanding, when default occurred 
and when last there was a payment, was available. Also in order to set the 
purchase price, the history of how many different parties had sought to collect 
the debt is reported. There was some information available about the debtor 
including  details  of  address  and  telephone  numbers  when  available,  and 
some demographic information. However there was little information on the 
default  risk  scores  of  the  borrower,  either application  score  or behavioural 
score; on WKHERUURZHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFHEHIRUHRUVLQFHGHIDXOW7KXVWKHGDWDLV
UHVWULFWHGWRWKHGHWDLOVWKDWZHUHDYDLODEOHERWKLQWKH³LQ-KRXVH´DQGLQWKH
³WKLUGSDUW\´GDWDVHWV 
3.1 Collection Strategies 
The  information  available  to  the  in-house  collection  department  is  different 
from the data available to the third party. This has a direct effect on their 
collection strategies because the in-house collectors with greater knowledge 
have an interest in saving the debtor. The original lender is initially interested 
in  protecting  their  relationship  with  the  debtor.  Once  they  believe  this 
relationship cannot continue they are only interested in recovering the money 
they are owed. The third party has no relationship with the debtor and so from 
the start is only interested in recovering the money owed. Thus the following 
sequences of events can be distinguished:  
1.  Recovery process ± internal collection tries to save person 
2.  Collection process ± internal collection tries to save money 
3.  Collection process ± Third Party tries to save money  
The  actions  undertaken  by  the  lender  during  the  recovery  or  collection 
process do not differ; only the objective has changed. The main tools used in   31 
the  in-house  recovery  process  are  letters  backed  up  with  telephone  calls. 
There are different types of letters and sending them depends on the status of 
the customers and the characteristics of the debt. The debt sold to the third 
party will normally be debt that has proven hard for the lender to collect in-
house. Since this is the case the distribution for LGD shows that the majority 
RIWKHGHEWVKDYHQRWEHHQSDLG,QIDFWRYHURIWKHWKLUGSDUW\¶VGHEWV
have had no payments made on them at all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Collection trees 
Figure 3.1 summaries the decision flows in both in-house and third party when 
they  are  collecting  defaulted  debt.  This  information  was  collected  through 
personal correspondence with the in-house lender and third party collector.   32 
In-house collection decisions are different depending upon company policy. 
Usually, the first step is to send the letters at the beginning of every month. 
There  are  different  types  of  letters  and  sending  them  depends  on  the 
customers.  Gentle  reminder  letters  are  sent  out  for  one  or  two  missed 
payments. The longer the customer is not paying the stronger language used 
in the letter, also old customers are treated in a more polite way than the new 
customers.  If  this  method  is  not  sufficient  the  company  must  use  other 
possible methods:  calling the client, paying a visit to the client, trying to set up 
a payment agreement or find other possible solutions such as rearranging the 
mortgage, selling their property etc. 
The  third  party  uses  different  methods  to  achieve  their  collections.  Their 
primary  technique  for  debt  collection  is  the  telephone  with  written 
communication in support. The telephone is used because it can lead to fast 
recovery of debt, as it is a direct line of communication with the debtor and 
can result in a payment from the first conversation. The telephone is also very 
cost effective compared to face-to-face communication but is just as personal. 
There  is  also  the  element  of  surprise  and  the  debtor  and  collector  can 
negotiate to achieve a mutually satisfactory result. 
The ideal outcome for the collector is to receive payment in full on the first 
call. In order to achieve this they will often offer discounts or threaten legal 
action. If they discover that the debtor is unable to pay the full amount then 
the fall back positions are to set up a payment plan and to receive part of the 
payment in advance. In order to set up the correct payment plan, the collector 
should find out as much information as possible from the debtor.  
If the debtor refuses to pay or doHVQ¶WPDNHWKHDJUHHGSD\PHQWVWKHQWKH
debt collection Third party will start County Court Proceedings.  Chapter 2 
covers the different legal options a collector has to force a debtor into paying. 
This will most likely result in a warrant of execution to retrieve the debt. 
When either a third party or in-house collections department takes over an 
account, they have to decide how to collect the debt. Their first step will be to 
always collect the full outstanding debt. If debtor pays then they close the 
account. If not then a discount is offered for a lump sum payment. If the debt   33 
is paid then the account is closed, otherwise the payment plan is set up (most 
likely outcome).  
If the full amount is paid at £x per week the account is closed. If the customer 
pays and stops then the lender will have to decide to either close the account 
if the total amount paid is satisfactory. If it is not satisfactory; they may try to 
VXHRUVHWXSDQHZSD\PHQWSODQ,IWKHGHEWRUVGRQ¶WSD\WKHLUSD\PHQWSODQ
at all then the third party will either sell the debt or close the account.  
Factor  In-house data set  3rd Party data set 
Main tool  Letter  Telephone 
Age of Debt  New  Old 
Type of Debt  Personal Loans  Credit Card 
Average Debt Amount  £3,609  £562 
Percentage Who Paid Back 
Whole Debt  30%  0.7% 
Percentage Who Paid Back Part 
of the Debt  60%  16.3% 
Percentage Who Paid Nothing  10%  83% 
Mean value of LGD  0.544  0.95 
Collection model  Decision tree model 
with sub-models 
$JHQW¶V 
sub-model 
LGD model  2-step model  2-step model 
Information available  All details of loan 
and customer 
Restricted data 
since not original 
lender 
Table 3.1: Summary of in-house and third party data sets 
The two data sets are completely different and hence show the two extremes 
of debt collection. The in-house data is for 10,000 cases over the entire in-
house collection lifetime for the majority of the cases. For the third party case 
study, the data is for a 70,000 of cases over a very short time period. In order 
to ensure that the data is comparable only the first 2 years after default was 
used in the in-house data set. Table 3.1 summaries the two data sets used to 
compare in-house and third party collections. 
Even the way the debt is collected is different; the in-house debt is collected 
via letter [personal correspondence with collectors]  (see figure 3.1 and table 
ZKHUHDVWKH7KLUGSDUW\XVHPDLQO\WHOHSKRQHVWRGLVFXVVWKHGHEWRUV¶
personal situation and come up with a collection timetable, which is agreeable 
to both parties.    34 
The two types of debt are different too, the in-house collections is recovering 
unsecured personal loan and the third party is collecting bad credit card debt. 
So not only are the amounts of debt very different but the debtors will have 
been intending to pay back the debt over different time periods and will have 
different reasons for taking out the loan in the first place. The lender will have 
had different checks performed on the debtors before issuing the loans and 
the original terms of the loan (loan amount, maximum credit limit) may be very 
different from the situation when the debtor defaults.  
3.2 Distribution of LGD 
Analysing the in-house distribution of LGD, in Figure 3.2, it can be seen that 30% of 
the debtors paid in full and so had LGD=0. Less than 10% paid off nothing. For some 
debtors the  LGD  value  was  greater  than  1  since fees  and  legal  costs  had  been 
added. This is not the case usually in third party collection where almost 90% of the 
population have LGD=1 (Figure 3.3). It is clear that if more attempts had already 
been made to collect the debt, then the recovery rate would be lower.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of LGD in the sample for in-house collection (collection 
for 24months: January1991-December 1992)  
Figure 3.3 shows the LGD for the credit card debt collected by the third party. The x-
axis shows the LGD, the column above 1 represents the number of debtors who 
failed to pay back any of their debt hence LGD=1. The column above 0.95 represents 
all of the debtors who paid back up to 5% of their debt (0.95<=LGD<1). The column 
above 0 represents all of the debtors who paid back more than 95% of their debt 
30%  60%  10%   35 
(0<=LGD<0.05).  The  y-axis  shows  the  percentage  of  debtors  within  each  LGD 
bracket. The majority of the debtors (83%) failed to pay back any of their debt. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of LGD for credit card debt sold to a third party  
The  recovery  rates  or  LGD  for  the  two  samples  are  very  different.  The 
majority of loans collected in-house have an LGD < 1, whereas the majority of 
the loans collected by the third party have LGD = 1. There are several factors 
contributing to this difference. Firstly the debt collected in-house is new debt, 
no  one  else  has  previously  tried  to  collect  the  debt  and  they  have  only 
recently defaulted at the time of collecting. On the other hand the third party 
debt is most likely old and has been collected before. This makes it harder for 
the third party to collect further. Secondly the in-house collection department 
will  have  access  to  more  data  and  that  data  will  have  more  details.  This 
means that they can look at past behaviour, the original loan details in some 
cases. They may also have access to data connected with their bank account 
and income. The third party will not have any of this data. In some cases the 
debtor  may  even  need  to  be  traced  because  they  have  moved  or  are 
deliberately trying to hide from the debt collections third party so that they 
cannot collect the debt.  
3.3 Data Available to In-house and Third Party Collectors 
As has been mentioned before, the in-house collections department will have 
very different data available to them as opposed to the third party collectors. 
0.7%  83%  16.3%
%   36 
The following data was the data issued by the company in each case study to 
the author for modelling purposes, so any sensitive data was unavailable. The 
data  discussed  in  this  chapter is  information,  which  could be  of use  when 
modelling  recovery  rates.  As  was  expected  the  in-house  collectors  had 
access to more detailed and accurate data. 
Table 3.2 shows a summary of the data accessible in both of the data sets. 
Contact information was similar with both in-house and agency having access 
to address, telephone and name of the debtor. However the in-house team 
would normally have up to date information whilst the agency may have data 
that is out of date. Telephone numbers given to the agency could include up 
to eight different numbers for contacting the debtor. However most of these 
numbers will be no longer valid. 
  In-House  Agency 
Contact Information  Address 
Telephone 
Name 
Address 
Telephone 
Name 
Past Behaviour 
Information 
Number  of  months  in 
arrears 
Yearly balance 
None 
Personal Information  Employment 
Sex 
Marital Status 
Age 
Some Employment 
Title 
Age 
Home Ownership  Yes  Yes 
Debt Information  Original Loan Amount 
Default Amount 
Default Date 
Value of Debt at sale 
Default Date 
 
Table 3.2, Summary of In-house Versus Agency Debtor Data 
The in-house collections case study had detailed information on the debtors 
past history whereas in contrast the third party had no data at all on what had 
previously been collected. The default amount was not even known, only the 
balance at time of sale to the third party. The in-house collections had yearly   37 
balances, before and after default, and the number of months they were in 
arrears  for  every  month  on  the  books.  It  is  from  this  information  that  the 
payment patterns discussed in the following chapter are derived and will be 
covered in more detail then. 
Personal information was about the same for both but there again there was 
either  more  detail  or  more  accurate  information  available  to  the  in-house 
collectors. The employment data for instance given to the third party was out 
of date since it came off the original credit card application, or were unusable 
as the debtor was listed as anything from employed to company name or job 
name (sale assistant) when the information was available at all. The in-house 
collectors had all of the different types of employment coded with complete 
information e.g. unemployed=00, self-employed=01 etc. This meant that the 
data was useable and available foUDOOGHEWRUVHYHQLILWZDVQ¶WDFFXUDWHIRU
the whole time period.  
Home ownership was another variable, which both third party and in-house 
collectors had access to. However the in-house data was most likely to be 
more  detailed  and  accurate  since  the  lender  also  lent  the  debtor  their 
mortgage in some cases. 
The debt information is also very different; the in-house collectors had access 
to  the  original  loan  data  (this  could  also  be  a  factor  of  personal  loan  as 
opposed to credit cards), like original loan amount and the term of the loan, 
also if the loan had been increased. Also the collectors knew the default date 
and amount. In contrast the third party collectors only know the amount when 
the debt was sold to the third party and the date of the sale, not the original 
default date and amount. 
3.4 Variable Analysis for Third Party 
7KH YDULDEOHV DYDLODEOH IRU DQDO\VLV DUH WKH GHEWRUV¶ WLWOHV FRXQWU\ RI
residence, age, amount of debt, if contactable by telephone, length of time in 
collections, and home ownership status.   38 
3.4.1 Age 
The debtors range in age between 19 and 100, with the majority of debtors in 
the 25-35 brackets. The data does appear to suggest that the older the debtor 
is the more likely they are to have a recovery rate greater than zero. Figure 
3.4 illustrates the proportion of debtors whose RR is greater than zero in each 
of the age brackets.  
The data was split according to coarse classification not fine classification so 
as to increase the robustness and cope with any non-monotonic relationship 
EHWZHHQWKHUHFRYHU\UDWHDQGWKHGHEWRU¶VDJH8VLQJFRDUVHFODVVLILFDWLRQLV
advocated for this type of situation by Thomas
 [52] since the relationship is not 
monotonic and  when  split  using  fine  classification many  of  the  groups  are 
VXIILFLHQWO\FORVHWREHJURXSHGWRJHWKHU7KHGHEWRU¶VDJHZDVVSOLWWRUHIOHFW
their  stage  in  life,  i.e.  18-25  would  normally  be  students  and  people  just 
starting out in a career and would therefore be on relatively low incomes, have 
little  responsibility  (house,  family)  and  have  little  history  of  financial 
independence. This would cause them to react differently from a person over 
65 who would most likely have a house, be retired, and be on a fixed pension.  
 
Figure 3.4, Recovery Rate by Age for Third Party 
3.4.2 Title 
7KHGDWDLQFOXGHGWKHGHEWRUV¶WLWOHZLWKILYHFODVVLILFDWLRQVSURIHVVLRQDOWLWOHV
(Dr), Mr, Miss, Mrs and Ms, with over 50% of the debtors being men. The 
GHEWRU¶V VH[ DQG WLWOH FDQ EH XVHG EHFDXVH WKLV PRGHO LV QRW XVHG IRU
determining  credit  decision.  Figure  3.4  illustrates  the  proportion  of  debtors 
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whose RR is greater than zero in each of the classifications. As figure 3.4 
demonstrates women are more likely to pay something than men and married 
women  are  the  most  likely  with  23%  of  the  debtors  using  the  title  of  Mrs 
paying something to the third party. What is interesting is that debtors using 
the title of Dr are least likely to pay anything back.  
 
Figure 3.5, Recovery Rate by Title 
3.4.3 Homeownership 
Homeownership  is  divided  into  four  classifications;  family,  solo  ownership, 
joint  ownership  and  tenant.  If  the  debtor  is  known  to  reside  in  a  property 
owned  by  a  member  of  their  family,  but  not  themselves,  then  their 
homeownership  is  classified  as  Family.  If  the  debtor  resides  in  a  property 
owned solely by them then their homeownership status is Solo. Joint status is 
recorded if the debtor and another own their residence and Tenant status if 
they are renting or the details are unknown. The vast majority of the debtors 
are recorded as Tenants, over 85%.  
Figure 3.6 demonstrates that debtors who are classified as Tenants are least 
likely  to  pay  anything  and  debtors  who  reside  at  a  property  that  is  jointly 
owned  appear  to  be  most  likely  to  pay  anything  back.  Presumably  this  is 
because not only do they have a property to raise money against, but they 
also have chattels that could be seized by bailiffs or the other owner could 
help them to raise the money.  
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Figure 3.6, Recovery Rate by Homeownership 
3.4.4 Country of Residence 
Debtors  have  been  divided  into  four  classifications  for  their  country  of 
residence, see figure 3.7; England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Foreign.  Although  the  vast  majority  (over 90%) of  the  debtors fall  into  the 
classification of England and Wales, over 100 debtors reside abroad and they 
appear to be harder to acquire the debt from. 
 
Figure 3.7, Recovery Rate by Country 
3.4.5 Debt Amount 
The individual debts vary from a few pounds to over £40,000. With the bulk of 
debtors owing between £500 and £1,000.  Figure 3.8 shows that the debt 
collection agency was especially successful in obtaining money from debtors 
who owed less than £100, with over 40% of them paying something towards 
their debt. However there are only 85 debts, which fall into this category. 
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Debt  amount  was  split  by  different  magnitudes  as  opposed  to  using  fine 
classification where the continuous variable would be split into deciles. This is 
because  the  range  was  so  large  with  a  majority  clustered  around  £500-
 $OVR SHRSOH¶V EHKDYLRXU LV H[SHFWHG WR EH JURXSHG WKHUHIRUH
someone who owed £51 would be expected to behave differently to someone 
who owed £151, the difference being threefold. However if two people owed 
£1,375, and £1,475, the difference being one hundred pounds as well, they 
may well react similarly or be treated similarly by the collector. The collector in 
this case did react differently to those who owed over £500 and those who 
owed less, which was discovered during personal correspondence with the 
company. Therefore it made sense to split the bins at this point.  
 
Figure 3.8, Recovery Rate by Debt Amount 
3.4.6 Telephone Information 
The data included which telephone numbers for the debtors were still active; 
they had up to five numbers for the debtors, which could include a mobile or 
work number. Figure 3.9 illustrates the number of active telephone numbers 
for the debtors and proportion who have a recovery rate of greater than zero. 
As would be expected the collection agency was least able to obtain money 
from the debtors, which had no telephone numbers. Having either a work or a 
mobile number increased the proportion of debtors paying back part of their 
debt.  
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Figure 3.9, Recovery Rate by Telephone 
Telephone bins were split at 0, 1 and greater active contact numbers available 
to the third party collectors. Having no active contact telephone number for a 
debtor would have a considerabOHQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDELOLW\WR
communicate with them. Having more than one number may also have been 
a factor but the difference between two and three contact numbers did not 
necessarily have any impact at all.  
The type of phone might have DQLPSDFWRQWKHGHEWRU¶VDELOLW\WRSD\HJD
work number implies they are in work and a mobile number implies they can 
pay some sort of contract with the phone company. This was why they were 
selected as variables. 
3.4.7 Time in Collections 
The third party bought the debt over a 20-month period. With the majority of 
the debt bought in the last eight months. There were two different sets of 
loans being collected; one is of significantly better quality of debt than the 
other. The debt collected in Set A is of a lower quality than Set B so they are 
both shown separately in figures 3.10 and 3.11 respectively.  
Set A was old debt, which had been previously collected by other debt agents. 
Therefore it is harder to collect because others have already tried and failed. 
The  debt  on  Set  B  was  bought  directly  from  the  lender  after  it  had  been 
through  their  collections  department  but  had  not  been  given  to  any  other 
agent to collect. This makes a significant difference to the quality of the debt.  
As  figures  3.10  and  3.11  show,  the  longer  the  debt  has  been  with  the 
collections  agency,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  the  debtors  will  pay  back 
something to the third party. The better quality debt in set B means that the 
third party is able to collect the debtor more quickly.    43 
The data from the third party is a snapshot at one point in time. However the 
third party buys the debts over a twenty-month period. Therefore figures 3.10 
and 3.11, show not how long the debt has been with the debtor but how long 
the debt has been with the third party.  
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Figure 3.10, Ratio of non-payers to payers by number of months on the books 
for Set A 
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Figure 3.11, Ratio of payers to non-payers for set B by the number of months 
on the books   44 
3.5 Analysis of the common variables 
Both the in-house and the third party data sets have some common variables. 
These  are:  age,  amount  of  debt  and  residential  status
1.  This  section 
compares how the distributions of these variables affect the debtors paying 
back part of their debt. 
3.5.1 Age 
The majority of debtors from the in-KRXVHGDWDVHWDUHLQWKH³´DQG³-
´ ELQV WKH VPDOOHVW QXPEHU RI GHEWRUV DUH LQ ³´ ELQ 0DMRULW\ RI WKH
FXVWRPHUVIURPWKLUGSDUW\GDWDVHWDUHLQWKH³-´DQG³-´ELQV,QWKH 
third party case, the trend of the proportion of payer to non-payers is stable, 
but slightly increasing for the last two bins. Whereas the in-house case, the 
higher proportion of payer to non-SD\HUVLVLQWKH³-´ELQWKHUHDIWHUWKH
older debtor the lower the proportion of payer to non-payers. 
In-house 
2          Third Party 
          
Figure 3.12: RR distribution by age for in-house collection and third party 
collection 
3.5.2 Residential status 
Homeownership is divided into the following classifications: µIDPLO\¶µRZQHU¶
µMRLQW RZQHUVKLS¶ µWHQDQW¶ DQG µRWKHU¶ ,I WKH GHEWRU LV NQRZQ WR UHVLGH LQ D
property owned by a member of their family, but not themselves or live with 
SDUHQWV WKHQ WKHLU KRPHRZQHUVKLS LV FODVVLILHG DV µIDPLO\¶ ,I WKH GHEWRU 
                                                 
1 Where in-house data set RR<0 due to recovery costs, we made the following 
assumption: if RR<=0, then RR=0. 
2 Data provided by A. Matuszyk during personal correspondence   45 
resides in a property owned solely by them then their homeownership status 
LVµRZQHU¶µ-RLQWRZQHUVKLS¶VWDWXVLVUHFRUGHGLIWKHGHEWRUDQGDQRWKHURZQ
WKHLU UHVLGHQFH µWHQDQW¶ VWDWXV LI WKH\ DUH UHQWLQJ DQG ILQDOO\ µRWKHU¶ LI WKH
details are unknown. The vast majority of the debtors in third party data set 
are recorded as Tenants, over 85%. In the in-house data set, majority of the 
clients have the Owner status (40%). This can also explain the behaviour of 
customers.  Owners  are  slightly  more  likely  to  pay  off  the  debt  whereas 
tenants belong to the group least likely to pay. 
In-house 
3           Third Party       
 
Figure 3.13: RR distribution by homeownership for in-house and third party 
collection 
3.5.3 Debt Amount  
The amount of the debt was from a few pounds to £50,000. The variable was 
divided into eight groups. What is surprising; is that clients, who owe similar 
amounts  in  each  data  set,  behave  differently.  For  in-house  collection  the 
recovery rate is growing with the amount of debt, in case of Third party the 
trend is stable with the only exception for the first bucket (£0-£100) where the 
repayment rate is the highest. 
                                                 
3 Data provided by A. Matuszyk during personal correspondence   46 
In-house 
4          Third Party 
Figure  3.14:  RR  distribution  by  debt  amount  for  in-house  and  third  party 
collection  
This analysis demonstrates that some debtor properties like their age, debt 
amount and residential status have a clear effect on the recovery rate.  
3.6 LGD Models  
For both the data sets, the models built consisted of two steps.  The first step 
is to estimate the spike in the distributions. So for in-house the split with LGD: 
/*'RU/*'!DQG/*' RU/*'IRUWKLUGSDUW\FROOHFWLRQ7KHVSOLWV
were necessary considering the shape of their respective LGD distributions 
(Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Logistic regression models were built for both data sets 
to split them into two groups. The predicted value for those in the first class 
should be either LGD=0 (In-house) or LGD=1 (third party). For those who paid 
back part of their debt, the LGD was estimated using a number of different 
variants of linear regression. These included using ordinary linear regression, 
applying  Beta  and  log  normal  transformations  to  the  data  before  applying 
regression, the Box-Cox [19] DSSURDFKWR³QRUPDOLVLQJ´WKHGDWDDQGXVLQJ
linear regression with Weight Of Evidence (WOE) approach.  
   
                                                 
4 Data provided by A. Matuszyk during personal correspondence   47 
a.  In-house            b. 3rd Party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15: LGD models 
Table  3.3  contains  the  variables  and  results  achieved  during  the  LGD 
modelling for both data sets. As can be seen, different variables were used 
because  of  the  information  available.  In-house  collections  have  more  data 
available to them because they have access to the original loan details and 
behaviour variables from monitoring the loan throughout its lifetime. Whereas 
the third party is limited to information given by the lender. This information is 
limited due to lender policy and lack of requirements on the lender to provide 
useful debtor information. 
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In-house  3rd Party 
1
st stage 
LGD=0 versus LGD>0  LGD=1 versus LGD<1 
The  higher the  loan amount  the 
lower  the  chance  of  paying  off 
everything  
The  longer  the  lifetime  of  the 
loan  the  higher  the  chance  of 
paying off everything  
The higher the application score 
the higher the chance of paying off 
everything  
The more time spent in arrears 
during  the  loan,  the  higher  the 
chance  of  paying  off  everything. 
However  those  who  were  in 
arrears  for  more  than  2/3  of  the 
time,  had  a  lower  chance  of 
paying off everything  
The  more  the  customer  was  in 
arrears  recently  (in  the  last  12 
months) the higher the chance of 
paying off everything  
Having a work telephone number 
increases the likelihood of paying 
back part of the debt 
Having  a  mobile  telephone 
number increases the likelihood of 
paying back part of the debt 
Having more telephone numbers 
increases the likelihood of paying 
back part of the debt  
Owing less than £100 at default 
increases the likelihood of paying 
back part of the debt.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Variables and results from modelling LGD 
5 
   
                                                 
5 In-house data provided by A. Matuszyk during personal correspondence   49 
2
nd stage predicting: 0<LGD<1 
LGD>0                                                                  LGD<1 
The  higher  the  loan  amount  the 
higher expected loss rate  
The higher the application score the 
lower expected loss rate  
The  longer  the  lifetime  of  the  loan 
the lower expected loss rate  
The  more  the  customer  was  in 
arrears  recently  (in  the  last  12 
months) the lower expected loss rate  
The  more  time  spent  in  arrears 
during  the  loan  the  lower  expected 
loss rate  
The  younger  the  GHEWRU¶V DJH  the 
lower expected loss rate 
The lower the default amount owed 
the lower expected loss rate 
Owners  will  have  lower  expected 
loss rate  
Having  a  mobile  decreases  the 
expected loss rate 
Not  having  a  contact  number 
decreases the expected loss rate 
 
 
Table 3.3 continued: Variables and results from modelling LGD 
6 
Stage one for in-house and third party is focused on different extreme LGD 
results. The appendix contains a more detailed regression results table for the 
third party. The contact information was a significant factor in determining who 
would pay back part of their debt. However where the default amount was 
separated into bins, not all of the bins were significant. Table A2 shows the 
2
nd stage linear regression results. All of the variables are significant. 
In the 1
st stage of the in-house model the concern was with paying off the 
whole loan whereas for third party the concern was with not paying off any of 
the loan because this was where the spikes in the LGD distributions were. 
The  in-house  model  found  that  the  higher  the  loan  amount  the  lower  the 
chance  of  paying  off  everything  and  the  third  party  model  found  that  the 
higher the loan amount the lower the chance of paying off part of the debt. 
Applicants with a high application score are predicted less likely to default and 
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if they do default the in-house results suggest they are more likely to pay off 
HYHU\WKLQJ 7KLV VXJJHVWV WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ VFRUH UHFRJQLVHV WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V
willingness  to  pay,  which  applies  both  before  and  after  default.  A  more 
counterintuitive result is that being in arrears recently increases the chance of 
paying  off  completely.  Implying  that  people  who  have  been  struggling  with 
debt in their past may cope better with default than those who have never had 
financial problems. The rest of the in-house model was based on behaviour 
and application variables, which were unavailable to the third party. Therefore 
WKHWKLUGSDUW\PRGHO¶VYDULDEOHVZHUHPRUHIRFXVHGRQKRZWRFRQWDFWWKH
debtor i.e. the telephone numbers available. 
The second stage model is focused on predicting the LGD between 0 and 1 
and trying to fit a distribution. In all cases the models were built in the training 
set  but  the  results  reported  are  based  on  the  holdout  test  set.  Different 
methods were tried (see table 3.4), the best method for in-house was weight 
of evidence with an R
2 of 0.23 and the best method for third party was also 
the weight of evidence with R
2 of 0.15.  
Method   In-house 
2 R   3rd Party 
2 R  
Box Cox  0.1299  0.0591 
Linear regression  0.1337  0.1097 
Beta distribution  0.0832  0.1161 
Log Normal 
transformation  0.1347  0.0729 
WOE approach  0.2274  0.1496 
 
Table 3.4: Comparison of the results for the 2nd stage models 
7 
Table 3.4 shows the fits of the different approaches used in both data sets 
with 
2 R  value. It can be noticed that 
2 R  values are not very different and in 
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both  cases  not  very  high.  These  results  suggest  that  LGD  values  seem 
difficult to forecast. All of the models for third party and in-house, except for 
weight of evidence, gave a narrow distribution focused around the mean. Only 
weight of evidence gave a distribution covering the whole range 0-1 for which 
the LGD observed results covered. 
The Mean Squared Error (MSE) results for WOE approach were 0.193 for the 
in-house and 0.195 for the third party.  
The  linear  regression  model  did  not  use  any  transformation  of  the  target 
variable. In the Box Cox, Beta and lognormal models, the target variable was 
transformed using Box Cox transformation, the Beta distribution and natural 
logarithms respectively. Then linear regression was applied and the results 
transformed  back.  These  transformations  were  applied  because  linear 
regression assumes a normal distribution. However the recovery rates were 
not  normally  distributed.  These  approaches  are  covered  in  more  detail  in 
chapter 2. 
The  variables  used  by  the  in-house  model  and  the  third  party  models are 
again very different due to the information available. The in-house collections 
were privy to application and behaviour variables whereas the third party were 
limited  to  personal  variables  and  contact  information.  Yet  despite  these 
different variables and the greater information held in-house the results of the 
models are very similar. Both the linear regression and the beta distribution 
models gave R
2 values around 0.1, where the predicted results were a poor 
representation of the observed results since in all cases the predictions were 
clustered around the means.  
3.7 Summary 
Although both analysed data sets are about debt recovery, the information 
available in each case is quite different and the average recovery rate varied 
from 5% to 46%. The two-stage model is appropriate for both, even though 
the  spikes  are  at  opposite  ends  of  the  LGD  distribution.  All  of  this  is  not 
surprising because third party debt will usually go through several collection 
processes, so by definition must be harder to collect.    52 
Both sides can use these models to determine the price at which to buy a 
debt. The third party model gives an indication of recovery rate so the third 
party can set an internal upper limit for the price of buying the debt. For the in-
house collection; the question is how much more would they get by keeping 
the debt in their collection process for some further time? To get a feel for this 
one  needs  to  estimate  RR  in  the  next  year  using  the  information  on  the 
borrower and the amount already recovered which will be covered in chapter 
5.  
What is remarkable about the models discussed in this chapter is that despite 
the in-house data set being more detailed, the goodness of fit for both was 
very similar. This is despite the third party model focusing on contact details 
and very few personal details including age and homeownership. Whereas 
the in-house model focused more on loan characteristics; loan amount, time 
spent in arrears, lifetime of the loan. Models for predicting LGD for both in-
house and third party will be covered in more detail later on in this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Predicting Third Party Collections 
The  last  chapter  focused  on  comparing  the  in-house  and  third  party 
collections.  This  chapter  is  focused  on  improving  the  third  party  collection 
predictions.  Since  third  party  predictions  were  poorer in  comparison  to  the 
weight of evidence in-house results (chapter 3) therefore the predictions might 
be improved by a more detailed analysis. With this in mind the debtors were 
grouped and then modelled using regression. Again the models were split into 
two stages. 
The data assessed in this chapter is the same as the data for third party in 
chapter three. The data is a single dump of all the debt being collected by the 
third party. So the information is a single snap shot of the debts bought by the 
third party over a period of twenty months. Because the data is a single dump, 
one data set for all debtors, then the time in collections is different for each 
debtor. However the debt comes from two different sources where the older 
debt is of a poorer quality than the newer debt.  
This data limitation is the motivation behind the modelling methodology in this 
chapter. The length of time in collections should have a positive relationship 
with recovery rates, since the more time in collections means that the agency 
have longer to recover the debt. However with this data set, while there was 
this positive relationship within the two types of debt, overall this relationship 
did not exist across the data set, because the newer debt was of a superior 
quality. Therefore the size of the debt was used to group the debt due to the 
data limitation.  
The  poor  quality  of  the  data  set  also  means  that  it  cannot  be  used  to 
accurately predict LGD, therefore this chapter looks at predicting if the debtor 
would pay back anything rather than predicting the recovery rate. The main 
reason for this is that the data set did not contain any history of the payments 
made, just the overall amount recovered. Therefore no set time period could 
be used to predict recovery rate. With 83% failing to pay back anything, the 
first stage of the model had to be predicting if the debtor would pay back. This 
is also the rational for splitting the debt into older and younger than six months 
for predicting if the debtors would start to pay back their debt. Since there was   54 
no historical record of when the debtors started to pay back, six months was 
used  to  ensure  that  the  third  party  would  have  adequate  time  to  start  the 
collections process without limiting the data set.  
4.1 Grouping the Debtors 
Since debt amount is a significant factor in all of the previous analyses, and is 
known up front of the collection process it is an excellent factor to distinguish 
between different types of debt. Debt amount was separated into four groups 
and then each group was analysed separately. The summary of the split is in 
table 4.1.  
  Range of debt value  Number of 
Debtors 
Number of 
Debtors who paid 
Small  £0< Debt Value<£750  20620  3271 
Medium  'HEW9DOXH  13638  2008 
Large  'HEW
Value<£2,000 
17872  3232 
Extra 
Large 
'HEW9DOXH  19556  3680 
 Table 4.1, Summary of grouping debt by value 
Once the debtors were grouped the regression results were different from the 
results  previously  found.  Assuming  a  beta  distribution,  for  the  linear 
regression model, resulted in a poorer model than using the ordinary linear 
regression model. The R-squared values were in some cases improved. In 
particular the R-squared values for the models predicting for debtors who fell 
into the category of owing a small amount of debt, were all an improvement 
on the models predicting for all of the debtors.    55 
Table 4.2, Summary of regression models with debt grouped by value 
7DEOHVXPPDULVHVWKHUHJUHVVLRQPRGHOV¶UHVXOWVZKHQWKHGHEWRUVDUH
grouped by the value of their debt. These results are from the training data to 
assess  how  goodness  of  fit  of  the  models.  R
2  is  calculated  by  using  the 
likelihood-ratio  statistic.  All  of  the  models  use  the  same  variables.  These 
variables are:  
x  Is the debtor aged between 18-25 (Age25) 
x  Is the debtor aged between 25-35 (Age35) 
x  Is the debtor aged between 35-45  (Age45) 
x  Is the debtor aged between 45-55  (Age55) 
x  Reference category for age is if the debtor is aged over 55 
x  The amount of debt owed (Debt Value) 
x  Does the debtor have one or more active telephone numbers (One or 
more Telephones) 
x  Reference category is if the debtor has no active telephone numbers 
and  therefore  the  third  party  has  no  way  to  contact  the  debtor  via 
telephone  
x  Does the debtor have an active mobile number (Mobile Telephone) 
x  Reference category is if the debtor has no active mobile number known 
to the third party 
x  Does the debtor have an active work number (Work Telephone) 
x  Reference category is if the debtor has no active work number known 
to the third party 
Debt Value Small Medium Large Ex-large All Debtors
Root MSE 0.33064 0.32651 0.35251 0.36208 0.34518
R-Squared 0.185 0.1489 0.1565 0.189 0.1579
Root MSE 0.35618 0.3478 0.36605 0.36439 0.36091
R-Squared 0.2124 0.1848 0.1934 0.2034 0.1945
Root MSE 0.33542 0.30312 0.28724 0.25945 0.32288
R-Squared 0.2343 0.1503 0.1284 0.0797 0.117
Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression (on books minimum 6 months)
Linear Regression Model (Recovery Rate)  56 
x  Number of telephone numbers (No. of Telephones) 
x  Does  the  debtor  reside  in  a  residence  owned  by  a  family  member 
(Family Home) 
x  Does  the  debtor  reside  in  a  residence  jointly  owned  by  them  and 
another (Joint Ownership) 
x  Does  the  debtor  reside  in  a  residence  owned  by  them  solely  (Solo 
Ownership) 
x  Reference category is if the debtor is a tenant or their residence status 
is unknown 
x  If the debtor is female (Female) 
x  Reference category is if the debtor is male 
x  ,IWKHGHEWRUKDVEHHQLQWKHWKLUGSDUW\¶VFROOHFWLRQSURFHVVIRUOHVV
than six months (In collections <6 months) 
x  ,I WKH GHEWRU KDV EHHQ LQ WKH WKLUG SDUW\¶V FROOHFWLRQ SURFHVV IRU
between six and twelve months (6<collections <12 months) 
x  Reference  category  LV LI WKH GHEWRU KDV EHHQ LQ WKH WKLUG SDUW\¶V
collection process for longer than twelve months 
Table 4.2 shows the results for three sets of prediction models. The top sets 
of results are for a logistic regression model to predict who will pay back part 
of their debt; this is the equivalent to 1
st stage in the models discussed in 
chapter 3. The middle sets of results are for a logistic regression model (1
st 
stage) on debtors who have been in collections for longer than six months. 
The final sets of results are for a linear regression model (equivalent to the 2
nd 
stage in chapter 3) to predict the recovery rate for those debtors who have 
started to pay back their debt. In each type of model, the debtors were first of 
all  separated  by  the  value  of  the  debt  they  owed.  Then  the  results  of  the 
regression  models  were  compared  to  the  regression  models  for  all  of  the 
debtors for that regression model. 
The Logistic Regression results (top of table 4.2) are for all of the debtors, 
modelling who will pay back part of their debt. As can be seen from table 4.2,   57 
debtors who owed less than £750 (small) have the best prediction model. The 
other groups of debtors (medium, large, extra large) had a worse prediction 
model than the prediction model for all debtors.  
7KH/RJLVWLF5HJUHVVLRQ0RGHOIRUGHEWRUVZKRKDGEHHQLQWKHWKLUGSDUW\¶V
collection process for a minimum of six months is the middle set of results in 
table  4.2.  The  reason  that  this  regression  model  was  tested,  is  that  the 
YDULDEOH ³GHEWRU KDG EHHQ LQ FROOHFWLRQV IRU OHVV WKDQ VL[ PRQWKV´ ZDV
significant in all cases and the estimate was negative. This shows that those 
debtors who had been in collections for less than six months, when this data 
was collected, are less likely to pay back any of their debt. This was assumed 
to be an operational issue, in that the third party had not had enough time to 
collect money from the debtor. Some may view six months to be too long. 
However  looking  at  figure  3.11,  six  months  gave  good  results  for  debtors 
paying back part of their debt so it was used as a variable here. These results 
for the regression models show an improvement on the  regression models 
using the entire set of debtors. This is most likely due to the fact that, the third 
party will have probably contacted the debtor within the first six months and 
collected some money from them if the debtor is willing and able to pay. Again 
debtors who owe less than £750 (small) have the best prediction model. 
The  results  for  the  linear  regression  model  (2
nd  stage)  for  predicting  the 
recovery rate on debtors who have started paying are displayed at the bottom 
of table 4.2. The linear regression model was not separated into debtors who 
have been in collections for more than six months because the reason for the 
separation of the logistic regression model was to allow time for the third party 
to contact the debtor and collect money from them. Since only debtors who 
have paid back part of their debt are included in the linear regression model, 
the third party has evidently already had sufficient time to contact the debtor 
and arrange for payment. The prediction models are more accurate when the 
debtors are separated into the debt value groups before modelling. Only those 
debtors  who  owed  more  than  £2,000  (extra  large)  had  a  worse  prediction 
model than the model for all debtors. Again debtors who owe less than £750 
(small) have the best prediction model.   58 
As can be seen in table 4.2, separating the debtors by the debt amount owed 
before modelling, improved the prediction models in some cases. Specifically 
in  the  case  of  debtors  who  owed  a  small  amount  (less  than  £750);  the 
prediction models were all an improvement on the models using all of the 
debtors regardless of debt amount. Separating out those debtors who had 
been  in  collections  for  less  than  six  months  also  improved  the  logistic 
regression  model  to  predict  who  would  pay  back  part  of  their  debt.  By 
separating  the  debtors  by  the  debt  amount  before  modelling,  the  linear 
UHJUHVVLRQPRGHOVIRUSUHGLFWLQJWKHGHEWRUV¶ recovery rate were improved in 
all cases, except those debtors who owed more than £2,000.  
4.2 Model 
The  models  all  used  the  same  variables,  but  the  resulting  parameter 
estimates  were  different  for  each  sub  group.  Tables  4.3  to  4.14  show  the 
results of the regressions.  
4.2.1 Small Debts  
Table  4.3  gives  the  results  for  the  logistic  regression  for  small  debts  to 
estimate if a debtor will pay back part of their debt. As the table 4.3 shows, 
only the variable of Solo Ownership (does the debtor reside in a residence 
owned by them solely) is not significant. In regards to age the results show 
that if the debtor is over 55 then they are more likely to pay back part of their 
debt than if they are younger. This is indicated because all of the variables 
shown are negative and the reference category for age is over 55, thereby the 
parameter estimate is positive. The higher the estimate of the parameter; the 
more likely that a debtor with that characteristic, will pay back part of their 
debt. This result corroborates  the results shown in figure 3.4 in chapter 3, 
which show that debtors over 55 were more likely to pay back part of their 
debt.  
In table 4.3, the Parameter Estimate of Debt Value (value of debt at time of 
sale)  is  negative  too,  which  is  interesting  because  for  medium  and  large 
debts, as show in tables 4.4 and 4.5, the opposite is true. This indicates that 
the larger the amount owed, the less likely the debtor will be to pay back part 
of their debt. These results bear out the results in figure 3.8 in chapter 3,   59 
where  the  debtor was  more  likely  to  pay  back  part  of  their  debt  for debts 
owing less than £100, after this the proportion paying back part of their debt 
fell and then rose after the amount owed was £1,000. It then started to fall 
again after £2,000; hence in table 4.6 the parameter estimate for debt amount 
is again negative. 
Table 4.3 shows that the more contact telephone numbers available to the 
collectors  the  more  likely  the  debtor  would  pay  back  part  of  their  debt. 
Especially if one of those numbers was a work telephone, indicating that they 
were still employed. 
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.21026  0.01358  15.49  <.0001 
Age25  1  -0.03909  0.0119  -3.28  0.001 
Age35  1  -0.05269  0.01138  -4.63  <.0001 
Age45  1  -0.04881  0.01186  -4.12  <.0001 
Age55  1  -0.03106  0.01312  -2.37  0.0179 
Debt Value  1  -0.00008906 1.52E-05  -5.86  <.0001 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.08355  0.01176  7.11  <.0001 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.03152  0.00989  3.19  0.0014 
Work 
Telephone  1  0.09285  0.01325  7.01  <.0001 
Female  1  0.04729  0.00551  8.59  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.10187  0.00693  14.69  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.04903  0.01652  2.97  0.003 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.0496  0.01591  3.12  0.0018 
Solo 
Ownership  1  -0.017  0.02045  -0.83  0.4057 
In collections 
<6 months  1  -0.2014  0.00717  -28.07  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.0276  0.00714  -3.86  0.0001 
 
Table 4.3, Logistic regression results (1
st stage) for small debts 
If the debtor was female then they were more likely to pay back part of their 
debt then if they were male. Again this is substantiated in figure 3.5 in chapter   60 
3  where  debtors with  female  titles  (Miss and  Mrs)  had  a  larger  proportion 
paying back part of their debt than their male counterparts.  
For home ownership what is interesting is that solo ownership has a negative 
effect on the results but this is not as significant a result as stated earlier and 
goes against the results in figure 3.6 chapter 3. However debtors residing in 
jointly owned or family own residences are the most likely to pay back part of 
their debt as shown in figure 3.6 in chapter 3.  
The longer the debt was in collections and therefore the more time the third 
party had to act on the debt, then the more likely it is that the debtor will pay 
back  part  of  their  debt,  which  is  the  intuitive  response  expected.  This  is 
indicated by the reference category EHLQJ]HURIRUWKHWLPHLQWKHWKLUGSDUW\¶V
collections  being  greater  than  12  months.  This  implies  a  higher  coefficient 
than the other two variables for time in collections, which both have negative 
coefficients as the last two rows of table 4.3 show. Therefore the probability 
that a debtor will have a collection rate>0 is higher for debtors who have been 
in collections for more than 12 months.  
4.2.2 Medium Debts 
Table  4.4  gives  the  results for the  logistic regression  for medium  debts  to 
estimate if a debtor will pay back part of their debt. Again the variable of Solo 
Ownership  is  not  significant,  and  the  probability  that  a  debtor  will  have  a 
collection rate>0 is higher if the debtor is over 55 than if they are younger. As 
discussed  earlier  the  debt  value  coefficient  is  positive  indicating  that  the 
higher the debt amount owed the more likely thHGHEWRU¶Vcollection rate>0. 
Once more the greater the number of contact telephone numbers available to 
the collectors the higher the probability that a debtor will have a  collection 
rate>0. Especially if one of those numbers is a work telephone, indicating that 
they are still employed.  
Again if the debtor was female then they were more likely to pay back part of 
their debt then if they were male. For home ownership, what is interesting, is 
that solo ownership now has a positive effect on the results but this is not a 
significant  result  as  stated  earlier  and  supports  the  results  in  figure  3.6 
chapter 3. Again debtors residing in a jointly owned or family owned residence   61 
are  the  most  likely  to  have  a  collection  rate>0  as  shown  in  figure  3.6  in 
chapter  3.  Also  the  longer  the  debt  was  in  collections  the  more  likely  the 
GHEWRU¶Vcollection rate>0. 
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.07576  0.04304  1.76  0.0784 
Age25  1  -0.06202  0.01502  -4.13  <.0001 
Age35  1  -0.07533  0.01416  -5.32  <.0001 
Age45  1  -0.06233  0.01445  -4.31  <.0001 
Age55  1  -0.03374  0.01572  -2.15  0.0319 
Debt Value  1  0.00011518 4.65E-05  2.48  0.0132 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.06397  0.01359  4.71  <.0001 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.05173  0.01122  4.61  <.0001 
Work 
Telephone  1  0.119  0.01563  7.61  <.0001 
Female  1  0.03811  0.00665  5.73  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.08  0.00767  10.44  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.06706  0.0181  3.7  0.0002 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.08397  0.01659  5.06  <.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.02745  0.0202  1.36  0.1743 
In collections 
<6 months  1  -0.17952  0.00916  -19.59  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.05366  0.00887  -6.05  <.0001 
 
Table 4.4, Logistic regression results (1
st stage) for medium debts   62 
4.2.3 Large Debts 
Table  4.5  gives  the  results  for  the  logistic  regression  for  large  debts  to 
estimate if a debtor will pay back part of their debt. As the table shows the two 
variables  of  Solo  Ownership  and  if  the  debtor  has  been  in  collections  for 
between  six  to  twelve  months,  are  not  significant.  There  are  no  other 
VLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHVLQWKHYDULDEOHV¶FRHIILFLHQWVDVLQWKHUHJUHVVLRQUHVXOWV
for medium sized debts.  
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.11539  0.02274  5.07  <.0001 
Age25  1  -0.05089  0.01579  -3.22  0.0013 
Age35  1  -0.06666  0.0135  -4.94  <.0001 
Age45  1  -0.06195  0.01351  -4.59  <.0001 
Age55  1  -0.03344  0.01469  -2.28  0.0228 
Debt Value  1  0.00003502 1.28E-05  2.75  0.006 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.08168  0.01422  5.74  <.0001 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.03658  0.01185  3.09  0.002 
Work 
Telephone  1  0.09993  0.01562  6.4  <.0001 
Female  1  0.04569  0.00724  6.31  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.08295  0.00793  10.46  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.05449  0.01806  3.02  0.0026 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.06662  0.0144  4.62  <.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.01651  0.01845  0.89  0.3709 
In collections 
<6 months  1  -0.16367  0.00998  -16.41  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.01175  0.00974  -1.21  0.2275 
 
Table 4.5, Logistic Regression Results (1
st stage) for Large Debts 
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4.2.4 Extra Large Debts 
Table 4.6 gives the results for the logistic regression for extra large debts to 
estimate if a debtor will pay back part of their debt. As discussed earlier the 
debt value coefficient is negative indicating that the higher the debt amount 
owed the less likely the debtor is to pay back part of the debt. The variables of 
Solo Ownership and if the debtor has been in collections for more than 12 
months  are  now  significant.  There  are  no  other  significant  changes  in  the 
YDULDEOHV¶FRHIILFLHQWVDVLQWKHUHJUHVVLRQUHVXOWVIRUODUJHVL]HGGHEWV 
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.11302  0.01112  10.17  <.0001 
Age25  1  -0.02759  0.0148  -1.86  0.0624 
Age35  1  -0.04668  0.00981  -4.76  <.0001 
Age45  1  -0.02812  0.00933  -3.01  0.0026 
Age55  1  -0.022  0.00997  -2.21  0.0274 
Debt Value  1  -0.000003 1.02E-06  -2.93  0.0034 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.0837  0.01139  7.35  <.0001 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.06257  0.00943  6.64  <.0001 
Work 
Telephone  1  0.06641  0.01202  5.52  <.0001 
Female  1  0.04457  0.00629  7.09  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.05599  0.00612  9.14  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.03507  0.01461  2.4  0.0164 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.14564  0.00988  14.74  <.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.0371  0.01251  2.96  0.003 
In collections 
<6 months  1  -0.10901  0.00889  -12.26  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  0.04758  0.00844  5.64  <.0001 
 
Table 4.6, Logistic Regression Results (1
st stage) for Extra Large Debts    64 
4.2.5 Small Debts Older than 6 Months 
Table  4.7  gives  the  results  for  the  logistic  regression  for  small  debts  to 
estimate if a debtor will pay back part of their debt; for debts, which had been 
LQWKHWKLUGSDUW\¶VFROOHFWLRQSURFHVVIRUORQJHUWKDQPRQWKV7KHUHDVRQIRU
producing this regrHVVLRQPRGHOLVWKDWWKHYDULDEOH³LIWKHGHEWRUKDGEHHQLQ
FROOHFWLRQV IRU OHVV WKDQ VL[ PRQWKV´ ZDV VLJQLILFDQW LQ DOO FDVHV DQG WKH
coefficient  was  negative.  This  shows  that  those  debtors  who  had  been  in 
collections for less than six months, when this data was collected, are less 
likely  to  have  paid  back  any  of  their  debt.  This  was  assumed  to  be  an 
operational issue, in that the third party had not had enough time to collect 
money from the debtor.  
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.22306  0.01853  12.04  <.0001 
Age25  1  -0.03178  0.01642  -1.94  0.0529 
Age35  1  -0.05204  0.01558  -3.34  0.0008 
Age45  1  -0.04758  0.01627  -2.92  0.0035 
Age55  1  -0.03191  0.01825  -1.75  0.0804 
Debt Value  1  -0.00013931 2.2E-05  -6.33  <.0001 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.1759  0.01872  9.39  <.0001 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.01744  0.016  1.09  0.2757 
Work 
Telephone  1  0.05305  0.02078  2.55  0.0107 
Female  1  0.05188  0.0077  6.73  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.13169  0.01162  11.33  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.06555  0.02677  2.45  0.0143 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.09527  0.0246  3.87  0.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.05128  0.03302  1.55  0.1205 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.072  0.00835  -8.63  <.0001 
Table 4.7, Logistic regression results (1
st stage) for small debts older than 6 
months 
The results in table 4.7 are very similar to the results in table 4.3 as expected. 
What is different however is that now the variables of whether the debtor has   65 
an  active  mobile  number,  aged  between  45  and  55,  as  well  as  Solo 
Ownership are not significant. The variable parameter estimates have also 
changed slightly in most cases, Solo Ownership having the largest change 
going from negative to positive but this result is not significant. 
Modelling the debt that was older than 6 months improved the regression, 
giving an R
2 of 0.2124 instead of 0.185 for all small debts. 
4.2.6 Medium Debts Older than 6 Months 
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.06375  0.05891  1.08  0.2792 
Age25  1  -0.0674  0.02075  -3.25  0.0012 
Age35  1  -0.08495  0.01944  -4.37  <.0001 
Age45  1  -0.07257  0.01994  -3.64  0.0003 
Age55  1  -0.01998  0.02168  -0.92  0.3568 
Debt Value  1  0.00012244 6.39E-05  1.92  0.0554 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.13858  0.02068  6.7  <.0001 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.03231  0.01729  1.87  0.0617 
Work 
Telephone  1  0.09609  0.02365  4.06  <.0001 
Female  1  0.04682  0.00919  5.09  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.09913  0.01202  8.25  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.09173  0.0281  3.26  0.0011 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.09809  0.02476  3.96  <.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  -0.0108  0.03167  -0.34  0.733 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.08765  0.01012  -8.66  <.0001 
Table 4.8, Logistic regression results (1
st stage) for medium debts older than 6 
months 
Table  4.8  gives  the  results for the  logistic regression  for medium  debts  to 
estimate if a debtor will pay back part of their debt; for debts, which had been 
LQWKHWKLUGSDUW\¶VFROOHFWLRQSURFHVVIRUORQJHUWKDQPRQWKV 
The results in table 4.8 are very similar to the results in table 4.4 as expected. 
What is different however is that again the variable of whether the debtor is   66 
aged between 45 and 55, has an active mobile, as well as Solo Ownership is 
now not significant. The debt value is also less significant than before. The 
variable parameter estimates have also changed slightly in most cases. 
Modelling the debt that was older than 6 months improved the regression, 
giving an R
2 of 0.1848 instead of 0.1489 for all medium debts. 
4.2.7 Large Debts Older than 6 Months 
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.12358  0.02457  5.03  <.0001 
Age25  1  -0.04838  0.01742  -2.78  0.0055 
Age35  1  -0.06945  0.01488  -4.67  <.0001 
Age45  1  -0.05789  0.015  -3.86  0.0001 
Age55  1  -0.03142  0.01631  -1.93  0.054 
Debt Value  1  0.00002259 1.4E-05  1.61  0.1078 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.15527  0.01741  8.92  <.0001 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.03308  0.01477  2.24  0.0251 
Work 
Telephone  1  0.05942  0.01948  3.05  0.0023 
Female  1  0.04219  0.00795  5.31  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.10661  0.01006  10.6  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.03682  0.02381  1.55  0.122 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.09812  0.01759  5.58  <.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.03457  0.02308  1.5  0.1342 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.0564  0.00895  -6.3  <.0001 
Table 4.9, Logistic regression results (1
st stage) for large debts older than 6 
months 
Table  4.9  gives  the  results  for  the  logistic  regression  for  large  debts  to 
estimate if a debtor will pay back part of their debt; for debts, which had been 
LQWKHWKLUGSDUW\¶VFROOHFWLRQSrocess for longer than 6 months.  
The results in table 4.9 are very similar to the results in table 4.5 as expected. 
What  is  different  however  is  that  now  the  variable  of  whether  the  debtor 
resides at the home of a family member and the debt value as well as Solo   67 
Ownership  is  not  significant.  The  variable  of  whether  the  debtor  is  aged 
between  45  and  55  is  also  less  significant  than  before.  The  variable 
parameter estimates have also changed slightly in most cases. The number of 
active telephones now has a greater positive effect than before. 
Modelling the debt that was older than 6 months improved the regression, 
giving an R
2 of 0.1934 instead of 0.1565 for all large debts. 
4.2.8 Extra Large Debts Older than 6 Months 
Table 4.10 gives the results for the logistic regression for extra large debts to 
estimate if a debtor will pay back part of their debt, for debts that had been in 
WKHWKLUGSDUW\¶VFROOHFWLRQSURFHVVIRUORQJHUWKDQPRQWKV 
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.10784  0.01348  8  <.0001 
Age25  1  -0.00961  0.01937  -0.5  0.6198 
Age35  1  -0.04137  0.01273  -3.25  0.0012 
Age45  1  -0.02917  0.01231  -2.37  0.0178 
Age55  1  -0.01899  0.01331  -1.43  0.1536 
Debt Value  1  -0.00000458 1.26E-06  -3.65  0.0003 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.1324  0.01636  8.09  <.0001 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.03008  0.0139  2.16  0.0305 
Work 
Telephone  1  0.04951  0.01798  2.75  0.0059 
Female  1  0.05501  0.00829  6.64  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.08906  0.0092  9.68  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.05764  0.0224  2.57  0.0101 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.18757  0.01489  12.59  <.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.07342  0.01859  3.95  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  0.00248  0.00917  0.27  0.7866 
Table 4.10, Logistic regression results (1
st stage) for extra large debts older 
than 6 months 
The  results  in  table  4.10  are  very  similar  to  the  results  in  table  4.6  as 
expected. What is different however is that now the variable of whether the   68 
debtor is aged between 18 and 25 or 45 and 55 and if the debt has been in 
collections  for  longer  than  6  months  is  no  longer  significant.  The  variable 
parameter estimates have also changed slightly in most cases.  
Modelling the debt that was older than 6 months improved the regression, 
giving an R
2 of 0.2034 instead of 0.189 for all extra large debts. 
4.2.9 Recovery Rate for Small Debts  
Table  4.11  gives  the  results  for  the  linear  regression  for  small  debts  to 
estimate how much of their debt they would repay if they repaid part of the 
debt. As the table shows the variables of debtors age, if they have a mobile 
phone, reside in a family home or are female are not significant. In regards to 
age the results show that if the debtor is younger then they are more likely to 
pay back more of the debt but these results are not significant.  
Debt value coefficient is negative, indicating that the larger the amount owed, 
the less of the debt the debtor is likely to pay back. Telephones have a more 
complicated effect on the recovery rate. This model shows that if the debtor 
has no contact telephone then they pay back more than if they do have a 
contact telephone. Evidently if the debtor does pay back part of their debt 
without being contacted by phone then they are more amenable to  paying 
back  their  debt  and  therefore  pay  back  more  than  those  contacted  by 
telephone. This result is only reversed if the debtor had at least four active 
telephones however one or two of those phone numbers would have to be a 
mobile  or  work  number.  Since  both  of  these  had  a  negative  effect  on  the 
recovery  rate,  the  debtor  would  really  have  to  have  five  active  telephone 
numbers to have the same positive result on the estimated recovery rate as if 
the  debtor  had  no  phone  number.  If  the  debtor  had  five  contact  numbers 
(maximum  on  the  records)  then  the  collectors  must  have  contacted  them 
numerous times to try out all of the numbers. However having as little as two 
numbers, provided they  were not a mobile or work number, would have a 
SRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQWKHGHEWRU¶VHVWLPDWHGUHFRYHU\UDWH 
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Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  1.01424  0.03593  28.23  <.0001 
Age25  1  0.06053  0.03024  2  0.0454 
Age35  1  0.03293  0.0288  1.14  0.2529 
Age45  1  0.0294  0.0298  0.99  0.3238 
Age55  1  -0.02919  0.03266  -0.89  0.3715 
Debt Value  1  -0.00074813 4.45E-05 -16.82  <.0001 
One or more 
Telephones  1  -0.0542  0.028  -1.94  0.053 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  -0.01577  0.02107  -0.75  0.4543 
Work 
Telephone  1  -0.09325  0.02368  -3.94  <.0001 
Family 
Home  1  0.04227  0.03528  1.2  0.231 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.08457  0.03243  2.61  0.0092 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.13152  0.0503  2.61  0.009 
Female  1  -0.0181  0.0152  -1.19  0.2341 
In collections 
<6 months  1  -0.33971  0.02656  -12.79  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.16402  0.02087  -7.86  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.02816  0.01435  1.96  0.0499 
 
Table 4.11, Linear regression results (2
nd stage) for small debts  
In  the  logistic  regression  results,  having  a  female  debtor  improved  their 
probability  of  their  collection  rate>0.  However  in  this  linear  regression,  a 
female debtor has a negative coefficient decreasing their predicted recovery 
rate in comparison to male debtors.  
For home ownership variables, provided the debtor is not a tenant then it had 
DSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQWKHHVWLPDWHGUHFRYHU\UDWH'HEWRUVZLWK³VRORRZQHUVKLS´
have the highest coefficient. 
The  longer  the  debt  was  in  collections  and  therefore  the  more  time  the 
collectors had to act on the debt then the higher the recovery rate as would be 
expected.    70 
4.2.10 Recovery Rate for Medium Debts  
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.69143  0.10164  6.8  <.0001 
Age25  1  0.04769  0.03255  1.46  0.1431 
Age35  1  0.06688  0.03029  2.21  0.0274 
Age45  1  0.02947  0.0306  0.96  0.3357 
Age55  1  0.02179  0.03242  0.67  0.5016 
Debt Value  1  -0.00024271 0.000111  -2.18  0.0294 
One or more 
Telephones  1  -0.04237  0.0288  -1.47  0.1414 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.02553  0.02119  1.2  0.2286 
Work 
Telephone  1  -0.03703  0.02413  -1.53  0.1251 
Family 
Home  1  0.06866  0.03411  2.01  0.0443 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.0427  0.0301  1.42  0.1563 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.14391  0.04119  3.49  0.0005 
Female  1  -0.04278  0.01588  -2.69  0.0072 
In collections 
<6 months  1  -0.31173  0.02582  -12.08  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.22429  0.02179  -10.29  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.00664  0.0135  0.49  0.6229 
Table 4.12, Linear regression results (2
nd stage) for medium debts 
Table  4.12  gives  the  results  for the  linear regression  for medium  debts  to 
estimate how much of their debt they would repay if they repaid part of the 
debt. As the table shows only the variables of debt values, female and time in 
collections are significant. In regards to age the results show that if the debtor 
is younger then they are more likely to pay back more of the debt but these 
results (with the exception of age 25-35) are not significant.  
Debt value parameter estimate is negative, this indicates that the larger the 
amount owed, the less of the debt the debtor will be likely to pay back. Again 
telephones have a more complicated effect on the recovery rate but none of 
the results are significant. The results are similar to those in table 4.11 except 
that mobile telephones now have a positive effect on recovery rate estimates.   71 
2QFH PRUH WKH FRHIILFLHQW IRU WKH YDULDEOH ³IHPDOH´ LV negative  decreasing 
their predicted recovery rate. 
 
For home ownership, provided the debtor is not a tenant, it had a positive 
effect on the estimated recovery rate. Only the result for joint ownership is not 
significant. The longer the debt was in collections then the more the debtor is 
likely to pay back as expected.  
4.2.11 Recovery Rate for Large Debts  
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.49633  0.04092  12.13  <.0001 
Age25  1  0.11446  0.02685  4.26  <.0001 
Age35  1  0.0592  0.02252  2.63  0.0086 
Age45  1  0.08124  0.02214  3.67  0.0002 
Age55  1  0.06546  0.02342  2.79  0.0052 
Debt Value  1  -0.0001029 0.000023  -4.47  <.0001 
One or more 
Telephones  1  -0.01625  0.02312  -0.7  0.4822 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.01692  0.01705  0.99  0.3212 
Work 
Telephone  1  -0.01859  0.01969  -0.94  0.345 
Family 
Home  1  0.0053  0.02714  0.2  0.8453 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.09187  0.02163  4.25  <.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.10598  0.03117  3.4  0.0007 
Female  1  -0.02818  0.01312  -2.15  0.0319 
In collections 
<6 months  1  -0.26528  0.02123  -12.5  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.18705  0.0189  -9.9  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.00198  0.01094  0.18  0.8564 
Table 4.13, Linear regression results (2
nd stage) for large debts 
Table  4.13  gives  the  results  for  the  linear  regression  for  large  debts  to 
estimate how much of their debt they would repay if they repaid part of the 
debt. As the table shows only the variables of female, telephone numbers and 
family home are not significant. In regards to age the results show that again if   72 
the debtor is under 25 then they are more likely to pay back more of the debt 
than those who are older. 
Debt value parameter estimate is again negative, this indicates that the larger 
the amount owed, the less of the debt the debtor is likely to pay back. Again 
telephones have a more complicated effect on the recovery rate but none of 
the results are significant. The results are similar to those in tables 4.11 and 
4.12. Again mobile telephones now have a positive effect on recovery rate 
estimates. There is little change between the variable coefficients for home 
ownership, sex and length of time in collections as in the results in table 4.12. 
4.2.12 Recovery Rate for Extra Large Debts  
Variable  DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
Intercept  1  0.33591  0.02486  13.51  <.0001 
Age25  1  0.02084  0.02833  0.74  0.462 
Age35  1  0.01607  0.01934  0.83  0.406 
Age45  1  -0.00099432 0.01746  -0.06  0.9546 
Age55  1  -0.00767  0.01825  -0.42  0.6745 
Debt Value  1  -0.00001379 2.31E-06  -5.97  <.0001 
One or more 
Telephones  1  0.00211  0.02064  0.1  0.9186 
Mobile 
Telephone  1  0.0145  0.01513  0.96  0.338 
Work 
Telephone  1  -0.00547  0.01731  -0.32  0.752 
Family 
Home  1  0.03901  0.02472  1.58  0.1148 
Joint 
Ownership  1  0.07178  0.01526  4.7  <.0001 
Solo 
Ownership  1  0.14257  0.02228  6.4  <.0001 
Female  1  -0.02405  0.01195  -2.01  0.0442 
In collections 
<6 months  1  -0.19734  0.02167  -9.11  <.0001 
6<collections 
<12 months  1  -0.15422  0.02015  -7.65  <.0001 
No. of 
Telephones  1  0.00097223  0.00948  0.1  0.9183 
Table 4.14, Linear regression results (2
nd stage) for extra large debts 
Table 4.14 gives the results for the linear regression for extra large debts to 
estimate how much of their debt they would repay if they repaid part of the 
debt. As the table shows only the variables of debt values, female and time in   73 
collections are significant. In regards to age the results show that if the debtor 
is younger then they are more likely to pay back more of the debt. In fact 
those over the age of 35 had a negative effect on the recovery rate estimate. 
Having active telephones have a positive effect on the recovery rate but none 
of the results are significant. Only work phone numbers have a negative effect 
on  recovery  rate  estimates.  There  is  little  change  between  the  variable 
coefficients for home ownership, sex and length of time in collections as the 
results to table 4.13. 
4.3 Prediction 
The two-stage model was used to predict the recovery rate of the debts. All of 
the  debtors  were  split  into  the  groups  and  then  divided  into  test  set  and 
training set. The training sets were used to form the models and then the test 
sets were used to test the models. The following results are based on the test 
sets. 
7KH WHVW VHWV¶ YDULDEOHV ZHUH PXOWLSOLHG E\ WKH ORJLVWLF UHJUHVVLRQ PRGHO
coefficients (for all debtors not just those older than 6-months). Selecting the 
logit value at which to cut off the payer from the non-payers depends on how 
the model is to be used. Trying to predict the value of a group of debts means 
using a cut-off, which ensures the higher percentage of debtors, are correctly 
classified. Figure 4.1 shows the effects of applying different cut-off values to 
the logistic regression on the small debts. Figure 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 shows the 
effects  of  applying  different  cut-off  values  to  the  logit  from  the  logistic 
regression on the medium, large and extra large debts respectively.  
Figures 4.1 to 4.4 show the effects of different logit cut-off values in each of 
the sets of debt. The x-axis shows the logit values, and the y-axis show how 
many  debtors  are  correctly  classified  using  each  cut-off.  The  blue  series 
indicates the percentage of non-payers that are correctly classified. The red 
series indicates the percentage of payers that are correctly classified and the 
green  series  indicates  the  total  percentage  of  debtors  which  are  correctly 
classified. 
As would be expected the non-payers correctly assessed increases as the 
cut-off increases where as the number of payers correctly assessed falls. At a   74 
cut-off of 0.4 the highest number of debtors is correctly gauged ~83% since 
the number of non-payers is greater than the number of payers. Therefore 
small  increases  in  the  number  of  none-payers  correctly  assessed  has  a 
proportionate effect on the number of debtors correctly assessed but has a 
large effect on the number of payers correctly assessed.  
Using figXUHWRILJXUHV¶UHVXOWVLQGLFDWHVWKDWDFXW-off of 0.4 would be 
best because that gives the highest percentage of debtors correctly classified 
for all four groups.  
 
Figure 4.1, Effects of logistic cut-off values on small debts 
 
However since in all groups the non-payers outnumber the payers, many payers are 
incorrectly classified. Therefore as a model to estimate which debtors will be likely to 
pay and assess their recovery rate a cut-off of 0.2 would be far more useful. Since at 
0.2 approximately 70% of the payers and non-payers were correctly assessed. After 
0.2 the proportion of payers correctly assessed fell significantly. 
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Selecting the Cut-off for Logistic Regression on Large Debt
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Figure 4.2, Effects of logistic cut-off values on medium debts 
Figure 4.3, Effects of logistic cut-off values on large debts  
Hence any debtor with an estimated result greater than 0.2 were assumed to 
have paid back part of their debt, and therefore passed on to stage 2. The 
linear regression model was used to estimate the collect rate. The GHEWRU¶V
variables were multiplied by their respective coefficients.  
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Figure 4.4, Effects of logistic cut-off values on extra large debts 
4.3.1 Small Debts 
The logistic regression model to predict if the debtor has a collection rate>0 
for small debts is based on table 4.3: 
12 6
4 3 2 1
55 45 35 25
0276 . 0 2014 . 0 017 . 0
0496 . 0 04903 . 0 4729 . 0 10187 . 0 09285 . 0 03152 . 0 8355 . 0
00008906 . 0 03106 . 0 04881 . 0 05269 . 0 03909 . 0 21026 . 0
M M H
H H S T T T T
D A A A A
S
J F
  
      
       D
 
Where 
A25=  1 if the debtor aged between 18-25, 0 otherwise 
A35=  1 if the debtor aged between 25-35, 0 otherwise 
A45=  1 if the debtor aged between 35-45, 0 otherwise 
A55=  1 if the debtor aged between 45-55, 0 otherwise 
D=  amount of debt owed (£) 
T1=  1 if the collector had one or more active telephone numbers for the 
debtor, 0 otherwise 
T2=  1  if  the  collector  had  an  active  mobile  number  for  the  debtor,  0 
otherwise 
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T3=  1 if the collector had an active work number for the debtor, 0 otherwise 
T4=  number of active telephone numbers the collector had for the debtor 
S=  1 if the debtor is female, 0 otherwise 
HF=  1  if  the  debtor reside  in  a  residence owned  by  a  family  member,  0 
otherwise 
HJ=  1 if the debtor reside in a residence owned jointly by them and another, 
0 otherwise 
HS=  1 if the debtor reside in a residence owned by them alone, 0 otherwise  
M6=  1 if the collector has had the debt for less than 6 months, 0 otherwise  
 M12=  1 if the collector has had the debt for between 6 and 12 months, 0 
otherwise 
If D<0.2 then the debtor is predicted to have a collection rate=0. If DWKHQ
WKHGHEWRU¶V5HFRYHU\5DWH55LVFDOFXODWHGXVLQJWKHUHVXOWVIURPWKHOLQHDU
regression model table 4.11 is as follows: 
12 6
4 3 2 1
55 45 35 25
16402 . 0 33971 . 0 13152 . 0
08457 . 0 04227 . 0 0181 . 0 02816 . 0 09325 . 0 01577 . 0 0542 . 0
00074813 . 0 02919 . 0 0294 . 0 03293 . 0 06053 . 0 01424 . 1
M M H
H H S T T T T
D A A A A RR
S
J F
  
      
      
Up till now R
2 has been used to determine the goodness of fit for the models. 
However since this is a two stage model not just a linear regression model 
that is not as useful as it is for the individual stages. Also the data limitations 
mean that the results in this chapter will be more useful in collections policy to 
determine who the best debtors to prioritise are, not as a prediction tool to 
estimate  returns.    An  alternative  to  R
2  is  the  Spearman  Rank  Correlation, 
which  is  a  non-parametric  measure  of  correlation.  The  real  collection  rate 
observed  results  and  the  predicted  collection  rate  results  are  converted  to 
ranks,  and  the  differences  di  between  the  ranks  of  each  observation  and 
prediction  are  calculated.  So  the  Spearman  Rank  Correlation  is  useful  in 
describing how good the predicted ranks are. 
7KH GHEWRU¶V SUHGLFWHG UDQN ZDV EDVHG RQ WKHLU  predicted  collection  rate 
UHVXOW GHVFHQGLQJ 7KH GHEWRU¶V UHDO REVHUYHG UDQN ZDV EDVHG RQ WKHLU
observed collection rate result; descending. The differences di between their   78 
real observed rank and predicted rank are used to calculate the Spearman 
Rank Correlation coefficient. However there are many tied ranks (share the 
same  rank)  since  there  are  several  debtors with  an  observed  or predicted 
collection rate of 1. When a rank is tied; all associated ranks are assigned the 
mean  of  the  tied  ranks.  Tied  ranks  also  mean  that  the  classic  Pearson's 
correlation coefficient has to be used instead of the abbreviated Spearman 
Rank Correlation coefficient. 
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Where  
ȇ   Pearson's correlation coefficient 
xi =  real observation rank 
yi =  predicted rank 
n =  sample size 
The results for the small debts give a Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient 
of 0.39, where 0 would indicate no correction between the modelled collection 
rate and the real collection rate and 1 would indicate perfect correlation. 
Table 4.15, confusion matrix for small debts (1
st stage) 
Table 4.15 shows the confusion matrix for the results of the model on small 
debts. As can be seen two thirds of the debts, which were paid, were correctly 
modelled,  and  80%  of  the  debts,  which  were  not  paid,  were  correctly 
classified. These results agree with the predicted results in figure 4.1. 
Table 4.15 illustrates that 10% of the debts were predicted to be paid and 
were paid. 5% of the debts really had some payment made but were predicted 
to not be paid. 16% of the debts were predicted to be paid but were not. The 
Small
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majority of the debts, 68% of them, were correctly assessed to not have any 
payment made. 
4.3.2 Medium Debts 
The logistic regression model to predict if the debtor has a collection rate>0 
for medium debts are based on table 4.4: 
12 6
4 3 2 1
55 45 35 25
05366 . 0 17952 . 0 02745 . 0
08397 . 0 06706 . 0 03811 . 0 08 . 0 119 . 0 05173 . 0 06397 . 0
00011518 . 0 03374 . 0 06233 . 0 07533 . 0 06202 . 0 07576 . 0
M M H
H H S T T T T
D A A A A
S
J F
  
      
       D
 
If D<0.2 then the debtor is predicted to have a collection rate=0. If DWKHQ
WKHGHEWRU¶V5HFRYHU\5DWH55LVFDOFXODWHGXVLQJWKHUHVXOWVIURPWKHOLQHDU
regression model table 4.12 is as follows: 
12 6
4 3 2 1
55 45 35 25
22429 . 0 31173 . 0 14391 . 0
0427 . 0 06866 . 0 04278 . 0 00664 . 0 03703 . 0 02553 . 0 04237 . 0
00024271 . 0 02179 . 0 02947 . 0 06688 . 0 04769 . 0 69143 . 0
M M H
H H S T T T T
D A A A A RR
S
J F
  
      
      
 
The  results  for  the  medium  debts  give  a  Spearman  Rank  Correlation 
coefficient  of  0.38,  where  0  would  indicate  no  correction  between  the 
modelled  collection  rate  and  the  real  collection  rate  and  1  would  indicate 
perfect correlation. 
Table 4.16, confusion matrix for medium debts (1
st stage) 
Table 4.16 is the confusion matrix for the results of the model on medium 
debts. As can be seen 70% of the debts, which were paid, were correctly 
modelled, and nearly 80% of the debts, which were not paid, were correctly 
classified. These results agree with the predicted results in figure 4.2. 
Table 4.16 illustrates that 10% of the debts were predicted to be paid and 
were paid. 4% of the debts really had some payment made but were predicted 
to not be paid. 18% of the debts were predicted to be paid but were not. The 
Medium
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majority of the debts, 67% of them, were correctly assessed to not have any 
payment made. 
4.3.3 Large Debts 
The logistic regression model to predict if the debtor has a collection rate>0 
for large debts is based on table 4.5: 
12 6
4 3 2 1
55 45 35 25
01175 . 0 16367 . 0 01651 . 0
06662 . 0 05449 . 0 04569 . 0 08295 . 0 09993 . 0 03658 . 0 08168 . 0
00003502 . 0 033444 . 0 06195 . 0 06666 . 0 05089 . 0 11539 . 0
M M H
H H S T T T T
D A A A A
S
J F
  
      
       D
 
If D<0.2 then the debtor is predicted to have a collection rate=0. If DWKHQ
WKHGHEWRU¶V5HFRYHU\5DWH55LVFDOFXODWHGXVLQJWKHUHVXOWVIURPWKHOLQHDU
regression model table 4.13 is as follows: 
12 6
4 3 2 1
55 45 35 25
18705 . 0 26528 . 0 10598 . 0
09187 . 0 0053 . 0 02818 . 0 00198 . 0 01859 . 0 01692 . 0 01625 . 0
0001029 . 0 06546 . 0 08124 . 0 0592 . 0 11446 . 0 49633 . 0
M M H
H H S T T T T
D A A A A RR
S
J F
  
      
      
 
The results for the large debts give a Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient 
of 0.38, where 0 would indicate no correction between the modelled collection 
rate and the real collection rate and 1 would indicate perfect correlation. 
 
Table 4.17, confusion matrix for large debts (1
st stage) 
Table 4.17 shows the confusion matrix for the results of the model on large 
debts. As can be seen 70% of the debts, which were paid, were correctly 
modelled, and over 70% of the debts, which were not paid, were correctly 
classified. These results agree with the predicted results in figure 4.3. 
Large
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4.3.4 Extra Large Debts 
The logistic regression model to predict if the debtor has a collection rate>0 
for extra large debts is based on table 4.6: 
12 6
4 3 2 1
55 45 35 25
04758 . 0 10901 . 0 0371 . 0
14564 . 0 03507 . 0 04457 . 0 05599 . 0 06641 . 0 06257 . 0 0837 . 0
000003 . 0 022 . 0 02812 . 0 04668 . 0 02759 . 0 11302 . 0
M M H
H H S T T T T
D A A A A
S
J F
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If D<0.2 then the debtor is predicted to have a collection rate=0. If DWKHQ
WKHGHEWRU¶V5HFRYHU\5DWH55LVFDOFXODWHGXVLQJWKHUHVXOWVIURPWKHOLnear 
regression model table 4.14 is as follows: 
12 6
4 3 2 1
55 45 35 25
15422 . 0 19734 . 0 14257 . 0 07178 . 0
03901 . 0 02405 . 0 00097223 . 0 00547 . 0 0145 . 0 00211 . 0
00001379 . 0 00767 . 0 00099432 . 0 01607 . 0 02084 . 0 33591 . 0
M M H H
H S T T T T
D A A A A RR
S J
F
   
     
      
  
The results for the large debts give a Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient 
of 0.33, where 0 would indicate no correction between the modelled collection 
rate and the real collection rate and 1 would indicate perfect correlation. 
 
Table 4.18, confusion matrix for extra large debts (1
st stage) 
Table 4.18 shows the confusion matrix for the results of the model on extra 
large  debts.  As  can  be  seen  70%  of  the  debts,  which  were  paid,  were 
correctly modelled, and under 70% of the debts, which were not paid, were 
correctly classified. These results agree with the predicted results in figure 
4.4.  
Ex-Large
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Not Paid 5% 56%
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4.3.5 All Debts 
The results from the logistic and linear regression models must be combined 
to predict recovery rate. The results for the holdout sample, where 0.2 was 
used for the logit in the logistic regression model, are as follows:  
For small debts model the Spearman Rank Correlation gave a result of 0.39, 
while the R
2 value was 0.09 and the root MSE was 0.26.  
For medium debts model the Spearman Rank Correlation gave a result of 
0.38, while the R
2 value was 0.08 and the root MSE was 0.18.  
For large debts model the Spearman Rank Correlation gave a result of 0.38, 
while the R
2 value was 0.05 and the root MSE was 0.18.  
For extra large debts model the Spearman Rank Correlation gave a result of 
0.33, while the R
2 value was 0.04 and the root MSE was 0.14.  
These results show that all of the models are not very good at predicting the 
returns from the debt. This is partly because of the limitations of the data, and 
also because predicting accurately what individuals will do results in models 
with poor R
2. On the other hand the root MSE does improve for larger debts. 
This is not because the models are improving but because the range of the 
recovery  rates  reduces  for  larger  debts  and  the  models  reflect  this.  The 
holdout sample results are shown in figure 4.5 and the reducing ranges of the 
recovery rates.  
Figure  4.5  illustrates  the  results  of  the  two-stage  model  for  all  debts.  The 
predicted RR is on the y-axis and the real observed RR is recorded along the 
x-axis. As can be seen, most of the debts had a RR of 0 indicating that no 
money was recovered. Some of the debts also were predicted to have an RR 
less than 0, this is a result of the model and not an indication that some of the 
debts were predicted to incur greater costs than the amounts recovered, since 
costs were not included in the model. However these results are not displayed 
in the graph. The 2
nd stage of the model was linear regression, which could 
return  a  negative  recovery  rate. This could  be fixed  so  that all  results  are 
between 0 and 1, but there were only a few cases (<0.1%) that fell outside 
this range, so the model was left as is.   83 
 
Figure 4.5, Results of the 2-stage model 
What  is  most  striking  about  this  graph  is  that  the  predicted  recovery  rate 
UHGXFHVDVWKHGHEWPRGHO¶VDPRXQWLQFUHDVHV)or small debt the  largest 
predicted RR is almost 1, but for medium debts the largest predicted RR is 
0.6. For large debt the largest prediction is 0.5 and for extra large debt the 
largest  prediction  is  under  0.4.  This  is  consistent  with  the  real  RR  results 
where for small debts 4% completely pay off their debt achieving an RR of 
one, compared with only 0.6% of extra large debts achieving an RR of one. 
Looking  at  the  overall  model  (for  all  the  debt  values)  using  the  two-stage 
modelling approach to estimate the recovery rate, the R
2 value was 0.08, with 
a root MSE of 0.20 for the holdout sample. While the models do not give a 
good recovery rate prediction, they are useful for collections policy to predict 
who to prioritise and the Spearman Ranks reflect this. 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter focused on predicting the recovery rate for third party collection 
over  the  20-month  time  period.  By  splitting  the  debtors  according  to  the 
amount  of  debt  they  owe  the  results  of  the  models  were  far  better  than 
modelling  the  debtors  as  a  whole.  Only  predicting  the  RR  for  extra  large 
debtors gave a poorer result than the linear regression model in chapter 3. 
The models for small and medium sized debt even managed to improve on 
the weight of evidence model. 
The model created was a two-stage RR predictor, using logistic regression to 
predict which debtors would have a RR=0 and which would pay back part of 
their  debt.  Those  debtors,  who  achieved  a  result  of  0.2  for  their  logit  and 
above in the logistic regression model would then, use the linear regression 
model to predict their RR value; the others would have a predicted RR of 0. 
Splitting at 0.2 meant that about 70% of debtors who paid and about 70% of 
debtors who did not pay, were correctly classified. 
Waiting until after the debtors had been in collections for at least 6-months 
gave  better  results  for  the  logistic  regression.  That  is  not  to  say  that  the 
models should only be used after 6-months but rather these models are for 
predicting the recovery rate after at least 6-months in collections. The results 
of  these  models  were  shown  using  the  Spearman  rank  correlation,  which 
shows that the model for small debts was the best predictor. 
For larger debts their predicted RR was lower than for debts in smaller debt 
amount models. So for debts larger than £2000 none were predicted to pay 
back more than 35% of their debt.   85 
Chapter 5: Forward Predicting and Economic Variables 
The main objective of this chapter is to show how economic variables effect 
the LGD predictions. To this end, this chapter will discuss the data set in more 
detail, including how the default date was determined and cleaning of the data 
set. Then there is a discussion of the different economic variables and how 
WKH\FKDQJHGGXULQJWKHGDWDVHW¶VWLPHSHULRG7KHVHHFRQRPLFYDriables are 
XVHGLQPRGHOVWRSUHGLFWLIWKHGHEWRU¶V55 DQGLQPRGHOVWRSUHGLFWWKH
Recovery Rate of debtors at 12-month intervals after default. 
The data used in this chapter is from the in-house data set used in chapter 3. 
7KH GDWD VHW LV IURP D 8. EDQN¶V SHUVRQDO ORDQV ERRN ZKLFK GHIDXOWHG
between 1988 and 1999. The lifetime of the loan was recorded between the 
ends of 1987 to 2003. The data set was very large and disorganised and so it 
had to be cleaned before it could be used for producing models. One of the 
problems was that if a debtor took out a loan and then increased the loan 
amount at a later date the new loan was entered with all of the same variables 
as the first and so the data could be copied up to four times in the data set. In 
order to eliminate this only every fifth loan was used to ensure there was no 
replication to bias the data.  
 
5.1 Default Date 
 
Figure 5.1 default dates  
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Figure  5.1  shows  the  number  of  debtors  who  defaulted  in  each  quarter 
recorded  in  the  data set.  However getting  the  default  date proved  hard  to 
HVWDEOLVK DV RQO\ WKH ³ODVW´ GHIDXOW GDWH ZDV UHFRUGHG 2QFH D GHEWRU
defaulted on the loan this data was recorded, should the debtor resolve this 
issue at a later date, i.e. pay back the lost arrears and carry on paying the 
debt off then they were recorded as being cured. Once cured the debtor could 
then default again. This new default date over wrote the previous default date. 
Therefore the recorded default date could not be used as a lot of the debtors 
were recorded as cured on up to three separate occasions. Also there was no 
information included in the files on how default was determined, whether it 
was three or six months in arrears.  
Therefore to ensure continuity three months in arrears was determined to be 
default for the purposes of these models. The default month could then be 
determined because the number of months that each debtor was in arrears 
was recorded for each month that the loan was outstanding. 
Determining how much of the loan was outstanding when they were three 
months in arrears proved quite complicated. The issues were that after 2001 
the  outstanding  balance  was  recorded  every  month  but  before  that  the 
balance was only recorded at the end of every year. So in order to determine 
how much was paid each month, the amount paid during the year (Bi-1-Bi) was 
divided by the number of months the person paid during the year (Pi). This 
way the approximate amount paid (ai) each month, if there was a payment, 
could be determined for all debtors.  
i
i i
i P
B B
a

 
1  
where i is the year, and Bi is the balance outstanding at the end of the year 
Another issue to further complicate the matter was that payments were not 
recorded, either the amount paid or if any payment had been made. Although 
the  number  of  months  the  debtor  was  in  arrears  was  recorded  for  every 
month. Therefore this information was used to determine when a debtor paid, 
based on the number of months they were in arrears.    87 
If the number of months went up then they were evidently not paying. If it went 
down, then they had paid. If it stayed the same then they were paying only if 
the  amount  still  outstanding  was  greater  than  the  number  of  months  of 
payments still owing. E.g. if the debtor took out a loan for £1000 and agreed 
to pay £100 per month for ten months to clear the loan. If the debtor then 
made only one payment of £100, then their months in arrears would be as 
shown in figure 5.2. Since the debtor can only be a maximum of 9 months in 
arrears, once he has reached 9 months it will stay at 9 until he either starts to 
pay or the lender writes off his debt. 
Month  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Months 
in 
Arrears 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  9 
Figure 5.2, Example of months in arrears 
Since  the  maximum  number  of  months  that  a  debtor  could  be  in  arrears 
changes each time a payment is made, it turned a relatively simple problem 
into a time dependant problem, given that, the maximum number of months in 
arrears had to be recalculated on a monthly basis determined by the number 
of  payments  made.  This  was  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  once  a 
debtor was in arrears they could pay two or more months worth of payments 
in one. For example if the debtor in the previous example after paying the first 
payment, stopped paying for two months then made a double payment in the 
fourth month but no further payments, this will reduce the maximum number 
of months in arrears down to seven although only two payments were made. 
Month  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Months 
in 
Arrears 
0  1  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  7 
Figure 5.3, Example 2 of months in arrears 
Now there are several different solutions to this problem and in the above 
examples it can be seen that the maximum number of months in arrears is   88 
reached  by  the  tenth  month  when  the  loan  was  due  for  full  repayment. 
Therefore this could be used to determine the maximum number of months in 
arrears. However, there are two problems with this solution. Firstly, the debtor 
may well start to repay his debt again after the term of the loan has expired 
again altering the maximum after this date. Secondly the debtors in the case 
study rarely stopped at just one loan. As has been previously stated, they 
increased their loan amount on several occasions. So they would take out one 
loan,  start  to  pay  it  back,  then  increase  the  loan.  Since  the  records  of 
intermediate  loans  were  not  included,  only  the  final  loan  status,  the 
convoluted payment patterns of 10,000 debtors proved difficult to unravel.  
For  this  thesis  the  maximum  number  of  months  in  arrears  had  to  be 
recalculated every month where not only the number of payments had to be 
included  but  also  double,  triple,  or  larger  payments.  Once  this  was 
determined,  a  constant  number  of  months  in  arrears  could  be  correctly 
classified as a payment or not a payment. 
5.2 Economic Indicators 
During the period covered by the data, the UK went through a recession and 
recovery  so  many  of  the  economic  indicators  changed  radically  over  this 
period. Therefore the data is ideal for investigating how economic indicators 
may influence or predict payment patterns for defaulted personal loans. 
Six such indicators of the economy are Consumer Price Index (CPI), Gross 
Domestic  Product  (GDP),  Interest  Rate,  Halifax  House  Prices  Index, 
unemployment and net lending which shall be used throughout this chapter. 
Figlewski  et  al  [31]  used  17  macroeconomic  variables  when  modelling 
corporate default in the US. These included a consumer price index, GDP, 
two  interest  rates,  unemployment  and  some  credit  variables  relating  to 
corporate finance. However because they had so many economic variables 
that were so closely related they found that many of them had correlations 
among their macro covariates and so had to eliminate several of them from 
the study. 
Grieb et al [33] found that unemployment leads to a rise in credit card default 
rates,  by  looking  at  time  series  data  to  study  consumer  behaviour,   89 
macroeconomic  factors,  and  credit  card  default  between  1981  and  1999. 
Whitley et al [56] looked at time series in mortgage default rates. They too 
found that unemployment was related to default rates but in mortgages. Their 
results showed that the proportion of mortgage loans  in at least 6 months 
arrears were related to mortgage income gearing, unemployment, and loan to 
value ratio for first time buyers.  
Banasik  &  Crook  [6]  found  that  default  rates  on  consumer  loans  were 
positively  correlated  with  real  disposable  income.  Their  results  indicated  a 
relationship  between  delinquent  consumer  credit  and  volume  of  debt 
outstanding, optimism and interest rates. They deduced that when people are 
more optimistic and may intend to borrow in the future they are more careful 
with their repayments. 
Bellotti  et  al  [14]  used  three  economic  variables  for  modelling  Loss  Given 
Default (LGD) for retail credit; interest rate, unemployment and earnings for 
data over the period 1999-2006. The macroeconomic variables were based 
on their values at time of default. 
5.2.1 CPI  
7KH&RQVXPHU3ULFHLQGH[&3,PHDVXUHVWKHFKDQJLQJSULFHVRID³EDVNHW´
of  goods  and  services  over  time  within  the  UK.  It  is  used  to  estimate  the 
average  price  of  these  goods  purchased  by  a  household.  The  percentage 
change in the CPI is an estimate of inflation. [43]  
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Figure 5.4 percentage change in CPI between 1988 and 2004   90 
Figure 5.4 shows the percentage change in CPI over the period the loan data 
was  collected  varies  modestly.  Before  the  1990-1992  recession  the 
percentage  change  in  CPI  is  higher  than  afterwards.  The  data  for  the 
percentage change in CPI was collected from the National Statistics Office. 
The seasonally adjusted CPI was not used because; it would firstly smooth 
the CPI, which has a small enough variation but also, the whole point in using 
the  percentage  change  in  CPI  is  to  include  a  variable  to  show  how  the 
GHEWRUV¶KRXVHKROGH[SHQGLWXUHDIIHFWVWKHLUZLOOLQJQHVVWRSD\,IDQLQGLYLGXDO
defaults then it is likely that they are in financial difficulties therefore small 
changes in their household expenditure could mean the difference between 
making  a  payment  or  not.  The  seasonally  adjusted  CPI  is  useful  for 
GHWHUPLQLQJLQIODWLRQEXWQRWWKHYDULDWLRQLQSHRSOH¶VH[SHQGLWXUHZKLFKLV
sought here. 
Figlewski  [31]  used  inflation  monthly  percentage  change  in  the  seasonally 
adjusted Consumer Price Index. They found that inflation was significant and 
had  a  positive  correlation  with  corporate  default  indicating  that  a  rise  in 
inflation suggests a rise in corporate default. 
5.2.2 GDP  
*URVV'RPHVWLF3URGXFW*'3LVDEDVLFPHDVXUHRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VRYHUDOO
economic output. It is the market value of all goods and services made within 
a country over one year.  
Figure 5.5 shows the percentage change in GDP from the same month the 
previous year. In view of the fact that there is a recession, a recovery and a 
boom period during this time GDP varies dramatically. During the recession 
GDP becomes negative and then swings up to 5% during the recovery. The 
data for the GDP was collected from the National Statistics Office and uses a 
moving  average  to  estimate  GDP  monthly,  which  was  then  taken  as  a 
percentage change from the same month in the previous year.   91 
 
Figure 5.5 GDP between 1989 and 2004 
Percentage  change  in  GDP  was  used  because  unlike  the  level  of  GDP  it 
shows the effect of the recession and recovery clearly whereas the level of 
GDP just shows a general rise so is really a surrogate for time, and other 
studies  have  found  that  it  is  insignificant.  The  percentage  change  on  the 
previous year was used instead of percentage change on last quarter or from 
peak, because if a lender wishes to use these models for predicting future 
recoveries, they will not know what the peak is unlike historical models and 
any seasonal variation is removed, so you can judge how the economy is 
really faring. 
GDP has been shown in some studies to have an effect on loan defaults. 
Sullivan found that a fall in GDP growth translates to a rise in default rates 
across all risk grades. [49] Figlewski [31] DOVRXVHV³5HDO*'3DFWXDOPLQXV
SRWHQWLDO´IURPWKH86'HSDUWPHQWRI&RPPHUFHDQG³5HDO*'3JURZWK´
)LQGLQJWKDW³5HDO*'3JURZWK´ZDVVLJQLILFDQWKRZHYHUKHDOVRIRXQGWKDW
³5HDO*'3DFWXDOPLQXVSRWHQWLDO´ZDVQRWVLJQLILFDQWEXWERWKKad a negative 
correlation  with  corporate  default  indicating  that  a  rise  in  GDP  suggests  a 
decrease in corporate default. 
Bellotti [14] used the UK earnings index (year 2000 = 100) for the whole of the 
economy including bonuses as a ratio of the retail price index in their models 
from  the  UK  Office  for  National  Statistics.  They  found  that  it  was  not 
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significant but had a positive correlation with RR indicating that a rise in UK 
earnings at default predicts a rise in RR indicating that defaulting debtors will 
pay back more of their debt. 
5.2.3 Interest Rate 
The Bank of England Base Rate is the interest rate charged by the Bank of 
England for securing overnight lending. Figure 5.6 shows the fluctuations in 
the Bank of England Base Rate over the period of the data set. The interest 
ranges between 15% and 3.5%, a dramatic change. Before the recession the 
interest rate was higher than afterwards. 
As interest rates rise there is a rise in default rates across all risk groups. [49] 
The Bank of England Base rate was used because many banks use this to 
determine their own interest rates, especially for variable rate lending. 
Figlewski [31] used two variations of interest rates; both were significant and 
had  a  positive  correlation  with  corporate  default  indicating  that  a  rise  in 
interest rates predicts a rise in corporate default. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Interest Rate between 1988 and 2004 
Bellotti [14] XVHGWKHVHOHFWHG8.UHWDLOEDQNV¶LQWHUHVWUDWHVLQWKHLUPRGHOV
from the UK Office for National Statistics. They found that it had a significant 
and  negative  correlation  with  RR  indicating  that  a  rise  in  interest  rates  at 
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default predicts a fall in RR indicating that defaulting debtors will pay back 
less of their debt. 
5.2.4 Halifax House Price Index 
House  Price  indices  have  been  around  in  the  UK  since  1973,  initially 
mortgage providers only collated them, although now government bodies also 
record them. The Halifax House Price Index was launched in 1984, based on 
WKH OHQGLQJ RI WKH 8.¶V ODUJHVW PRUWJDJH OHQGHU ,W SURYLGHV WKH ORQgest 
unbroken monthly data series in the UK. Therefore it is ideal for assessing 
FKDQJHVWRWKH8.¶VKRXVLQJPDUNHWRYHUWKHWLPHRIWKHGDWDVHW)LJXUH
shows the Halifax House Price Index between 1988 and 2004. 
 
Figure 5.7 Halifax House Price Index between 1988 and 2004 (% change in 
house price index) 
5.2.5 Unemployment  
The  definition  of  who  are  unemployed  changes  over  this  period  so  the 
unemployment  figures  for  use  in  this  thesis  are  based  on  the  number  of 
people in the UK not employed divided by the number of people economically 
active.  
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Figure 5.8 shows how unemployment changes over this period. During the 
recession unemployment rose and then fell during the recovery. 
Figlewski  [31]  examined  both  the  unemployment  level  and  change  in  the 
seasonally adjusted monthly civilian Unemployment Rate constructed by the 
US Bureau of Labour Statistics. However that paper did not use change in 
unemployment.  Unemployment  level  was  significant  and  had  a  positive 
correlation  with  corporate  default  indicating  that  a  rise  in  unemployment 
suggests a rise in corporate default. 
Bellotti  [14]  used  the  UK  unemployment  level  measured  in  thousands  of 
adults (16+) unemployed from the National Statistics Office. They found that it 
had a  significant  and  negative  correlation with  RR  indicating  that  a  rise  in 
unemployment at default predicts a fall in RR indicating that defaulting debtors 
will pay back less of their debt.  
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Figure 5.8 Unemployment between 1988 and 2004 
5.2.6 Net Lending 
Net lending is the total value of loans advanced in the UK less repayments 
and other adjustments such as written off bad debts. Figure 5.9 shows the net 
lending over the time period of the data set. As can be seen, net lending fell 
before the recession and then rose afterwards.   95 
 
Figure 5.9 Net Lending between 1988 and 2004 
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5.3 Economic Variables 
These six indicators of the economy are Consumer Price index (CPI), Gross 
Domestic  Product  (GDP),  Interest  Rate,  Halifax  House  Prices  Index, 
unemployment and net lending, were used in modelling debt recovery to see if 
economic variables helped estimate debt recovery rates.  
Percentage change in CPI was selected because it estimates the changing 
cost  of  living  for  the  debtors.  Therefore  if  they  had  the  same  disposable 
income over time but their cost of living was rising, then they would have less 
income to spend on repaying their debt. On the other hand if their cost of 
living were falling then they would have more money to spend on repaying 
their debt. 
*'3ZDVVHOHFWHGDVDQLQGLFDWLRQRIWKH8.¶Vincome. If GDP is rising then 
WKHGHEWRU¶VVWDQGDUGRIOLYLQJPLJKWHTXDOO\EHULVLQJVLQFH*'3LVSRVLWLYHO\
correlated  with  the  standard  of  living.  Therefore  if  GDP  is  rising  then  the 
debtor may have more money to spend on paying off their debt. So a positive 
correlation would be expected. 
7KH%DQNRI(QJODQG¶VEDVHLQWHUHVWUDWHZDVVHOHFWHGEHFDXVHDORWRIORDQV
have  interest  rates  tied  to  this  measure  or  their  initial  interest  rate  is 
GHWHUPLQHGSDUWLDOO\RQWKLVUDWH7KHUHIRUHLIWKH%DQNRI(QJODQG¶VEDVHUDWH
is low, then a variable rate mortgage will be low also, therefore the borrower 
of this mortgage will be paying less each month and hence have more money 
to spend on paying back their other loans. Also a debtor could take out a new 
loan at a lower rate of interest to pay off any previous loans acquired at a 
higher rate  of  interest.  Therefore  a  negative  correlation  could  be  expected 
between the interest rate and payments to loans. 
The Halifax House Price Index was selected because, if a debtor has a house 
as an asset, then any increase in the value of this asset could enable them to 
take out larger loans (mortgages) secured against this asset to pay off other 
loans. Or the debtor may sell their house at a profit and use the profit to pay 
off their loans. Therefore increases to the house price index may lead to the 
debtor paying back more of their loan, provided they have a house. If they do 
not then it may have the opposite effect.   97 
Unemployment  was  selected  because  it  indicates  the  number  of  people 
unemployed in the UK. If a debtor becomes unemployed during the course of 
repaying their loan, the information is either unknown or not recorded within 
the  data  set  available.  Therefore  this  is  the  only  indicator  available  for 
determining unemployment. As unemployment increases, then the probability 
of the debtor becoming unemployed increases too. If they are unemployed 
then, rising unemployment will make it harder for them to find new work since 
there  are  more  people  applying  for  the  same  jobs.  Also  if  they  are  not 
unemployed themselves, rising unemployment means that there could be lots 
of workers, interested in their jobs, so employers are less likely to pay their 
current workers high pay rises, if they have lots of workers willing to do the job 
for less money. Therefore a negative correlation could be expected between 
the unemployment and payments to loans. 
Net lending was selected to show partly how easy it is to acquire loans over 
this period, for if there are lots of loans being taken out, then it will be easier to 
acquire  credit  and  therefore  the  debtors  will  have  more  money  in  their 
pockets. Alternatively when it is hard to get a loan, net lending will be low, this 
is shown during the 1991-92 recession. Therefore net lending could have a 
SRVLWLYHFRUUHODWLRQZLWKWKHGHEWRUV¶DELOLW\WRSD\WKHLUORDQV 
5.4 Defaults Over Time 
The data set covers almost 10,000 loans over nearly 16 years. These loans 
were first of all taken out before 1999, then they defaulted, and the debtor 
may start to pay back the loans after default. If they do, then they may pay off 
the debt entirely, or the debt may be written off if they fail to pay it. Some of 
the debtors were still trying to pay off their debt at the end of the time period. 
Figure 5.10 shows the number of defaulted debtors over time. It shows for any 
calendar time period the number of accounts in the state of default, and how 
these  debtors  are  split  up  into  paying  (blue),  paid  off  (green),  written  off 
(yellow) and not paying (red). This graph shows that the number of defaults 
rapidly  increases  during  the  recession  and  that  the  percentage  of  these 
debtors  paying  is  very  small.  After  the  recovery  the  number  of  defaults 
becomes steady and the number of debtors paying increases. Over time the 
majority of the debtors get written off but some are also paid off. By 2004,   98 
10% are still paying, nearly 18% have paid off and nearly 70% have been 
written off. 
 
Figure 5.10 Distribution of debtors between 1988 and 2004 
The  results  for  comparing  the  distribution  of  debtors  against  economic 
variables are exploratory. If the percentage who are paying compared with 
those who are able to pay (whose who have defaulted and have not paid off 
or been written off) is viewed against all of the following economic variables 
the results are quite startling.  
Figure 5.11 shows percentage change in CPI against the percentage that are 
paying after default. As can be seen there is almost no correlation between 
these  two  variables.  Figure  5.13  shows  that  there  is  also  a  moderate 
correlation between interest rates and the percentage  that are paying after 
default. However there is a negative linear relationship between the two. This 
is  as  expected  since  lower  interest  rates  means  that  people  have  more 
disposable income and can afford to take out larger loans. 
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Figure 5.11 percentage change in CPI against the percentage who are paying 
after default 
 
Figure 5.12 GDP against the percentage who are paying after default 
Figures  5.12,  5.14  and  5.16  all  show  strong  positive  linear  relationships 
between; the percentage of debtors who are paying after default; and GDP; 
Halifax house price index; and net lending, respectively. The relationship with 
GDP is as expected because, as GDP rises, so too GRHVSHRSOH¶VLQFRPH
indicating that they have more disposable income. The same is true of house 
prices and lending for if they have more money due to borrowing or the assets 
increasing in value then they can have more money to spend. If they have 
more money then they can afford to pay back their outstanding loans. House 
prices  are  less  strongly  correlated  because  not  everyone  will  be  affected 
equally as not all debtors will own a house. 
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Figure  5.13  Interest  Rates  against  the  percentage  who  are  paying  after 
default 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Halifax House Price Index against the percentage who are paying 
after default 
Figure  5.15  shows  a  strong  negative  linear  correlation  between 
unemployment  and  the  percentage  paying  after  default.  This  result  is  as 
expected  because,  debtors  who  are  unemployed  will  have  less  money  to 
spend on paying off their debts, and those employed may receive lower pay 
rises due to the unemployed lowering wages. 
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Figure  5.15  Unemployment  against  the  percentage  who  are  paying  after 
default 
 
 
Figure 5.16 Net Lending against the percentage who are paying after default 
These economic indicators can be used in a simple linear regression model to 
determine the percentage of defaulted debtors paying in any month. When 
using all of the discussed variables, GDP, percentage change in CPI and the 
Halifax house price index were all found to be insignificant. The model used 
the first 13years for training data. Then the last 12 months were held as a hold 
out sample. Interest rates had a Durbin Watson statistic of 0.007 and a t-
statistic of -3.1. Unemployment had a Durbin Watson statistic of 0.003 and a t-
statistic of -2.4. Net Lending had a Durbin Watson statistic of 0.028 and a t-
statistic of 5.9. These Durbin Watson statistics show that there is evidence is 
positive serial correlation. The holdout sample gave an R
2=0.61 and a Mean 
Squared Error (MSE) =0.01. 
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Percentage Paying =   0.481 - 0.0085 Interest Rates -1.97 Unemployment 
+ 0.0002 Net Lending 
 
Figure  5.17  Predicting  the  percentage  paying  after  default  in  the  last  12 
months using economic variables 
Figure  5.17  shows  the  results  of  the  regression  model  for  predicting  the 
percentage  of  defaulted  debtors  who  are  paying  each  month.  The  results 
displayed are based on the holdout sample, which shows that the model using 
all of the significant economic variables. The sample size for these models 
were  not  large  but  covered  an  interesting  period  of  history  of  economic 
volatility. However the results are very close to those predicted by the model 
and  show  that  the  economic  variables  are  very  good  at  predicting  the 
percentage of payers each month. 
Predicting the percentage paying is the equivalent of the first stage in the two 
stage  prediction  models.  Using  the  economic  variable  in  a  more  detailed 
model  will  be  discussed  in  chapter  6.  The  next  section  of  this  chapter 
examines models using economic variables to estimate not the final LGD but 
the LGD for the next 12-months. These models are useful for determining the 
short-term  recovery  rates  of  debtors  once  they  have  defaulted  and  during 
collections. 
Economic variables seem very useful in predicting the percentage of payers, 
but  what  past  literature  has  shown,  is  that  they  are  not  that  successful  in 
helping to identify who is going to pay or how much an individual will pay.  
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Because of this, the economic variables have not been added to the models 
discussed  in  chapters  3  and  4.  Instead  the  next  section  looks  at  how  the 
economic variables can be used to relate to repayments over the first 24 and 
36-PRQWKVRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VGHIDXOW6RWKHTXHVWLRQLVGRHVNQRZOHGJHRI
how the debt has been repaid plus the economic conditions at default give a 
good indication of how they will pay in the future. 
5.5 Recovery Models 
When a bad debt defaults the outstanding debt at this time is not the loss 
given default. More of the debt could be recovered both in-house and by other 
agencies. This chapter looks at the payment patterns of in-house collections 
after default has occurred on approximately 10,000 personal loans. The data 
set is the same as was used for in-house in chapter 3 however the whole data 
set is used not just the results for the first 2 years.  
In  previous  models  the  focus  was  on  predicting  the  final  LGD,  but  when 
looking at whether to sell the debt or collect in-house; it might be useful to 
predict what will happen over shorter time periods. The next model is a simple 
linear regression based on what was collected in the first 12 months in-house 
to see what would happen in the second 12 months. These models estimate 
the recovery rate (RR) at 24 months and 36 months after default; RR24 and 
RR36 respectively. 
RR24=0.056+1.2RR12 
This model had an R
2=0.58 and a Root Mean Squared Error (MSE) =0.13.  
Expanding  the  model  to  see  what  would  happen  in  the  3
rd  year  gave  an 
R
2=0.38 and a Root MSE=0.20: 
RR36=0.11+1.23RR12 
Using the above models a lender can make more informed decisions about 
when  to  sell  and  how  much  to  sell  for.  The  reason  these  results  are  so 
superior to the previous models is because there is a dependence on both 
sides of the equation. RR24 and RR36 are dependent upon RR12 since they 
cannot  be  smaller  than  RR12  by  definition.  This  artificially  inflates  the  R
2 
results.   104 
These  models  can  be  rewritten  to  calculate  the  amount  recovered  in  the 
second  year only,  the  second  and  third  year and  the  third  year only.  This 
HOLPLQDWHVWKHGHSHQGHQF\RQWKHILUVW\HDU¶VUHVXOWV 
          RR24 -RR12=0.056+0.2RR12 
Rewriting the model this way to calculate the amount recovered in the second 
year only giving R
2=0.05 and a Root MSE=0.13. The model for estimating the 
amount recovered in the second and third year gives an R
2=0.02 and a Root 
MSE=0.2. This shows that during the second year the lender can expect to 
recover 11% of the default amount plus 23% of what was recovered in the first 
year. 
RR36 -RR12=0.11+0.23RR12 
Since 5% of the default amount and 20% of what was recovered in the first 
year was recovered during the second year only another 6% of the default 
amount can be expected to be recovered during the third year. 
As has already been shown in this chapter, the economic environment can 
have an impact on debtors paying back their debt. Belyaev et al [15] found 
that when modelling LGD for 12, 24 and 36 months, that some of the models 
were  improved  slightly  by  using  economic  variables  especially  linear 
regression models. The best estimate for the economic environment is to use 
a binary variable for the year. This means that all debtors who defaulted in 
similar economic circumstances are grouped together. Using the economic 
predictors,  discussed  earlier  in  this  chapter,  which  are  indicators  of  this 
economic period and would consequently give a poorer result. Therefore the 
regression models were recalculated to include the effect of their default year 
in the model.  
RR24=0.058 +1.2RR12 -0.05D88 -0.06D89 -0.03D90 -0.02D91-0.02D92 -0.01D93 
+0.03D95 +0.03D96+0.02D97+0.02D98 
This  model  had  an  R
2=0.59  and  a  Root  MSE=0.13.  This  is  a  small 
improvement  on  the  previous  model  (R
2=0.58  to  R
2=0.59).  As  this  model 
shows, those who defaulted prior to the recession were estimated to have a 
poorer recovery rate during their first two years after default than those who 
default during and after the recession. Since this collection period covers part   105 
of  the  time  Britain  was  in  recession  and  those  who  defaulted  after  were 
FROOHFWHGGXULQJ%ULWDLQ¶VUHFRYHU\WKLVLVQRWVXUSULVLQJ7KLVPRGHOVKRZV
that economic factors have a big impact on how much a lender can expect to 
collect. In this model a lender could expect to recover nearly 10% more of the 
debt during the first two years after default if they are collecting during an age 
of economic prosperity (1995) compared to a period of recession (1989). 
The model above is for the first two years after default dependant upon the 
ILUVW\HDU¶VUHFRYHU\UDWH,IZHORRNQRZDWMXVWWKHVHFRQG\HDU¶VUHFRYHU\
rate using the default year the model has an R
2=0.07 and a Root MSE=0.13. 
It  is  still  a  poor  model  but  a  definite  improvement  on  the  previous  model 
without the default year (R
2=0.05 to 0.07). 
RR24-RR12=0.058 +0.2RR12 -0.05D88 -0.06D89 -0.03D90 -0.02D91-0.01D92 -
0.01D93 +0.03D95 +0.03D96+0.02D97+0.02D98 
Following  on  from  this  model  to  see  what  happens  in  the  third  year  after 
default. This first model estimates the recovery rate for debtors during the first 
three years after default based on their recovery rate for the first year and 
their default year.  
RR36=0.09 +1.2RR12 -0.07D88 -0.05D89 -0.01D90 +0.01D93 +0.05D94 +0.09D95 
+0.09D96+0.06D97+0.05D98 
This  model  had  an  R
2=0.4  and  a  Root  MSE=0.2.  This  is  again  a  small 
improvement on the previous model (R
2=0.38 to 0.40). Here the economic 
situation is having an even larger effect on the recovery rate. In this model a 
lender could expect to recover nearly 16% more of the debt during the first 
three  years  after  default  if  they  are  collecting  during  an  age  of  economic 
prosperity compared to a period of recession. Moving on to look at just the 
VHFRQGDQGWKLUG\HDU¶VUHFRYHU\UDWHXVLQJWKHGHIDXOW\HDUWKHPRGHOKDVDn 
R
2=0.05  and  a  Root  MSE=0.2.  It  is  still  a  poor  model  but  an  obvious 
improvement  on  the  previous  model  without  the  default  year  (R
2=0.02  to 
R
2=0.05). 
RR36-RR12=0.09 +0.2RR12 -0.07D88 -0.05D89 -0.01D90 +0.01D93 +0.05D94 
+0.09D95 +0.09D96+0.06D97+0.05D98   106 
Since  the  improvements  were  so  small  it  is  unproductive  to  consider 
modelling  using  the  economic  factors  discussed  earlier  since  any  model 
would be worse than the models above. However there was an improvement 
to  both  models  therefore  the  economic  variables  do  have  an  effect  on 
recovery rates. Another factor to consider is that the economic indicators will 
change over time, therefore the problem with regression models is that if only 
one value is used; should the default dates economic variables be used, or 
those at the end of the first year in recovery? Or maybe some combination of 
WKHWZRRUHYHQDSUHGLFWLRQIRUWKHQH[W\HDU¶VHFRQRPLFWUHQGV 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has looked at the effects of economic factors in debtors repaying 
their loans after they have defaulted. The data set used was ideal for testing 
HFRQRPLFYDULDEOHVRQUHFRYHU\UDWHVVLQFHLWFRYHUVWKHORDQV¶KLVWRU\GXULQJ
a recession, recovery and a period of stability. 
When looking at the percentage of defaulters who pay back their loans each 
month, the economic variables were excellent at predicting how many will pay 
back. In particular, net lending was a very strong indicator. Net lending, GDP 
and house prices all had a strong positive linear relationship between them 
and,  the  percentage  of  debtors  who  are  paying  each  month  after  default. 
Higher interest rates and unemployment had a negative relationship with the 
percentage of debtors who are paying each month after default. 
When it came to predicting the recovery rates after the first 12 months, the 
GHEWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUGXULQJWKRVHILUVWPRQWKVLVDQLQGLFDWRUIRUWKHIROORZLQJ
12 and 24 months. On average it appeared that debtors were repaying around 
5% of the default balance off each year after the first year.  
The results were disappointing in that even when employing dummy years, 
which are the best economic variables one can hope for, there is little or no 
improvement on the R
2 values. 
 In the next chapter when debtors pay and by how much will be covered in 
greater detail. What is evident is that during the lifetime of a loan, economic 
conditions  can  vary  wildly,  especially  as  some  loans  can  have  debtors 
repaying even a decade after they have defaulted. This means that using the   107 
economic  conditions  at  a  certain  point,  e.g.  at  default,  is not  as  useful  as 
continuous  monitoring  within  the  models.  Therefore  in  the  next  chapter, 
survival  analysis  will  be  used  to  predict  when  debtors  repay  because  the 
economic conditions for each month can be used to help the predictions. 
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Chapter 6: Payment Patterns 
6.1 Introduction 
This  chapter  looks  at  the  payment  patterns  of  in-house  collections  after 
default has occurred on approximately 10,000 personal loans. The data set is 
the same as was used for in-house in chapter 3 however the whole data set is 
used not just the results for the first 2 years. The payment patterns are use to 
estimate RR and LGD. 
7KHGDWDVHWIRUWKLVFKDSWHULVIURPD8.EDQN¶VSHUVRQDOORDQVERRNZKLFK
defaulted  between  1988  and  1999.  The  lifetime  of  the  loan  was  recorded 
between the ends of 1987 to 2003. Default was taken to be three months in 
arrears. 
6.2 Payment Patterns 
When a debtor begins to pay back the debt they could stop the repayments at 
anytime. After they have stopped again they may restart, and this pattern will 
continue until the debtor either repays the whole loan or is written off.  
Figure 6.1 shows some examples of the actual payment patterns where the 
red bars are when the debtor is not paying and the green bars are when the 
debtors are paying. As can be seen from this graph the debtors can go for 
long periods without paying and then start up again. All of these payment 
patterns  are  for  after the  debtor  has  defaulted.  NP
i  is  the  i
th  non-payment 
sequence and P
i is the i
th payment sequence. 
Some  of  the  debtors  never  pay  back  anything  more  after  default  as  for 
example Debtor 8 in figure 6.1. Some of the debtors pay back part of their 
debt but are written off when they stop repaying. Some of the debtors pay 
back  all  of  their  debt  and  others  are  still  paying  back  at  the  end  of  the 
observation period.    110 
Figure 6.1 Payment Patterns 
With regards to payment patterns there are several different aspects, which 
make up these payment patterns. These shall be separated into the following 
categories: 
x  Number  of  payment  sequences  (where  a  sequence  is  a  run  of 
consecutive months of repayment) 
x  Amount recovered in each payment sequence 
x  Length of each payment and non payment sequence 
x  Proportion  of  default  amount  recovered  in  any  payment  sequences 
(Recovery Rate) 
Each of these categories needs to be considered separately. 
6.3 Number of Payment Sequences 
When considering how many payment sequences a debtor will participate in, 
one needs to consider the sequence of paying and the probability of leaving 
the payment sequence at any point. So all debtors begin in NP
1 (first non 
payment sequence) since all of the debtors in the data set have defaulted. 
There are only two ways to leave NP
1, the debtor either has to start paying 
(P
1) or get written off (W
1). Once the debtor starts paying there are only two 
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ways to leave P
1. The debtor can either stop paying, in which case they enter 
NP
2 or pay off all of their debt (D
1). So in order to calculate the probability of a 
debtor entering NP
i+1 given that they are in NP
i, first calculate the probability 
of moving to P
i and then the probability of moving to NP
i+1. 
P(NP
i+1| NP
i) = P(NP
i+1|P
i) * P(P
i| NP
i) 
  P(W
i
 | NP
i )  P(P
i | NP
i )  P(D
i | P
i )  P(NP
i+1|P
i) 
NP
1  0.273  0.727  0.043  0.957 
NP
2  0.163  0.837  0.042  0.958 
NP
3  0.138  0.862  0.044  0.956 
NP
4  0.113  0.887  0.051  0.949 
NP
5  0.122  0.878  0.049  0.951 
NP
6  0.105  0.895  0.049  0.951 
NP
7  0.097  0.903  0.053  0.947 
NP
8  0.089  0.911  0.059  0.941 
NP
9  0.104  0.896  0.069  0.931 
NP
10  0.117  0.883  0.065  0.935 
Table 6.1 probability table 
Table  6.1  shows  the  probabilities  of  moving  from  one  payment  state  to 
another.  As  would  be  expected  the  probability  of  being  written  off  (W
1)  is 
higher in NP
1 and then drops off for subsequent sequences. The probability of 
paying  off  the  whole  debt  (D
i)  increases  with  each  payment  sequence  as 
would  be  expected  since  with  each  payment  the  debt  to  be  recovered 
decreases.  
The table was calculated by   P(W
i
 | NP
i )  = No. of written offs in NP
i 
                     No. who reach NP
i 
        P(P
i|NP
i)   = No. who reach P
i 
                         No. who reach NP
i 
Where P(W
i|NP
i) + P(P
i|NP
i) =1 
And         P(D
i|P
i) = No. of paid offs in P
i 
                  No. who reach P
i 
        P(NP
i+1|P
i) = No. who reach NP
i+1   112 
            No. who reach P
i 
Where P(D
i|P
i) + P(NP
i+1|P
i) =1 
Therefore  the  probability  of  the  debt  being  paid  off  in  the  first  payment 
sequence is: P(D
1) = P(P
1|NP
1) P(D
1|P
1) = 0.727 * 0.043 = 0.031 
The probability of reaching the second non-paying sequence is: 
P(NP
2) = P(P
1|NP
1) P(NP
2|P
1) = 0.727 * 0.957 = 0.696 
Hence  the  probability  of  reaching  NP
11  sequence  is  given  in  equation  6.1 
below: 
P(NP
11)                   (eq6.1) 
=  P(P
1|NP
1)  P(NP
2|P
1)  P(P
2|NP
2)  P(NP
3|P
2 « 33
10|NP
10)  P(NP
11|P
10)  = 
«        
While  there  are  debtors  in  the  data  set  that  continue  on  this  stop  start 
payment process for up to P
25, however the probability of reaching NP
11 is 
less than 3%, as can be seen from the equation 6.1 above. Hence the sample 
sizes become too small to be relied upon so only payment sequences up to 
P
10 will be discussed in this thesis.  
6.4 Length of Payment Sequence 
The length of the payment period is dependant upon when the debtor stops 
paying after they have started. In the same way the length of the non-payment 
period is dependant upon when the debtor starts to pay. As could be seen 
from figure 6.1 the length of any payment period or non-payment period can 
vary considerably from one month to many years. Due to small sample sizes, 
the next figures will only cover for up to two years.  
Figure 6.2 shows the conditional probability of paying given that the debtor 
has  reached  that  month  without  paying  for  the  first  six  non-payment 
sequences. As can be seen from this graph the probability of when a debtor 
starts to pay in the first non-payment sequence (NP
1) is different to when a 
debtor will start paying in any other sequence. It is also clear that the first nine 
months are different to the following months. Months 9 to 24 appear to be 
almost flat at about 0.03. The first nine months resemble a power distribution.    113 
The blips at 12 months and 24 months are caused by the way the data is 
recorded and are not true spikes. As was discussed in chapter 5, the way the 
data was collected, meant that if it was unclear when a debtor had made a 
payment,  it  was  assumed  that  the  debtor  paid  all  year.  This  assumption 
causes spikes to occur at twelve-month intervals.  
Figure 6.2 Conditional probability of starting to pay given that they reached 
the month without paying or being written off 
This graph shows that the debtor is more likely to start paying again sooner, if 
they have made some previous payments after default. Also the more times 
they have started and stopped repayments (i.e. the greater the non-payment 
sequence) the more likely they are to pay sooner as the curves are stacked in 
descending order. 
Therefore a model for the conditional probability of starting to pay in NP
1 is 
best  expressed  as  a  power  function  based  on  the  shape  of  the  curves. 
Different  equations  were  fitted  using  trend  lines  and  then  the  model 
predictions were matched to the real results using an R
2 comparison and the 
best result was selected. Hence the form P(Pj|NPj-1) = a j
b was assumed and 
then fitted to the values. The data was then split into training and holdout set 
in the ratio 70:30. Then the model was calculated on the training set using 
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minimum  squared  errors  to  gauge  the  best  fit  and  then  the  R
2  value  was 
calculated on the holdout sample using the explained variance method.  
P(Pj
1|NPj-1
1)  = Probability of starting to pay in month j given that they have 
not started to pay or been written off by month j-1 
    = 0.1058 j
-0.6729   for j<10 
    = 0.025    otherwise 
This model gives an R
2 value of 0.94. 
Since the curves NP
2, NP
3, NP
4, NP
5 and NP
6 are so similar it made sense to 
use the same curve to estimate all of these cases. Again a power function 
gave the best match after fitting various forms to the shape of the curves so 
trend  lines  were  used  to  estimate  P(Pj|NPj-1)=  a  j
b.  The  data  was  split  as 
before and minimum squared error was used to create the model. 
A model for the conditional probability of starting to pay for NP
2, NP
3, NP
4, 
NP
5 and NP
6 is: 
P(Pj
i|NPj-1
i), i>1   = Probability of starting to pay in month j given that they 
have not started to pay or been written off by month j-1 
    = 0.3017 j
-0.7746   for j<12 
    = 0.025    otherwise 
This model gives an R
2 value of 0.86.   115 
Figure 6.3 Conditional probability of stopping paying given that they reached 
the month without stopping or paying off the full debt 
Figure 6.3 shows the conditional probability of stopping payments for the first 
six payment sequences given that the debtor has reached that month in the 
payment sequence without stopping paying. As can be seen from this graph 
the probability of when a debtor will stop paying in the first payment sequence 
(P
1) is different to when a debtor will stop paying in any other sequence. It is 
also clear that the first six months of any payment sequence are different to 
the following months. In months 6 to 24 the conditional probabilities appear to 
be almost flat at about 0.11 for P
1
 and 0.03 for the other payment sequences. 
The first six months resemble a linear distribution. The blips at 12 months and 
24 months are again caused by the way the data is recorded and are not true 
spikes. Chapter 5 gives more detail on how the spikes are created, because 
of the lack of detail within the data set, if it was unclear when a payment was 
made it was sometimes assumed that the debtor paid for the full year. This 
DVVXPSWLRQFDXVHVWKHVSLNHVDWDQGPRQWKVZKHUHDVWKHGHEWRUV¶
payment sequences were probably of a shorter duration.  
Therefore a model for the conditional probability of stopping payment in P
1 is 
expressed using a linear regression since the curve is almost a straight line: 
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P(NPj
1|Pj-1
1)  =  Probability  of  stopping  payment  in  month  j  given  that  they 
have been paying and have not paid off by month j-1 
    = -0.0128j + 0.2014
    for j<7 
    = 0.11       otherwise 
This model gives an R
2 value of 0.98. 
Since the curves P
2, P
3, P
4, P
5 and P
6 are so similar it made sense to use the 
same curve to estimate all of these cases. So again a power function gave the 
best match for the shape of the curves so trend lines were used to estimate 
P(NPj|Pj-1)= a j
b. 
A model for the conditional probability of stopping payment for P
2, P
3, P
4, P
5 
and P
6 is: 
P(NPj
i|Pj-1
i), i>1  = Probability of stopping payment in month j given that 
they have been paying and have not paid off by month j-1 
    = 0.6193 j
-1.32     for j<11 
    = 0.025    otherwise 
This model gives an R
2 value of 0.97. 
6.5 Amount Recovered in Each Payment Sequence 
When considering the amount recovered in each payment sequence one also 
needs to consider the length of the payment sequence. Since in most cases 
the debtor has agreed to pay back their debt at a certain rate e.g. £50 per 
month,  then  the  longer  they  continue  the  payment  plan,  the  more  will  be 
recovered. 
Figure  6.4  shows  the  conditional  probability  of  amount  recovered  in  £10 
segments for each payment sequence given that they do not pay off their 
debt. As can be seen from this graph there is no discernable pattern. There is 
a slight downward trend indicating an exponential model may be used but due 
to the fluctuations in the amount recovered the R
2 value will be very low. 
This model to predict the amount recovered in pounds, based on a conditional 
probability, given that they have paid  amount A-10, the model predicts the 
probability  of  them  paying  A  (i.e.  another £10).  The  amount for  any given   117 
sequence of payments is estimated from a linear regression of log P(A) and is 
as follows: 
P(A) = 0.0658e
-0.003(A-10)     R
2=0.5  
However since the amount paid back in any payment sequence is dependent 
upon the length of the payment sequence it may be more stable to consider 
the average amount repaid in each month during a sequence. 
Figure 6.4 Conditional probability of amount recovered in £10 segments for 
each payment sequence given that they do not pay off their debt 
Figure 6.5 shows the mean amount recovered per month during a payment 
sequence for the first nine payment sequences. Payment sequences after this 
still followed the same negative relationship with average amount received but 
become more erratic due to the small sample sizes. There is clearly a very 
definite exponential negative relationship with average amount received. 
A model to predict the average amount recovered per month in pounds for 
any given sequence of payments is as follows: 
P(A) = 0.116e
-0.0115A     R
2=0.96 
The curves do not automatically suggest any particular form so various forms 
were tested using trend lines which were analysed using R
2 to evaluate the 
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goodness of fit of the model to the real values but eventually the log model log 
P(A) =a+bA gave the best fit. 
Figure 6.5 Average amount recovered per month during a payment sequence 
6.6 Recovery Rate in Each Payment Sequence 
Calculating the amount recovered during a payment sequence could be useful 
for some prediction models however when considering loss given default it 
can be far more interesting and useful to consider the recovery rate for each 
sequence rather than the amount recovered. In order to calculate the recovery 
rate we need to know the amount outstanding and for the following recovery 
rates the default amount is used for the amount outstanding rather than the 
amount outstanding at the start of each sequence. For modelling LGD the RR 
for each month of the payment sequence may be smoother than the RR for 
the  whole  payment  sequence.  This  means  that  the  RR  per  month  is 
independent of sequence length. Therefore both have been modelled.   
Using the default amount to determine recovery rate, means that after the first 
payment sequence the recovery rate cannot equal one. Therefore the total 
recovery rate is  ¦
f
 
 
1 i
i RR RR where i is the payment sequence.  
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Figure 6.6 Probability of recovery rate per sequence 
Figure 6.6 shows the recovery rate for each sequence. All of the sequences 
follow  the  same  pattern  an  exponential  drop  followed  by  a  shallower 
exponential. The first is slightly different to the rest. Clearly the probability for 
recovery  rate  changes  at  around  0.08  (x-axis)  so  the  following  model 
incorporates this. 
P(RR)   =  Probability  that  RR  proportion  of  loan  at  default  will  be 
recovered in any payment sequence 
    = 0.3248e
-33.82RR     for RR<0.08 
    = 0.036e
-9.6971RR    otherwise 
This model gives an R
2 value of 0.92. 
Figure 6.7 shows the average recovery rate per month in each sequence. The 
results are very similar to figure 6.6 but are now smother because they are 
now independent of the length of the sequence. Therefore the same form has 
been used for both. 
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P(RR)   =  Probability  that  RR  proportion  of  loan  at  default  will  be 
recovered in month of any payment sequence 
    = 0.4988e
-41.22RR     for RR<0.07 
    = 0.0339e
-15.146RR    otherwise 
This model gives an R
2 value of 0.97. 
Figure 6.7 Probability of recovery rate per month of each sequence 
The next section will look at which individual variables are the best predictors 
of the average monthly paid amount after default. 
6.7 ,QGLYLGXDO¶V3D\PHQW3DWWHUQ 
So far this chapter has looked at predicting the payment patterns of a group of 
debtors, trying to predict how an individual debtor will pay back their debt is 
more  difficult.  The  same  things  have  to  be  predicted  i.e.  amount  per 
sequence, length of sequence, but using individual variables.  
Predicting the amount paid back per sequence by debtors is the aim of this 
model. In order to achieve this the length of the sequence must be known and 
the mean amount paid back each month during the sequence, since as figure 
6.4 shows trying the predict the total amount recovered in each sequence 
without  reference  to  its  length  has  too  much  variation.  The  length  of  the 
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sequence can be used to calculate the total amount recovered per sequence 
by multiply it by the mean amount recovered per month. 
Trying to predict the average amount a debtor would pay back each month 
during their first payment sequence proved to be difficult as regression was 
resulting in R
2 of 0.04, which even for debt models is very poor. So a decision 
tree approach was used. To select the variables weight of evidence was used.  
6.7.1 Time at Address 
Figure 6.8 WOE for Time at Address 
 
Table 6.2 WOE for Time at Address 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 shows the results for Weight of Evidence (WOE) analysis for the 
variable Time at Address. Time at address is the length of time that a debtor 
resided in their address when the loan was approved. Count is the number of 
debtors in each bin, bad; a bad debtor is one who paid back below the mean 
amount per month in the first payment sequence. A good debtor is therefore 
one  who  paid  back  more  than  the  mean  amount  per  month  in  the  first 
Time at Address
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years 15-20 years 20-25 years 25+ years
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Count
Bad
Good
Time at Address  Count  Bad  Good  Distr Bad  Dirtr Good Weight 
1 year  1211  966  245  24.33%  23.79%  -2.24 
2 years  676  543  133  13.68%  12.91%  -5.76 
3 years  431  343  88  8.64%  8.54%  -1.12 
4 years  463  375  88  9.45%  8.54%  -10.04 
5 years  297  234  63  5.89%  6.12%  3.70 
5-10 years  756  596  160  15.01%  15.53%  3.41 
10-15 years  442  338  104  8.51%  10.10%  17.06 
15-20 years  351  284  67  7.15%  6.50%  -9.51 
20-25 years  240  197  43  4.96%  4.17%  -17.28 
25+ years  133  94  39  2.37%  3.79%  46.95 
Total  5000  3970  1030 
Information Value =  1.31   122 
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good  debtors  respectively  who  fall  into  each  bin.  The  weight  is  then 
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Since the model is trying to determine amount paid by an average debtor the 
mean is far more appropriate than the median to determine good and bad 
characteristics.  These  WOE  variables  were  constructed  for  the  different 
borrow characteristics and those chosen for the models were the ones with 
the highest information value.  
The information value is determined by  
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  where n is the number of bins 
The higher the information value the more useful the variable is to determine 
amount paid per month in the first payment sequence. Figure 6.8 shows the 
distribution of good and bad debtors for time at address. 
Using time in occupation as an example for calculating the information value: 
The  information  value  =  (0.2194-0.2474)*-11.98+  (0.1621-0.1798)*-10.37  + 
(0.1282-0.1798)*2.95 + (0.3602-0.3292)*8.99 + (0.1301-0.1191)*8.80 = 0.90 
All of the WOE analysis is based on a training set of 5000 debtors who all 
paid back some money in the first sequence. 
6.7.2 Time in Occupation 
Table  6.3  shows  the  results  for  WOE  analysis  for  the  variable  Time  in 
Occupation.  Time  in  occupation  is  the  length  of  time  that  a  debtor  was 
employed in their occupation when the loan was approved. Figure 6.9 shows 
the  distribution  of  good  and  bad  debtors  for  time  in  occupation.  The 
information value for time in occupation shows that the variable is less useful 
than time at address for determining amount paid in the first sequence each 
month.   123 
Figure 6.9 WOE for Time in Occupation 
 
Table 6.3 WOE for Time in Occupation 
6.7.3 Default Amount 
Table 6.4 WOE for Default Amount 
Table 6.4 shows the results for WOE analysis for the variable Default Amount. 
Default  amount  is  the  amount  outstanding  on  the  loan  when  the  debtor 
defaults given that default is three months in arrears. The information value 
for default shows that the variable is very useful for determining amount paid 
in the first sequence each month. Figure 6.10 shows the distribution of good 
Time in Occupation Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
1 year 1208 982 226 24.74% 21.94% -11.98
2 years 881 714 167 17.98% 16.21% -10.37
3 years 626 494 132 12.44% 12.82% 2.95
3-10 years 1678 1307 371 32.92% 36.02% 8.99
10-20 years 607 473 134 11.91% 13.01% 8.80
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 0.90
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Default Amount Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
£1,000 360 331 29 8.34% 2.82% -108.56
£2,000 867 790 77 19.90% 7.48% -97.90
£3,000 930 807 123 20.33% 11.94% -53.19
£4,000 772 610 162 15.37% 15.73% 2.33
£5,000 786 606 180 15.26% 17.48% 13.53
£6,000 490 346 144 8.72% 13.98% 47.26
£7,000 267 175 92 4.41% 8.93% 70.62
£8,000 419 262 157 6.60% 15.24% 83.71
+£8,000 109 43 66 1.08% 6.41% 177.77
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 45.31  124 
and bad debtors for default amount. The figure and table show that the more 
money owed at default the greater the proportion of debtors who paid back 
more than the average each month during the first sequence. 
Figure 6.10 WOE for Default Amount 
6.7.4 Mortgage 
Table 6.5 WOE for Mortgage 
Table  6.5  shows  the  results  for  WOE  analysis  for  the  variable  Mortgage. 
Mortgage is whether the debtor took out a mortgage with the lender prior to 
the loan approval. The information value shows that the variable is poor for 
determining amount paid in the first sequence each month. Since there are 
only two bins for this variable there is no accompanying figure. 
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Mortgage Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
Yes 1490 1147 343 28.89% 33.30% 14.20
No 3510 2823 687 71.11% 66.70% -6.40
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 0.91  125 
6.7.5 Married 
Table 6.6 WOE for Married 
Table  6.6  shows  the  results  for  WOE  analysis  for  the  variable  Married. 
Married is whether the debtor was married at the time of loan approval. The 
information  value  shows  that  the  variable  is  reasonable  for  determining 
amount paid in the first sequence each month.  
6.7.6 Own Home 
Table 6.7 WOE for Own Home 
Table 6.7 shows the results for WOE analysis for the variable Own Home. 
Own  Home  is  whether  the  debtor  was  either  the  sole  owner  or  had  joint 
ownership  of  their  residence  at  the  time  of  loan  approval.  The  information 
value shows that the variable is very poor for determining amount paid in the 
first sequence each month.  
6.7.7 Children 
Table 6.8 WOE for Children 
Table  6.8  shows  the  results  for  WOE  analysis  for  the  variable  Children. 
Children are the number children the debtor had at the time of loan approval. 
The information value shows that the variable is poor for determining amount 
paid in the first sequence each month.  
Married Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
Yes 2287 1858 429 46.80% 41.65% -11.66
No 2713 2112 601 53.20% 58.35% 9.24
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 1.08
Own Home Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
Yes 2511 1986 525 50.03% 50.97% 1.87
No 2489 1984 505 49.97% 49.03% -1.91
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 0.04
Children Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
0 3222 2540 682 63.98% 66.21% 3.43
1 799 650 149 16.37% 14.47% -12.38
2 640 499 141 12.57% 13.69% 8.54
+2 339 281 58 7.08% 5.63% -22.87
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 0.74  126 
6.7.8 Savings Account 
 
Table 6.9 WOE for Savings Account 
Table  6.9  shows  the  results  for  WOE  analysis  for  the  variable  Savings 
Account. Savings Account is whether the debtor had a savings account with 
the lender at the time of loan approval. The information value shows that the 
variable is very poor for determining amount paid in the first sequence each 
month.  
6.7.9 Employment 
 
Table 6.10 WOE for Employment 
Table 6.10 shows the results for WOE analysis for the variable Employment. 
Employment is whether the debtor was employed at the time of loan approval. 
The information value shows that the variable is very poor for determining 
amount paid in the first sequence each month.  
Savings Account Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
Yes 2188 1707 481 43.00% 46.70% 8.26
No 2812 2263 549 57.00% 53.30% -6.71
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 0.55
Employment Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
Employed 4920 3900 1020 98.24% 99.03% 0.80
Not Employed 80 70 10 1.76% 0.97% -59.67
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 0.48  127 
6.7.10 Loan Amount 
Table 6.11 WOE for Loan Amount 
Table 6.11 shows the results for WOE analysis for the variable Loan Amount. 
Loan  Amount  is  the  amount  loaned  at  the  time  of  loan  approval.  The 
information value shows that the variable is very good for determining amount 
paid in the first sequence each month.  
6.7.11 Loan Term 
Table 6.12 shows the results for WOE analysis for the variable Loan Term. 
Loan Term is the original length of the loan at the time of loan approval. The 
information value shows that the variable is good for determining amount paid 
in the first sequence each month.  
Table 6.12 WOE for Loan Term 
6.7.12 Application Score 
Table 6.13 shows the results for WOE analysis for the variable Application 
Score. Application Score is the score given to the debtor by the lender at the 
time of loan approval. The information value shows that the variable is good 
for determining amount paid in the first sequence each month.  
 
Loan Amount Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
£1,000 435 407 28 10.25% 2.73% -132.35
£2,000 921 833 88 20.98% 8.58% -89.46
£3,000 936 803 133 20.23% 12.96% -44.49
£4,000 705 550 155 13.85% 15.11% 8.66
£5,000 926 704 222 17.73% 21.64% 19.90
£6,000 329 222 107 5.59% 10.43% 62.32
£7,000 250 160 90 4.03% 8.77% 77.77
£7,000+ 498 291 207 7.33% 20.18% 101.25
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 48.88
Loan Term Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
2 years 641 567 74 14.28% 7.18% -68.71
3 years 1121 925 196 23.30% 19.03% -20.25
4 years 472 363 109 9.14% 10.58% 14.62
5 years 2765 2114 651 53.25% 63.20% 17.14
5 years + 1 1 0 0.03% 0.00% 0.00
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 7.66  128 
Table 6.13 WOE for Application Score 
The  top  six  variables  were  Loan  Amount  (48.88),  Default  Amount  (45.31), 
Term of Loan (7.66), Application Score (2.21), Time at Address (1.31) and 
Married (1.08). The top variables were used to create a segmentation tree to 
determine the amount paid each month during the first sequence. 
 Loan amount and default amount had the highest weight, however they are 
both very closely tied and since the amount paid back before default was so 
small in most cases, they were almost identical for the majority of debtors. 
Therefore  it  makes  more  sense  to  use  the  original  loan  amount  and  the 
amount  paid  back  before  default.  Table  6.14  shows  the  results  for  WOE 
analysis for the variable Amount Paid Before Default.  
Table 6.14 WOE for Amount Paid Before Default 
Amount Paid Before Default is the next highest value after Loan Amount if 
Default Amount is discounted. Therefore to estimate the average amount paid 
after default, loan amount, amount paid back before default, and loan term are 
used for the first branches of the segmentation tree.  
Application Score Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
£180 499 391 108 9.85% 10.53% 6.65
£190 595 484 111 12.19% 10.82% -11.95
£200 950 778 172 19.60% 16.76% -15.61
£210 909 724 185 18.24% 18.03% -1.13
£220 684 532 152 13.40% 14.81% 10.03
£230 561 454 107 11.44% 10.43% -9.22
£240 304 245 59 6.17% 5.75% -7.06
240+ 494 362 132 9.12% 12.87% 34.43
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 2.21
Amount                    
Paid Before Default Count Bad Good Distr Bad Dirtr Good Weight
£0 1530 1190 340 29.97% 33.01% 9.64
£30 1024 892 132 22.47% 12.82% -56.15
£60 930 806 124 20.30% 12.04% -52.26
£90 573 461 112 11.61% 10.87% -6.57
£90+ 943 621 322 15.64% 31.26% 69.24
Total 5000 3970 1030
Information Value = 20.89  129 
6.8 Segmentation Tree to Calculate Repayments After Default 
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Figure 6.11 example of estimating the average payment amount in the first 
payment sequence 
Figure 6.11 above shows the segmentation tree for determining the average 
amount  paid  per  month  during  the  first  sequence.  There  are  160  different 
combinations available. In the figure above one is example is shown where 
the loan amount was for between £3,000 and £4,000, the debtor paid over 
£90 before default and the original loan term was for two years. This particular 
combination predicts that the average amount the debtor will pay per month in   130 
the first sequence is £221. Had any of these factors been different than the 
predicted payment amount would also have been different. For instance if the 
debtor had not paid anything back before default then the debtor would have 
been predicted to pay back £215.63 per month. 
Count  Amount Paid Before Default 
Loan 
Amount 
  £0  £30  £60  £90  £90.00+ 
£1000  162  290  283  188  277 
£2000  160  290  205  122  141 
£3000  49  182  208  169  175 
£4000  30  73  98  79  129 
£5000  34  86  142  147  204 
£6000  162  290  283  188  277 
£7000  160  290  205  122  141 
£7,000+  49  182  208  169  175 
Table 6.15 Number of training data for the first matrix of segmentation tree 
Table  6.15  shows  the  number  of  debtors  in  the  training  set  in  each 
classification. Since just using loan amount and amount paid before default 
means 40 different bins, and there are only 5000 debtors in the training set 
means there is only 125 debtor in each bin on average. The mean payment of 
the debtors in each bin was then used to determine the payment for each bin. 
Table 6.16 show the mean payments. 
Amount  Amount Paid Before Default 
Loan 
Amount 
  £0  £30  £60  £90  £90.00+ 
£1000  £69.88  £42.41  £39.73  £69.22  £74.83 
£2000  £93.27  £67.89  £68.49  £90.43  £131.73 
£3000  £169.84  £105.79  £93.56  £112.36  £219.47 
£4000  £215.63  £190.10  £143.07  £123.24  £220.76 
£5000  £288.38  £157.02  £227.39  £107.27  £197.99 
£6000  £384.00  £351.27  £194.13  £134.15  £280.22 
£7000  £311.28  £217.15  £293.44  £215.00  £234.01 
£7,000+  £515.51  £590.86  £260.19  £524.20  £432.73 
Table 6.16 Mean amount paid by debtors in each bin on average per month in 
the first payment sequence 
The next variable with the highest WOE value was Term of Loan at 7.66. Now 
since there was only one loan whose term was over 5 years, it makes sense 
to group that result with the five-year terms. So now there are 160 bins. With 
only 5000 debts in the training data that is only 31 debts per bin on average.   131 
The next set of tables 6.17 show the number of debtors in the training set 
within each bin.  
Count  Loan Term with £0 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  103  35  5  19 
£2000  82  104  15  89 
£3000  31  87  29  136 
£4000  12  42  27  107 
£5000  4  30  24  219 
£6000  1  9  9  86 
£7000  0  4  3  73 
£7,000+  0  4  4  137 
Table  6.17a  Number  of  debtors  in  the  training  set  where  the  debtor  paid 
nothing before default 
Count  Loan Term with £30 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  82  42  3  33 
£2000  51  91  29  119 
£3000  5  43  29  128 
£4000  2  26  15  79 
£5000  1  13  7  120 
£6000  0  1  2  40 
£7000  0  3  1  16 
£7,000+  0  2  3  38 
Table 6.17b Number of debtors in the training set where the debtor paid £30 
before default 
Count  Loan Term with £60 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  33  12  2  2 
£2000  45  73  19  45 
£3000  14  72  22  100 
£4000  1  30  23  115 
£5000  2  9  21  143 
£6000  0  1  1  47 
£7000  0  0  1  32 
£7,000+  0  2  1  62 
Table 6.17c Number of debtors in the training set where the debtor paid £60 
before default 
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Count  Loan Term with £90 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  25  3  1  1 
£2000  21  38  5  9 
£3000  13  52  9  24 
£4000  1  23  18  37 
£5000  0  11  16  102 
£6000  0  1  5  46 
£7000  1  2  4  35 
£7,000+  0  3  4  63 
Table 6.17d Number of debtors in the training set where the debtor paid £90 
before default 
 
Count  Loan Term with more than £90 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  29  2  1  2 
£2000  36  34  6  10 
£3000  28  63  13  38 
£4000  9  56  29  53 
£5000  4  63  26  111 
£6000  2  13  15  50 
£7000  0  11  9  55 
£7,000+  3  11  16  145 
Table 6.17e Number of debtors in the training set where the debtor paid more 
than £90 before default 
As you can see from tables 6.17 a-e there are several bins with no debtors to 
use and other bins with very low numbers of debtors in each bin. Therefore 
when the value was less than 15 debtors in the bin (0.3% of the debtors) just 
under half the average number of debtors in each bin on average, the value of 
the bin one branch up the segmentation tree were used. Therefore in tables 
6.18 all bins with less than 15 debtors the value from table 6.16 was used 
instead. 
The next set of tables show the final amounts within each bin to determine 
average payment made during the first sequence. 
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Amount  Loan Term with £0 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  £69.81  £80.94  £69.88  £56.66 
£2000  £99.34  £110.90  £52.07  £74.01 
£3000  £85.90  £210.02  £117.72  £174.39 
£4000  £215.63  £194.09  £150.18  £228.70 
£5000  £288.38  £186.40  £341.33  £300.69 
£6000  £384.00  £384.00  £384.00  £395.51 
£7000  £311.28  £311.28  £311.28  £310.64 
£7,000+  £515.51  £515.51  £515.51  £537.01 
Table 6.18a Mean amount paid by debtors in each bin on average per month 
in the first payment sequence where the debtor paid nothing before default 
 
Amount  Loan Term with £30 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  £34.86  £64.98  £42.41  £32.18 
£2000  £95.43  £48.35  £60.82  £72.75 
£3000  £105.79  £129.45  £51.71  £111.56 
£4000  £190.10  £106.70  £383.78  £183.48 
£5000  £157.02  £157.02  £157.02  £152.44 
£6000  £351.27  £351.27  £351.27  £368.68 
£7000  £217.15  £217.15  £217.15  £176.55 
£7,000+  £590.86  £590.86  £590.86  £546.09 
Table 6.18b Mean amount paid by debtors in each bin on average per month 
in the first payment sequence where the debtor paid £30 before default 
 
Amount  Loan Term with £60 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  £38.10  £39.73  £39.73  £39.73 
£2000  £71.44  £65.75  £86.99  £62.17 
£3000  £93.56  £106.31  £127.60  £83.13 
£4000  £143.07  £291.95  £170.98  £99.28 
£5000  £227.39  £227.39  £247.91  £230.54 
£6000  £194.13  £194.13  £194.13  £184.09 
£7000  £293.44  £293.44  £293.44  £300.68 
£7,000+  £260.19  £260.19  £260.19  £265.45 
Table 6.18c Mean amount paid by debtors in each bin on average per month 
in the first payment sequence where the debtor paid £60 before default 
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Amount  Loan Term with £90 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  £74.87  £69.22  £69.22  £69.22 
£2000  £112.08  £88.44  £90.43  £90.43 
£3000  £112.36  £80.27  £112.36  £88.81 
£4000  £123.24  £76.56  £171.33  £130.36 
£5000  £107.27  £107.27  £138.25  £105.83 
£6000  £134.15  £134.15  £134.15  £143.17 
£7000  £215.00  £215.00  £215.00  £206.53 
£7,000+  £524.20  £524.20  £524.20  £428.20 
Table 6.18d Mean amount paid by debtors in each bin on average per month 
in the first payment sequence where the debtor paid £90 before default 
 
Amount  Loan Term with more than £90 paid before default 
Loan 
Amount 
  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
£1000  £66.98  £74.83  £74.83  £74.83 
£2000  £135.26  £136.73  £131.73  £131.73 
£3000  £135.51  £306.28  £219.47  £168.27 
£4000  £220.76  £219.62  £240.32  £215.18 
£5000  £197.99  £197.71  £194.67  £203.55 
£6000  £280.22  £280.22  £356.69  £251.49 
£7000  £234.01  £234.01  £234.01  £264.38 
£7,000+  £432.73  £432.73  £160.99  £468.30 
Table 6.18e Mean amount paid by debtors in each bin on average per month 
in the first payment sequence where the debtor paid more than £90 before 
default 
The figure 6.12 shows the results of using the segmentation tree to predict the 
average amount paid each month during the first sequence. There is quite a 
large spread of payments made. The observed data shows that sometimes a 
debtor would just make one payment after default to pay off the whole debt. 
This meant that the payment amounts could vary from a few pounds up to 
thousands. This made predicting the payment amount very tricky. The large 
single payments were also quite rare meaning that a logistic regression to 
determine high and low payers would not be applicable.  
The segmentation tree predicted payments from £32 up to £591. Using other 
prediction  methods  the  predictions  were  all  clustered  around  the  mean  of, 
£190  or  the  median  of  £66.  Instead  of  segmenting  into  bins  using  loan   135 
amount, loan term and amount paid before default to create historic averages 
for the value of each bin, one could try to use non-linear regression. Using 
non-linear regression avoids the problem of clustering and is more adaptive 
than  the  segmentation  tree.  The  next  section  suggests  one  non-linear 
regression approach, which gave good results for an individual model. 
Figure 6.12 results of using the prediction tree for estimating the amount paid 
in the first sequence 
6.9  Alternative  Approach  for  Predicting  the  First  Sequence 
Payments using Non Linear Regression 
The average amount paid per month during the first sequence was modelled 
using  linear  regression  with  all  available  variables.  Yet  since  the  payment 
sequences  are  evidentially  exponentially  distributed  and  not  normal  (figure 
6.5),  linear  regression  gives  very  poor  results  (R
2~0.02),  however  the 
payments  are  lognormal.  Therefore  by  converting  the  payments  to  log10 
before using regression, the results are improved.  
Equation 6.1 
Predicted  Log10  average  payment  per  month  in  1
st  payment 
sequence=1.45207  +average  collected  before  default*0.0002483  +default 
amount*0.00015323  +loan  amount*0.00000232  +no  children*0.05573 
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+term*0.00312-  defaulted  in  1990*0.21361-  defaulted  in  1991*0.23166- 
defaulted  in  1992*0.31639-  defaulted  in  1993*0.26216-  defaulted  in 
1994*0.21751- defaulted in 1995*0.09943- defaulted in 1997*0.08927 
Equation 6.1 gave an R
2=0.12 using the explained variance method on the 
holdout sample however the default year is not much use for future prediction 
therefore using the economic variables described in chapter 5. 
Equation 6.2 
Predicted  Log10  average  payment  per  month  in  1
st  payment  sequence  = 
1.20541 + average collected before default * 0.00025313 - default amount * 
0.00015795  -  loan  amount*0.00000236  +no  children  *  0.05552  +  term  * 
0.00292+ Halifax *0.00992 + net lending *0.00016674 
This  also  gave  an  R
2=0.12  using  the  explained  variance  method  on  the 
holdout  sample.    Figure  6.12  shows  the  predicted  results  of  this  model 
compared to the real average monthly payment in the first sequence.  As you 
can see the spread was not as good as in figure 6.11. On the holdout sample 
the correlation between the actual and the predicted was 0.05, which is far 
worse than the R
2 from the original regression model predicted. 
Since  the  regression  estimates  the  log  of  the  payment  amounts,  the 
exponential of the estimates have to be taken to get the estimate of the actual 
payment amount.   137 
Figure 6.13 results of using lognormal regression for estimating the amount 
paid in the first sequence  
6.10 Predicting Repayment Amounts in Future Sequences 
When  predicting  the  further  payment  sequence  using  regression  the 
lognormal gave the best results but they were still poor in comparison to the 
first sequence. The model gave an R
2=0.06: 
Equation 6.3 
Predicted Log10 average payment per month in payment sequences after 1
st 
payment sequence= 1.7253 -loan amount* 0.000000171252 +term* 0.00748 
+ net lending at default* 0.00009003 
An alternative is to use the average amount recovered in the first sequence to 
predict further payments. This means that the payment sequences have to 
have  started,  but  the  model  is  far  better.  The  model  no  longer  uses  a 
lognormal but just a simple linear regression model. This is because of the 
linear relationship displayed  between the first  sequence payments  and  the 
second sequence payments. This achieved an R
2=0.28.      
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Equation 6.4 
Predicted average payment per month in 2
nd payment sequences =-462.5+ 
payment in 1
st sequence *0.5384 + interest rate* 9.692 + net lending * 0.1583 
+ married * 9.31+ total recovered in first sequence * 0.047+unemployment * 
3536.3 + amount left after first sequence*0.0114 
 
 
Figure 6.14 results of using lognormal regression for estimating the amount 
paid in the second sequence 
Figure 6.14 shows the predicted results against the real average amount paid 
in the second sequence. 
6.11 Expected Recovery Rate 
The individual models discussed in this chapter can be used to predict the 
expected recovery rate. This is made up of the probability of having an i
th 
SD\PHQWVHTXHQFHIRUL «PXOWLSOLHGE\WKHOHQJWKRIWKHL
th payment 
sequence and the expected payment per month in the i
th payment sequence. 
Summing this for all i gives an estimate for LGD. This calculation is explained 
in more detail below. 
The probability of starting to pay each sequence is summarised in table 6.1. 
Now once an individual has defaulted the probability of them starting to pay in 
the  first  sequence  is  0.727  from  table  6.1.  The  probability  of  starting  the 
second  sequence  is the  probability  of  starting  the first  payment sequence,   139 
multiplied by the probability of not paying off their debt in that first sequence, 
multiplied by the probability of starting to pay off the second sequence. 
Equation 6.5 
P(P
2) = P(P
1|NP
1) * P(NP
2|P
1) * P(P
2|NP
2) 
Since figures 6.2 and 6.3 show that after the first payment sequence and first 
non  payment  sequence  all  of  the  subsequent  sequences  are  very  closely 
related  and  have  been  taken  to  be  the  same  in  all  other  models  in  this 
chapter, then the probabilities of starting the subsequent payment sequences 
should likewise be taken to be the same.  Therefore the probability of stopping 
a non-payment sequence after NP
i, i>1 is 0.88 and the probability of stopping 
any payment sequence after P
i is 0.95. These probabilities are the averages 
IURPWDEOHLHLVWKHDYHUDJHIRU«DQGLV
the average for (0.9«+HQFHWKHSUREDELOLW\RIVWDUWLQJWR
pay off the second sequence is P(P
2) = 0.727 * 0.95 * 0.88 = 0.61. 
The expected recovery amount from the first sequence E(R
1) is the amount 
recovered per month (equation 6.2), multiplied by the number of months in the 
first sequence. The amount recovered per month is given below, OHW¶V call it 
M
1: 
Equation 6.2 rewritten 
Predicted  amount  recovered  in  the  1
st  payment  sequence  (M
1)  =  10  ^ 
(1.20541 + average collected before default * 0.00025313 - default amount * 
0.00015795 - loan amount * 0.00000236 + no children * 0.05552 + term * 
0.00292 + Halifax * 0.00992 + net lending * 0.00016674) 
The model for the conditional probability of stopping payment in P1 is: 
P(NPj|Pj-1)   =  Probability  of  stopping  payment  in  month  j  given  that  they 
have been paying and have not paid off by month j-1 
    = -0.0128j + 0.2014
    for j<7 
    = 0.11       otherwise 
/HW¶V call the probability of paying in the i
th month of the first payment 
sequence q
1
i.    140 
Equation 6.6 
Therefore    ¦ ¦
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where k is for case k 
So q
1
i = 1 ±(-0.0128*(i -1) + 0.2014) for i<7 given that a payment was made in 
month i-1. Also q
1
i+1 = q
1
i (1 ± 0.11) =0.89 q
1
i for i>6. 
Therefore: 
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Equation 6.7 (equation 6.2 substituted into equation 6.6) 
E(R
1
k)  =  5.27  *  10  ^  (1.20541  +  average  collected  before  defaultk  * 
0.00025313 - default amountk * 0.00015795 - loan amountk * 0.00000236 + no 
childrenk * 0.05552 + termk * 0.00292 + Halifaxt * 0.00992 + net lendingt * 
0.00016674) 
Where k is for case k and t is for default date in case k 
Moving on to the expected recovery amount from the second sequence E(R
2) 
Equation 6.8 
  ¦
f
 
u u u u  
1
2 2 2 88 . 0 95 . 0 727 . 0
i
i k k q M R E  
Where the amount recovered per month is M
2
k (equation 6.3 rewritten): 
M
2
k = 10 ^(1.7253 -loan amountk* 0.000000171252 +termk* 0.00748 + net 
lending at defaultt* 0.00009003) 
And P(NPj|Pj-1) = Probability of stopping payment in month j given that they 
have been paying and have not paid off by month j-1 
    = 0.6193 j
-1.32     for j<11 
    = 0.025    otherwise 
So q
2
i = 1 ±(0.6193 (i-1
-1.32) for i<11 given that a payment was made in month 
i-1.  
Therefore: 
1
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1   q ,  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32 . 1 2
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-1.32) (1-0.025) = 0.165555606 
Hence:   142 
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The model to predict the recovery rate for all future sequences, where j is the 
sequence and k is case k, is as follows: 
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Equation 6.7 where equations 6.2 and 6.3 have been substituted in 
E(Rk) =5.27*10 ^ (1.20541 + average collected before defaultk* 0.00025313 - 
default amountk * 0.00015795 - loan amountk * 0.00000236 + no childrenk * 
0.05552 + termk * 0.00292 + Halifaxt * 0.00992 + net lendingt * 0.00016674) +   143 
35.87 * 10^ (1.7253 -loan amountk * 0.000000171252 +termk * 0.00748 + net 
lending at defaultt * 0.00009003) 
Loan Amount in the equation 6.7 above is in the form of negative pence, since 
this was the format given in the data. In order to have all financial variables in 
the same form, E(Rk) can be rewritten as follows, where Loan Amount is in 
positive pounds. 
E(Rk) =5.27*10 ^ (1.20541 + average collected before defaultk * 0.00025313 - 
default amountk * 0.00015795 + loan amountk * 0.000236 + no childrenk * 
0.05552 + termk * 0.00292 + Halifaxt * 0.00992 + net lendingt * 0.00016674) + 
35.87 * 10^ (1.7253 + loan amountk* 0.0000171252 +termk* 0.00748 + net 
lending at defaultt* 0.00009003) 
A real life example of calculating E(R) is given in table 6.19 below.  
Table 6.19 real life examples from the hold out sample 
Table 6.19 shows four real debtors from the holdout sample who all paid back 
part  of  their  debt  after  default.  The  applicable  variables  to  calculate  their 
expected amount recovered after default for these debtors are shown above 
along with their real and predicted amounts recovered after default. As can be 
seen two out of the four where predicted to pay back over £3,000 more than 
they did in reality. This is partly due to the fact that the equation to calculate 
the expected amount recovered includes the assumption that there could be 
infinite payment sequences of infinite length. Therefore the expected recovery 
amount will be higher than the real recovery amount for most debtors, since 
the collectors will never allow this to happen.  
Figure 6.15 shows the results of applying the expected recovery equation to 
the holdout sample. The vast majority of the debtors are estimated to pay 
Variable Debtor A Debtor B Debtor C Debtor D
Average collected before default £0.10 £2.26 £1,115.03 £0.94
Default amount £2,498.38 £4,830.04 £8,730.06 £8,985.89
Loan amount £2,500.00 £4,900.00 £6,500.00 £9,000.00
Loan term 48 60 36 36
No children 1 0 1 1
Halifax 0.2 -2.3 -1.7 5.4
Net lending 368 181 334 1190
Real amount recovered after default £1,865.10 £4,104.68 £8,712.16 £7,529.42
Expected amount recovered £6,555.72 £8,529.37 £6,337.46 £7,573.66  144 
back far more than they did. Looking at figure 6.15, on the other hand, which 
shows the results for estimating the amount recovered in the first sequence 
only, in the holdout sample. Here the reverse is true, the majority of debtors 
were under estimated. This is partly because there were quite a number of 
debtors who paid off the full amount in the first sequence and because within 
each sequence the estimated amount tends towards the mean.  
Figure 6.15, results of using the expected recovery amount for estimating the 
total recovery amount after default 
UVLQJ 6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQN IRU H[SHFWHG UHFRYHU\ DPRXQW DJDLQVW WKH UHDO
UHFRYHU\DPRXQWJLYHVD7KLVLVVXSHULRUWRWKH6SHDUPDQ¶VUDQNIRUWKH
WKLUGSDUW\SUHGLFWLRQVLQFKDSWHUZKLFKKDGD6SHDUPDQ¶VUDQNEHWZHHQ
and 0.3. The R-squared value for the holdout sample in this model is 0.21 
which is nearly as good as the weight of evidence (WOE) approach discussed 
in chapter 3. In comparison this is a good result since the WOE approach was 
far less detailed, estimated the recovery rate and based on a limit two year 
period.  The  Mean  Squared  Error  (MSE)  for  the  model  was  21,000,000.  
However all of the expected payments were far larger than the real payments. 
This is partly because the expected recovered amount assumes that there are 
infinite sequences, and each sequence can be of infinite length. Also there 
are no individual characteristics for determining the probability of starting a 
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sequence or for the length of sequence. This is one aspect of the research, 
which could be looked into in future.  
 
 
Figure 6.16, results of using the expected recovery amount for estimating the 
total recovery amount in the 1
st payment sequence 
This model resulted in R-squared = 0.008, and MSE=1,300,000. Since the R-
squared = 0.05 for the model predicted the amount paid per month in the first 
sequence, this result while poor is not unexpected.  
Therefore this model assumes that the average debtor will pay for five months 
in the first sequence and for a further 35 months for all following sequences. 
For most debtors this will be an over estimation. This model allows lenders to 
assess their write off policies by estimating the LGD for the different policies. 
The write off policy of the lender was unknown for this data set. However the 
OHQGHUGLGQ¶WZULWHRIIWKHGHEWXQWLOWKHUHKDGEHHQQRSD\PHQWVIRURYHUVL[
months in all cases and often waited for years to be sure there would be no 
future payments. Therefore it can be assumed that if the debt was written off, 
the lender was fairly certain that they would not receive any further payments.  
The  data  can  be  used  to  test  out  the  impact  of  different  write  off  polices. 
These  could  include  write  offs  after  an  agreed  number  of  payments,  non-
payments or payment sequences.  For example if the lender chose to write off 
the debt after the first payment sequence following default then the estimated 
LGD would be equal to: 
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LGD after first sequence = Default Amount -E(R1) 
        Default Amount 
All of these are practices by lenders but are not modelled here. This is one of 
the  reasons  for  the  over  estimations.  This  is  just  one  of  a  number  of 
improvements which could be made to the model. Another expansion of this 
model could be to use the individual characteristics to estimate the length of 
the payment sequences and non-payment sequences. This could mean that 
the LGD could be estimated for any given length of time, e.g. the LGD 3 years 
after default. 
Also  as  was  previously  demonstrated  in  figure  6.13,  the  more  information 
collected after default like the first sequence payments leads to more accurate 
future predictions. However as would be expected the further into the future 
the predictions go the less accurate the prediction. 
6.12 Summary 
The payment patterns can be very useful for prediction models as they show 
how debtors pay back their debt after default. These models can be useful for 
not  only  predicting  loss  given  default  but  also  policy  for  collecting  and 
predicting income from defaulted loans.  
The  amount  recovered  and  the  recovery  rate  for  each  sequence  was 
dependent upon the length of the sequence as would be expected for any 
repayment plan. The length of the sequence was dependant upon the number 
of the sequence since the first non-payment and payment sequences were 
different from the others.  
The expected recovery model assumes that all debtors have a 73% chance of 
starting to pay the first sequence. This has no individual characteristics, and 
neither do the probabilities for starting further sequences. This is one area 
that could be continued in future research.  
The  expected  recovery  model  also  assumes  that  all  further  payment 
sequences are the same, therefore they have the same probability of starting 
and the same amount will be recovered in each. This assumption is backed   147 
up by the data, but including some individual characteristic for determining the 
length of the payment sequence, might be applicable future research. 
This  model  shows  that  modelling  the  payment  sequences  can  in  principle 
predict the expected recovery amount of the loan after default. This type of 
model may also be of more use to loan collectors than a simple regression to 
estimate LGD, because it allows the lender to estimate what would happen if 
different  write  off  polices  were  implemented.  Changing  the  write  off  policy 
would alter the predicted probability of starting each payment sequence. If the 
collector experimented in changing the write off policy with a few debtors and 
used this to estimate the probability of starting each payment sequence, then 
they could estimate the results of these changes within the model. This would 
mean  they  could  assess  the  impact  of  the  new  policy  after  only  a  few 
sequences. 
This model also shows that if a lender decided to write off the debtor after the 
first sequence, then there would be a potentially large loss of income from the 
debtor as table 6.14, and 6.15 demonstrates. These models could also be 
used to estimate the sale price for the debt no matter what sequence the 
debtor was in. And as figure 6.13 shows, once the debtor has started to pay 
back part of their debt the model can be improved by using the first sequence 
results to predict future payments more accurately.   148 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
With debt on the increase, many consumers fail to pay back their debt.  There 
are many factors contributing to customer delinquency. These include poor 
financial management skills, the economy and ease of access to loans and 
credit cards. When a debtor becomes delinquent for 180 days (FSA definition) 
then the loan is considered to be in default. The lender will try to collect the 
debt  as  soon  as  the  debtor  becomes  delinquent.  Then  once  the  debtor 
defaults, the debt will get passed on to their in-house collections department 
who will try to collect the outstanding debt. However some companies use 
RXWVLGHDJHQWVRUZLOOMXVWVHOORIIWKHGHEW,IWKHOHQGHU¶VFROOHFWLRQGHSDUWPHQW
LVXQDEOHWRFROOHFWWKHGHEWWKHQWKH\PD\DOVRGHFLGHWRXVHDFROOHFWLRQ¶V
agency or just sell off the debt. The debt can be passed on several times, and 
can be collected up to six years after the last payment was made as stated in 
the  Limitations  Act  of  1980  [40].  Debt  collection  agencies  recovered  $51 
billion in 2005 [37]. 
The novelties of this research are that it looks at not only in-house collections 
but also compares them to third party recovery processes. Models for both in-
house and third party LGD are calculated and discussed over similar time 
periods for real comparisons to be made. These models are also refined and 
improved;  in  the  case  of  the  in-house  data  set  economic  variables  were 
included  because  the  data  was  collected  over  different  economic  time 
periods.  What  is  remarkably  unique  in  this  thesis  is  the  use  of  payment 
patterns to predict the LGD of loans. This approach is far more flexible than 
other models because it can be used to not only calculate the final LGD but 
also the LGD at any given time. 
Chapter 3 discusses the differences between debt that is collected in-house 
and debt that is collected by a third party. Although both analysed data sets 
are  about  debt  recovery,  the  information  available  in  each  case  is  quite 
different and the average recovery rate varied from 5% to 46%. The two-stage 
model was appropriate for both, even though the spikes are at opposite ends 
of the LGD distribution. The in-house spike was at 0 indicating that a large 
proportion of debtors repaid everything whereas the third party spike was at 1   150 
indicating that a large proportion of debtors repaid nothing. All of this is not 
surprising because third party debt will usually go through several collection 
processes, so by definition must be harder to collect.  
What is remarkable about the models discussed in chapter 3 is that despite 
the in-house data set being more detailed, the goodness of fit of both  was 
very similar. This is despite the third party model focusing on contact details 
and very few personal details. Whereas the in-house model focused more on 
loan characteristics; loan amount, time spent in arrears, lifetime of the loan.  
Chapter 4 focused on predicting the recovery rate for third party collection 
over  the  20-month  time  period.  By  splitting  the  debtors  according  to  the 
amount  of  debt  they  owe  the  results  of  the  models  were  far  better  than 
modelling the debtors as a whole. Only predicting the  LGD for extra large 
debtors gave a poorer result than the linear regression model in chapter 3. 
The models for small and medium sized debt even managed to improve on 
the weight of evidence model. 
The model created was a two-stage LGD predictor, using logistic regression 
to predict which debtors would have a LGD=1 and which would pay back part 
of  their  debt.  To  ensure  the  best  classification  of  the  debtors,  those  who 
achieved a result of less than 0.2 in the logistic regression model would have 
a  predicted  LGD  of  1.  The  others  would  have  their  predicted  LGD  value 
estimated by using the linear regression model. Splitting at 0.2 meant that 
about 70% of debtors who paid were correctly classified and about 70% of 
debtors who did not pay were correctly classified. 
Waiting until after the debtors had been in collections for at least 6-months 
gave  better  results  for  the  logistic  regression.  That  is  not  to  say  that  the 
models should only be used after 6-months but rather that these models are 
for predicting the recovery rate after at least 6-months in collections.  
For larger debts their predicted LGD was higher than for debts in smaller debt 
amount models. So for debts larger than £2000 none were predicted to pay 
back more than 35% of their debt. 
Chapter 5 has looked at the effects of economic factors in debtors repaying 
their  loans  after  they  have  defaulted.  The  in-house  data  set  was  ideal  for   151 
WHVWLQJHFRQRPLFYDULDEOHVRQUHFRYHU\UDWHVVLQFHLWFRYHUVWKHORDQV¶KLVWRU\
during a recession, recovery and a period of stability. 
When looking at the percentage of defaulters who pay back their loans each 
month, the economic variables were excellent at predicting how many will pay 
back. In particular, net lending was a very strong indicator. Net lending, GDP 
and house prices all had a strong positive linear relationship between them 
and,  the  percentage  of  debtors  who  are  paying  each  month  after  default. 
Interest  rates  and  unemployment  had  a  negative  relationship  with  the 
percentage of debtors who are paying each month after default. 
When it came to predicting the recovery rates after the first 12 months, the 
GHEWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUGXULQJWKRVHILUVWPRQWKVLVDQLQGLFDWRUIRUWKHIROORZLQJ
12 and 24 months. On average it appeared that debtors were repaying around 
5% of the default balance off each year. However the variability was very high 
where some debtors paid off everything in one payment and many failed to 
pay off anything. 
Using  economic  variables  for  predicting  for  when  debtors  pay  gave  good 
results and for predicting how much debtors repay is also improved by using 
economic variables. 
What is evident is that during the lifetime of a loan, economic conditions can 
vary  wildly,  especially  as  some  loans  can  have  debtors  repaying  even  a 
decade  after  they  have  defaulted.  This  means  that  using  the  economic 
conditions at a certain point, e.g. at default, is not as useful as continuous 
monitoring within the models. Therefore in future research it would be useful 
to  predict  when  debtors  repay  and  use  predicted  economic  conditions  for 
each month to improve the predictions. 
Both parties can use these models to determine the price at which to buy a 
debt if the lenders wish to sell. The third party model gives an indication of 
recovery rate so the third party can set an internal upper limit for the price of 
buying the debt. For the in-house collection; the question is how much more 
would they get by keeping the debt in their collection process for some further 
time? To get a feel for this one needs to estimate RR in the next year as 
covered in chapter 5.    152 
All of these models are based on calculating the final LGD or the LGD after a 
predetermined  time  period.  Chapter  6  discusses  the  advantages  of  a 
revolutionary LGD modelling approach. Once a debtor defaults on a loan they 
do not behave the same way as a non-defaulted debtor. Some payback all of 
their debt in one go, others never payback anything but the majority pay back 
what  they  can  with  instalments.  These  instalments  are  discussed  with  the 
collector,  and  often  the  lender  describes  theVH GHEWRUV DV EHLQJ ³FXUHG´
+RZHYHUWKHVH³FXUHG´GHEWRUVGRQRWVWD\³FXUHG´WKH\VWRSSD\LQJDJDLQ
and again, causing the collector to renegotiate the instalments time and again. 
These instalments can potentially go on for years.   
The payment patterns can be very useful for prediction models as they show 
how debtors pay back their debt after default. These models can be useful for 
not only predicting LGD but also policy for collecting and predicting income 
from defaulted loans.  
The  amount  recovered  and  the  recovery  rate  for  each  sequence  was 
dependent upon the length of the sequence as would be expected for any 
repayment plan. The length of the sequence was dependant upon the number 
of the sequence (i.e. first, second, third sequence etc.). The first non-payment 
and payment sequences were different from the others.  
The expected recovery model assumes that all debtors have a 73% chance of 
starting to pay the first sequence. This has no individual characteristics, and 
neither do the probabilities for starting further sequences. This is one area 
that could be continued in future research.  
The  expected  recovery  model  also  assumes  that  all  further  payment 
sequences are the same, therefore they have the same probability of starting 
and the same amount will be recovered in each. This assumption is backed 
up by the data, but including some individual characteristic for determining the 
length of the payment sequence, might be applicable future research. 
The model in chapter 6 shows that modelling the payment sequences can in 
principle predict the expected recovery amount of the loan after default. This 
type  of  model  may  also  be  of  more  use  to  loan  collectors  than  a  simple 
regression to estimate LGD, because it allows the lender to estimate what   153 
would happen if different write off polices were implemented. Changing the 
write off policy would alter the predicted probability of starting each payment 
sequence. If the collector experimented in changing the write off policy with a 
few debtors and used this to estimate the probability of starting each payment 
sequence, then they could estimate the results of these changes within the 
model. This would mean they could assess the impact of the new policy after 
only a few sequences. 
This model also shows that if a lender decided to write off the debtor after the 
first sequence, then there would be a potentially large loss of income from the 
debtor as tables 6.14, and 6.15 demonstrate. These models could also be 
used to estimate the sale price for the debt no matter what sequence the 
debtor was in. And as figure 6.13 shows, once the debtor has started to pay 
back part of their debt the model can be improved by using the first sequence 
results to predict future payments more accurately. 
The main point of the payment pattern models was not to improve the current 
regression based models but to see if the approach is feasible. These finding 
show that the models are feasible and can be an improvement on the two-
stage model also discussed in this thesis. 
7.1 Further Research  
As discussed research into consumer LGD is still in its infancy, therefore there 
is lots of potential further research. All of the models discussed in this thesis 
give results, which while on a par with other models in this industry are not 
terrific.  
This is the first research to compare in-house and third party LGD results and 
recovery  processes.  This  research  could  be  expanded  over  a  longer  time 
period and if possible it would be very interesting to observe the complete 
history of some debtors after default. This would allow models to be created to 
calculate the LGD for the lender and the third party. Also assessing how the 
price at which the debt is sold is reflected in the LGD over time and when the 
third party begins to break even.  
The third party models in this thesis are based on a snapshot of the debt. 
Further research could improve on these models by observing the debtors   154 
over a longer time period and at regular intervals to see how time affects the 
LGD. 
The in-house models are more detailed, mainly because the data held by in-
house collectors is far greater and the particular lender who donated the data 
set kept detailed records. The payment patterns model can be improved by 
more detailed research into the number of payment patterns, the length of the 
patterns  and  the  length  of  the  non-payment  patterns.  The  probabilities  for 
starting each of the sequences had no economic or individual characteristics. 
Neither  did  the  length  of  the  payment  sequences.  These  could  both  be 
improved  upon.  The  length  of  the  non-payment  sequences  were  not  even 
included in the final model but only analysed in general. Creating a detailed 
model that includes the length of the non-payments as well as the payments 
means that the LGD at any time can be estimated. This would be very useful 
for  collectors  because  they  could  estimate  their  potential  income  from 
defaulted loans of any given length; also all of the economic variables are 
from the default date. As the lifetime of some of these loans can be decades 
the economic situation can change radically. Knowing when the debtor will 
pay  back  means  that  the  economic  variables  at  these  times  could  be 
predicted which may improve the models.   155 
Appendix 
Table A1, Logistic Regression Results (1
st stage) for Third Party 
 
Parameter     DF  Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-
Square  Pr>ChiSq 
Standardised 
Estimate  Exp(Est) 
                          
Intercept     1  -1.8929  0.0932  412.34  <.0001     0.151 
No Work Telephone  1  -0.1959  0.031  39.99  <.0001     0.822 
No Mobile Telephone  1  -0.1582  0.0247  41  <.0001     0.854 
Amount  100  1  0.6695  0.4723  2.01  0.1564     1.953 
Amount  500  1 
-
0.00061  0.0951  0  0.9949     0.999 
Amount  1000  1  -0.2258  0.0848  7.09  0.0077     0.798 
Amount  1500  1  -0.0368  0.0886  0.17  0.678     0.964 
Amount  2000  1  -0.0886  0.0959  0.85  0.3556     0.915 
Amount  5000  1  -0.1469  0.0879  2.8  0.0945     0.863 
Number of 
Telephones  1  0.6115  0.0247  615.19  <.0001  0.3196  1.843 
 
Table A2, Logistic Regression Results (2
nd stage) for Third Party 
 
Label  Coefficients  Standard Error  t Stat  P-value 
Intercept  0.23782  0.01928  12.33733  <.0001 
Age 18-25  0.10969  0.01524  7.19650  <.0001 
Age 25-35  0.06030  0.01324  4.55511  <.0001 
Age 35-45  0.02765  0.01303  2.12251  0.0338 
Age 45-55  0.00302  0.01376  0.21962  <.0001 
Phone  0.13453  0.01826  7.36558  <.0001 
Mobile  -0.05200  0.01037  -5.01253  <.0001 
Default Amount  -0.00004  0.00000 -21.89901  <.0001 
Owner  0.05380  0.01088  4.94404  <.0001 
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